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Aims of the Study 
The aims of the study were 
(i) to provide a comparative review of the experience of Worker 
Take-Overs (WTOs) and attempted WTOs, in 6 member states, 
(ii) to identify the factors that facilitate or restrict attempts to form rescue 
enterprises, with particular attention to 
- roles and attitude of Trade Union organisations 
- roles and attitude of employers' organisations 
- access to capital 
- national and local Government attitudes 
- legal frameworks 
- role and experience of support agencies (and their scale and 
distribution) 
(iii) to identify areas of agreement concerning common pitfalls, dilemmas 
and good practice in the support of WTOs as well as key policy issues 
concerning them. 
Six countries were selected for the study. 
Italy has had the most extensive, and the most successful, experience of 
WTOs, with perhaps 1000 cases over the last decade. These generally 
involve small or medium size enterprises, and usually employ, between 
say, 30 and 200 people in the re-established enterprises. This experience has 
been concentrated in particular areas of Northern Italy, creating a context in 
which WTOs have become a normal feature of economic life. 
The industrialised regions of Spain have also seen very large numbers of 
WTOs, reflecting both the severity of the economic restructuring it has 
undergone and the extent of public support for WTOs over the last 10 years. 
In France the incidence and reputation of WTOs have both fluctuated 
sharply over the last decade. More recently, between 50 and 100 WTOs per 
year have continued to occur, with the most promising results being 
achieved in sectors where co-operatives have traditionally had a presence. 
British experience has been far more limited, with only about 80 cases in 
total. However, the number of WTOs has tended to increase in recent years, 
particularly through the efforts of local authorities in relation to local 
economic initiatives. More WTOs are beginning to emerge in certain areas; 
and Trade Union attitudes are being reconsidered. 
In Denmark only 14 WTOs have occurred. The great majority of these 
have been commercially successful so the interesting question is why there 
have not been more. This highlights the importance of economic and 
cultural factors and the traditions of the labour movement in 
understanding the conditions which give rise to WTO and make it a 
realistic strategy. 
In West Germany, there have been 13 WTOs in the last two decades, but 
well over 30 attempts, most occurring in the last few years. In general, the 
experience of and capacity to support WTOs has increased quite rapidly in 
the last few years - particularly around Bremen - but starting from a very 
limited base, so that the institutional obstacles remain considerable. 
Attempts at WTO: Why, When and Where 
The great majority of attempts at a WTO are a response to the threat of 
unemployment. As such, they tend to occur: 
0 in industries undergoing re-structuring 
° where the workforce possesses industry-specific skills for which 
demand is limited 
° where the threatened plant or enterprise is a major employer on 
which the locality is economically dependent. 
Such enterprises may be badly run down with little, if any, prospect of 
commercial viability. However attempts at WTO do not only occur in such 
circumstances. The owners of a viable, or potentially viable, enterprise or 
plant may wish to dispose of it for a wide variety of reasons and yet they 
may fail to attract a purchaser. Such failures in the market for enterprises 
arise, essentially, because of the high transaction costs associated with the 
decision to purchase an economic unit, and the likely difficulties of 
managing the acquisition effectively. Hence the prospect of a high return 
will be necessary in order to justify the risks involved. In short, an 
enterprise or plant may be threatened with closure not because it is 
unprofitable but becuase it is not considered to be profitable enough. 
Whether or not the threat of closure and unemployment stimulates an 
attempt at a WTO depends on the confidence of the workforce and the 
credibility of the WTO idea. In this respect the attitude of various external 
parties is crucial. 
In general, mainstream Trade Union movements have been doubtful or 
hostile towards WTO. More recently, rising unemployment and the failure 
of traditional strategies for saving jobs have prompted a reconsideration of 
the WTO option and the position is now more complex and fluid with, for 
example, differences between unions, and between national and local 
levels, in several countries. 
In countries with worker co-operative sectors, the extent of support offered 
by movement bodies for WTOs has, on occasions, been a controversial 
issue. WTOs have been seen as offering great opportunities and also great 
dangers. But in general the stronger the worker co-operative sector in a 
country, the more credible is the WTO idea, and the more support for WTO 
attempts there is available. 
The actions of governments - whether at national, regional or local level -
have also influenced the number of WTO attempts occurring in different 
countries and areas. Though their reasons have differed somewhat, 
governments of both the right and left have on occasions provided support 
for WTO, and in other contexts, both have opposed WTOs. In general, 
government actions towards WTO are best understood in relation to 
political pressures for job preservation and to the prevailing reputation of 
WTO for that purpose. 
Overall, it is clear that attempts at a WTO are no longer an entirely 
spontaneous initiative by the workforce. It is a response to the threat of 
closure which has variously been promoted or discouraged, - either 
explicity or tacitly. 
Success tends to breed success. The credibility of the WTO idea and the 
availability of support for WTO attempts is affected by the success or failure 
of previous attempts. Over the last ten years, this had lead to 
concentrations of WTO activity in particular localities. In a historical 
perspective such self-sustaining tendenceis may explain the very different 
institutional and cultural pat terns of the labour and co-operative 
movements that have developed in, for example, Denmark and Northern 
Italy. In any event, it seems that the WTO response is more readily 
under taken and accepted where collective en t repreneursh ip and 
decentralised self-help are established within the labour movement and the 
wider society. Such cultural considerations provide a caution against 
assuming that the experience of one country or region can be easily 
reproduced elsewhere. 
Achieving a WTO 
When a workforce attempts to take over a business this involves the 
preparation of a business plan, the creation of a new organization, and the 
mobilization of external support. These three areas of activity are closely 
inter-related. 
Planning the business 
The willingness of the workforce to accept responsibility for ensuring 
viability is critical for the formulation of a realistic business plan - and the 
discussion and preparation of the plan by the workforce is the vehicle by 
which it starts to discover and come to terms with the implications of a 
WTO. Decisions over job losses present these implications most starkly. 
While a substantial reduction in employment is commonly required there 
are a number of ways in which the difficulties this poses can be handled 
without jeopardising the WTO - particularly where there is external 
support from public agencies and other worker co-operatives. 
The preparation of a credible business plan also depends on whether the 
workforce can obtain the necessary information and advice. In this respect, 
the attitude of the existing owners or managers, the extent to which the 
new venture can adopt the products, markets etc of the old, and the 
availability of appropriate support agencies or networks, are particularly 
important. 
The business plans for most WTOs can be understood as variants of two 
basic strategies. The 'rescue' strategy is more like a conventional recovery 
plan intended to cut costs and abandon unprofitable lines. It tries to avoid 
any break in production and hence has the advantages of preserving the 
customer base and maintaining continuity of employment. On the other 
hand, the time available may not be sufficient to assess business prospects 
in detail, or for the workforce to come to terms with commercial 
self-reliance. 
A 'phoenix' strategy is more like starting up a new enterprise - except that it 
is based on some of the employees, assets and perhaps customers of the old 
business. Characteristically there is a break of several months before 
production re-starts. This can lead to problems if key workers seek 
employment elsewhere. On the other hand, the additional time often 
makes it easier to plan the business realistically, and allows for attitudes to 
change, training to be undertaken, and the self-selection of a committed 
and cohesive group of workers. In addition a selection of the assets can 
often be purchased comparatively cheaply from the liquidator, thus 
avoiding taking over the entire plant (which may be valued as a 'going 
concern', and carry with it some liabilitites, in the case of a 'rescue'). 
In practice these two strategies are more or less appropriate in different 
circumstances and many WTOs develop schemes that fall somewhere 
between them. However the distinction does highlight the particular 
difficulties of achieving a viable WTO in the case of the 'large plant' 
closures that have often attracted considerable publicity and political 
controversy. For a variety of reasons (e.g. parent company control of 
markets, obsolete but capital intensive production facilities, etc) a rescue 
strategy is unlikely to be viable; a phoenix strategy will only support a 
small fraction of those previously employed; and neither approach is likely 
to sustain the high cost of the new product development often required. 
Organising a WTO 
The organization of a WTO is a formative experience for the enterprise 
created. Although some WTOs are promoted by external parties and the 
leadership, with the workers themselves in a passive role, it is more 
common for many of the workers to be actively involved. Ensuring the 
effective involvement of the workforce in the direction of the project poses 
severe problems - for structural, cultural and contextual reasons. Hence the 
process may at times appear passionate, disorderly, and 'unprofessional'. 
Nevertheless this involvement is often essential for a number of very 
practical reasons - it generates the shared unders tanding and the 
commitment necessary for new patterns of work and organization to 
develop. Hence, too, the ideals of self-management often (but not always) 
associated with WTOs cannot be dismissed as being irrelevant in principle 
and damaging in practice, in relation to the primary objective of job 
preservation. These populist and radical ideologies of worker autonomy 
appear often to be highly functional - for example, in facilitating a change of 
attitudes (e.g. from opposition to management to the acceptance of 
(self-)management responsibilities); in encouraging individuals to come 
forward to fill the managerial vacuum that commonly exists. 
These and other organizational issues are often highlighted by difficult 
choices over the legal constitution of the enterprise - choices which will 
express the individualism or collectivism of the enterprise's philosophy, 
affect its financial structure, and determine how it is to be controlled. The 
absence of appropriate legal frameworks has been a serious problem in 
several countries and contrasts with the situation in Italy where the legal 
status of a co-operative provides clear advantages over other forms. 
Mobilising external support 
Although attempts at a WTO must gain the support of a range of external 
parties - suppliers, customers, the receiver, etc - the financial support of a 
bank is generally most critical. To gain this means overcoming three 
problems that are quite independent of the actual commercial prospects. 
o the problem of capital structure (the workforce's resources provide 
insufficient security for loans - and if loans' are obtainedthe financial 
gearing may be excessive). 
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o the crucial question of the management capacity of the enterprise is 
more difficult to assess (and this cannot sensibly be done on a 
conventional basis) 
o in most countries the banks are unfamiliar with WTOs; this, quite 
apart from an ideological antipathy, often involves misconceptions 
and evokes excessive caution. 
In practice these closely interrelated problems mean that WTOs must 
obtain a measure of public funding - e.g as loans or guarantees - to reduce 
their commercial borrowing requirement, or the risk associated with it. 
Hence WTO commonly seek political support as well. 
The somewhat uneasy combination of political and commercial logics 
poses problems for the workforce and usually follows one of two courses. 
In the 'loosely-coupled' model, a political commitment to the WTO 
precedes the detailed planning of the WTO and its financial requirements. 
In the ' t ightly-coupled' model , political suppor t depends on the 
commercial appraisal, and vice versa, so the process is iterative rather than 
sequential. Each of these patterns can generate sound business plans, a 
committed workforce and adequate financial support - and each, too, has its 
own way of failing. 
After the take-over: varieties of success and failure 
Although the proportions seem to vary somewhat between countries, a 
rough estimate is that, overall, up to 25% of WTOs fail without ever 
achieving viability; up to 25% are able to consolidate as secure and 
competitive enterprises; the remainder become marginal enterprises with 
fluctuating profitability. In any year a number of these marginal ones will 
fail - but some will continue for many years. 
Cost reductions are the principal source of improved performance 
following a WTO. These commonly arise from reductions in management 
overheads, reduced labour costs, and improved production methods. The 
productivity improvements associated with WTOs have regularly been 
very substantial. On the other hand, shortages of capital, obsolete 
equipment, a lack of financial and marketing expertise, and a neglect of 
strategic management, have meant that the underlying competitive 
position of many enterprises remains weak (marginality). 
Where consolidation is achieved the infrastructure of the co-operative or 
worker-owned sector (support agencies, consortia, financial institutions) 
has usually played a vital role. The importance of a worker co-operative or 
worker-owned sector is also apparent in providing cultural and 
organizational support for WTO enterprises as they progress from the 
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intense commitment, solidarity and egalitarianism of the early days to 
more sustainable forms of collaborative management or self-management. 
Policy issues 
Rationales for the Support of WTO 
Support for WTO may be intended to serve a number of rather different, if 
related, objectives. 
Job saving. In the context of Local Employment Initiatives support for this 
purpose is likely to be realistic and well-justified. The number of WTOs in 
an area does respond to policy initiatives. Comparatively modest amounts 
of public funding is often able to facilitate substantial investment by the 
workforce, the banks and other parties. Compared to the jobs created in 
many other LEI projects, the number of jobs saved in WTOs is often high, 
and the time and resources committed to WTO support appear to generate 
more jobs than an equivalent effort spent on 'new starts'. The survival 
rates of WTO enterprises do not at all support the popular view that these 
enterprises soon fail. Finally, in terms of labour market management, it is 
clear that support for WTOs is entirely consonant with the trend towards 
supporting enterprise creation efforts by the unemployed that is apparent 
through the European Communities. 
Managing Decline. It has been argued that in the case of 'large 
plant'closures support for a WTO will often be justified even if the 
prospects for viability are poor. In such cases an important objective for 
governments is simply to manage the decline of the large plant so as to 
minimise the adverse effects on the local economy and labour market. 
Where some intervention is inevitable for social or political reasons, then 
support for a WTO in the form of a co-operative or other worker owned 
enterprise would be the preferred instrument on strictly economic grounds. 
This rationale is economically sound but politically unrealistic. A policy 
whose declared intention is to create viable workers enterprises cannot 
result in a significant proportion of 'failures' without being seen as a waste 
of public funds - even if, in fact, such 'failures' fall within the range of 
acceptable outcomes. 
Nevertheless these economic arguments may still justify a measure of 
public funding for workforce-based re-employment initiatives that combine 
a gradual run-down of the former activities, with the exploration and 
preparation of potential 'phoenix' enterprises based on different products. 
Economic restructuring The rationale for this objective is based on two 
propositions: 
(i) Re-structuring that arises within a declining enterprise is very much 
preferable, both socially and fiscally, to restructuring that results 
from the closure of one enterprise and the opening of another, often 
in a different region. 
(ii) WTOs can succeed where others have failed or are unwilling to try. 
Even if (inevitably) WTO enterprises are marginal to begin with, they 
can consolidate and develop. 
These two propositions are basically sound but this objective is more 
ambitious than simple job-saving. The financial resources, the expertise 
and the time required to achieve this are much greater. Hence this 
objective will not be achieved if it is not adequately resourced, and pilot 
projects will be the appropriate first step in countries and regions with 
limited WTO experience. 
Promoting a worker co-operative sector and/or employee ownership. The 
very substantial contribution that WTO enterprises have made to the 
growth of the worker co-operative sector in Italy, and the emergence of the 
SAL phenomenon in Spain, demonstrate that support for WTO can be an 
effective means of promoting 'economic pluralism'. This objective is 
closely associated with that of promoting economic restructuring - a 
dynamic sector can hardly be based entirely on marginal enterprises. In 
addition, the development of a worker co-operative sector with its own 
infrastructure (or equivalent secondary organizations for employee-owned 
firms) increases the prospects for economic restructuring through the 
support of WTOs. Hence, like the objective of promoting economic 
restructuring through WTO, the pursuit of 'economic pluralism' is a 
longer-term objective that would have to be resourced accordingly. 
Instruments, pitfalls and dilemmas 
WTOs have been supported in a wide variety of different ways. Many of 
these initiatives have occurred as part of more general efforts to develop 
local economic strategies, to support the cooperative sector or to create 
employment. At least initially, however, support for WTOs has always 
been ad-hoc and as such it has been characterised by a number of common 
weaknesses: 
(i) Expecting too much, too soon. 
Hastily prepared measures, limited time horizons, and over-ambitious 
policies have often resulted in an unacceptably and unnecessarily high 
proportion of failures. 
(ii) Inadequate support measures. 
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Common weaknesses in the form and extent of support provided for WTO 
include: 
o providing insufficient funds 
o providing funds on an inappropriate basis 
o providing funds, but no other support 
(iii) Insufficient attention to smaller WTOs 
Because of the greater political pressure cretated by the threat of large plant 
closures the greatest effort (and the largest financial and political 
investment) has been made in the most difficult cases. Much more 
straightforward opportunities have been neglected. 
(iv) No evaluation of support policies. 
The absence in any of the countries studied of any systematic efforts to 
assess policies of support for WTO is striking. 
Dilemmas 
The experience of WTOs also highlights a number of dilemmas that are 
inherent in any attempt to provide support: 
o Realism versus encouragement. Any policy to support WTO must 
avoid encouraging attempts on an inappropriate basis, or raising false 
hopes. 
o Financial assistance versus financial dependence . Where public 
funds (or guarantees) are provided for a WTO, the danger arises that 
the workforce may see itself as being rescued, rather than being the 
rescuers. 
o The short-term versus the long-term. Policy makers and agencies 
will be under strong pressure to achieve results. But where existing 
experience is limited, the cost of failure will be high and the 
infrastructure to support WTOs effectively cannot be created over 
night. 
o Support versus direction. The nature of the, support relationship is 
problematic. A reluctance to insist that particular problems are faced 
may lead to costly mistakes jeopardising the enterprise. But efforts to 
prevent failure may easily be counter-productive: insisting that 
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particular issues are tackled may undermine the relationship, leading 
to a rejection of the advisor; or it may lead to dependence, and an 
erosion of the psychological ownership of the project and the 
self-reliance that are so important for its success. 
Some General Principles 
o Any support for WTO must recognise that the workforce are the 
central figures in the project. If the workforce is not interested in a 
WTO - and they may have good reasons for rejecting the option - then 
the idea cannot sensibly be pursued. 
o Financial support for a WTO should not be an entitlement. It must 
always be justified in relation to the prospects for developing a viable 
enterprise. 
o Advisory support for a WTO is not the same as normal business 
advice, nor is it effectively provided by conventional business advice 
agencies. 
o The financial support provided for WTOs should be commensurate 
with the other support services available, and vice versa. 
o Prolonged, close involvement by the Public Authorities and the Trade 
Unions in the support of WTO is undesirable and ineffective. Their 
general support, and occasional specific assistance, remain invaluable. 
o The secondary organizat ions represent ing WTO enterprises 
(Co-operative Associations, SAL federations etc) and agencies 
associated with them, should be the principal locus of support for 
WTO. Where such organizations do not yet exist, LEI and new social 
movement networks should be recognised as the primary source of 
support. 
o The state has three roles in relation to the support of WTO:-
(i) Guaranteeing equal access 
(ii) Enabling not directing 
(iii) Co-ordinating and reviewing support for WTO 
o Given the extreme urgency affecting most WTO, it is essential that the 
provisions of any government measures are clear, and that they can 
be effected quickly. 
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o Rescues of larger (above say, 300-400 employees) and more 
capital-intensive plants and enterprises should be undertaken only 
under very favourable circumstances. 
o Some sectoral and geographic concentration of support for WTO is 
likely to be more cost-effective in the long run. 
Priorities for enhancing the support of WTOs 
The following issues deserve particular attention in any efforts to develop 
public policy in relation to WTO: 
Removing obstacles to WTO 
A range of administrative, legal and fiscal obstacles hinder attempts at 
WTOs. Some of these obstacles are specific to WTOs; others affect 
co-operatives more generally. Some are minor irritants; others are of 
major significance. A few might require significant legislative time because 
they involve fairly complex legal and other issues; many could be resolved 
by minor additions or amendments to existing provisions or even on a 
purely administrative basis. In no cases would removing such obstacles 
require additional financial commitments by governments, beyond those 
already committed to existing programmes. 
The principle of equal access that justifies the removal of administrative 
legal and fiscal anomalies that obstruct WTOs may also justify measures of 
positive discrimination in favour of WTO. The workforce of a closing 
plant or enterprise is often so disadvantaged in its attempts to mount a 
WTO in relation to other interests (creditors, asset-strippers, mother 
company etc), and so obstructed by a general lack of understanding of WTO 
(among banks, suppliers, customers, Trade Unions, receivers etc) that only 
government measures to legitimise and facilitate WTO will prevent 
failures in the market for enterprises and allow the full benefits of this 
option to be realised. Such measures might include: 
o extensions to employee rights to information in the context of plant 
and company closures 
o modifications to receivership laws which are currently framed 
entirely in terms of creditors and shareholders rights 
o under specific conditions the introduction of a 'right to buy' for the 
workforce. 
The Marginality Problem 
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A long-standing criticism of the WTO option is that it produces marginal 
enterprises with poor long-term prospects and unsatisfactory terms and 
conditions of employment. Since most WTO are undertaken and 
resourced with a limited, job-saving objective, criticism on the grounds that 
they have not also achieved restructuring and consolidation is rather 
severe. At any point, a substantial proportion of small and medium sized 
enterprises can be considered 'marginal ' and they still contribute 
substantially to employment. Hence the problem is not one of 
'marginality' as such. It is, firstly, that the worker co-operative and 
worker-owned sectors have a disproportionate number of marginal 
enterprises placing an undue burden on their resources and secondly, that 
those enterprises with the potential to escape their marginal status 
frequently lack access to appropriate finance and real services to allow this 
to happen. 
Ensuring the capacity to provide selective support for this purpose will 
mean developing the infrastructure of the worker co-operative (or 
worker-owned) sectors, especially in such areas as: 
o Sectoral collaboration and joint ventures 
o Consulting and advisory services 
o Training and 'cultural' support for both workers and management 
o The development of institutions for co-operative financing 
Public support for measures to address the marginality problem (through 
the development of the infrastructure of the worker co-operative and 
worker-owned sectors) would obviously have to be commensurate with the 
social benefits anticipated, but it appears well justified on employment 
grounds (both directly as regards the enterprises themselves, and indirectly, 
in maintaining the credibility of the WTO option with employees, Trade 
Unions, Co-operative Associations and other such bodies); as a socially and 
fiscally efficient contribution to restructuring; and as a 
longer term investment in 'economic pluralism'. 
The 'Large Plant' Problem 
New approaches to the 'large plant' problem are required. 
It is important to explore the possibility of other frameworks within which 
workforce-based employment initiatives could be supported in such cases. 
The aim would be to gain the advantages of a WTO - in enlisting the skills 
and intelligence of the workforce, in cultivating an ethic of self help and 
self-reliance, in providing a resource and organizational base for product 
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and business development, in protecting lhe locality from complete and 
sudden closure - without the project becoming demoralized, or appearing 
as a failure because it was unable to achieve commercial viability, and 
unable to provide continuity of employment for all those involved in it. 
Despite its many difficulties, the experience of the Bitteswell Employment 
Alliance (see UK country study) is suggestive of the scope for workforce 
based initiatives of this sort which, by being less individualistic and 
paternalistic, would seem to have considerable advantages over the usual 
employment advice services introduced in the context of large plant 
closures. 
The Evaluation and Exchange of Experience 
The following issues are seen as deserving particular attention in future 
studies and conferences, both nationally and internationally: 
(i) Management training and development. 
The role of management in WTOs and other LEIs is both crucial and 
problematic. A shortage of appropriate and competent managers is widely 
believed to be a major constraint on future development. Little is known 
about the profiles and career paths of those who do undertake managerial 
roles in such projects. Currently there are reports of a number of 
exper imenta l management training and deve lopment init iatives 
underway, or being prepared, in several European countries. A 
comparative review of these initiatives would be timely. 
(ii) Support methodologies. 
WTOs and other enterprise creation projects require advice and support 
over a range of issues. Such support can only be provided by people with 
the requisite business know-how and with the appropriate counselling 
skills and approach. In practice, the latter skills are less well recognised and 
are more difficult to find and develop. A study of the different models and 
methodologies for providing such support in LEI contexts would raise 
awareness of this issue and help to disseminate good practice. 
(iii) Cost-benefit studies. 
Although many case studies exist, very few provide information helpful to 
policy-makers. The general case for supporting WTOs set out in this report 
needs to be tested against a few more rigorous· studies of selected WTOs. 
The aim would be to enable comparisons with alternative measures for 
both job-saving and re-structuring. 
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(iv) Trade Union - co-operative relations. 
A comparative study of recent developments in trade union - co-operative 
relations is needed to review and disseminate experience of the agreements 
that have been reached, the new initiatives that have been promoted (such 
as co-operative sector branches, courses for Trade Unionists in respect of 
WTOs, collaboration with the new social movements) and the extent to 
which the legitimate anxieties of both sides are actually borne out in 
practice. 
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PROGRAMME FOR RESEARCH AND ACTIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE LABOUR MARKET 
ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIENCES OF AND PROBLEMS 
ENCOUNTERED BY WORKER TAKE-OVERS OF 
COMPANIES IN DIFFICULTY OR BANKRUPT 
I. - Main Report 

SUMMARY 
This study examines the experiences of and problems encountered by 
worker take-overs of companies in difficulty or bankrupt, in the 
following member states: the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, 
Denmark, Italy and Spain. These countries provide a range of experience 
- from those where worker take-overs are rare, to those where they 
are an accepted feature of economic life. 
The study reviews the similarities and differences among the experience 
of worker take-overs both within and between the member states in 
order to identify the factors affecting success and failure, the 
common pitfalls and dilemmas, and good practice concerninq the support 
for such rescue enterprises. It considers the roles and attitudes of 
Trade Union organizations, national and local government policies, 
the availability of capital, legal frameworks, and the requirements 
of support agencies. 
The study aims to identify the key policy issues concerning whether, 
in what circumstances, in what ways, and to what specific ends, it may 
be appropriate for the principal parties likely to be concerned, to 
support attempts at worker take-overs. 
This study was financed by the Commission of the European Communities 
as part of its Programme of Research and Actions on the Development 
of the Labour Market. The analyses and the results presented do not 
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The report has been made available for information only. It should not 
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1 Introduction 
This report considers a phenomenon which, according to many conven-
tional views of business, should scarcely exist. To the extent that 
Worker Take-Overs (WTOs) do occur, such views would expect a report on 
their experience to be "nasty, brutish and short". In fact, WTOs are 
no longer particularly rare events and their experience, though mixed, 
is certainly not a simple tale of failure - for example, in those 
regions where WTOs have become an accepted part of economic life, 
their numbers run in hundreds and the jobs saved in thousands. 
Indeed, the contrast between the quite definite achievements of WTOs 
and (in many countries) their publicly perceived failure, is striking. 
Although WTOs raise a number of other important questions, it is in 
relation to public support for job-preservation and creation that they 
have attracted most controversy. Since attempts at WTO tend to occur 
in the areas of greatest need - where unemployment levels are par-
ticularly high - the pressure for public support is understandable. 
But whether policies of support for WTOs would tend to facilitate or 
to obstruct the processes of economic adjustment, and what costs and 
benefits they might contribute to other policy objectives, remain 
uncertain. Similarly, in countries where measures of support for WTOs 
have been explored, as additional instruments of labour market manage-
ment and local economic strategy for example, it often remains unclear 
what the priorities should be and how such support may be most effec-
tively implemented. Hence in terms both of general desirability and 
of appropriate measures, the issues surrounding support for WTOs are 
controversial. However, in the absence of any systematic, comparative 
review of what is a complex and varied phenomenon, the conflicting 
arguments are hard to evaluate. 
1.1 Aims 
The aims of the study were 
(i) to provide a review of the experience of WTOs, and attempted 
WTOs, in 6 member states, that would incorporate 
- simple descriptive statistics on the scale of the phenomenon, 
- appropriate illustrative material 
- an analysis of the main similarities and differences both between 
and within the designated member states; 
(ii) to identify the factors that facilitate or restrict attempts to 
form enterprises, with particular attention to 
- roles and attitude of Trade Union organisations 
- roles and attitude of employers' organisations 
- access to capital 
- national and local Government attitudes 
- legal frameworks 
- role and experience of support agencies (and their scale and 
distribution). 
(iii) to identify areas of agreement concerning common pitfalls dilem-
mas and good practice in the support of WTOs as well as key policy 
issues concerning them. 
1.2 The Scope of the Study 
The following member states were selected: 
Denmark 




The United Kingdom 
These countries range from those with very considerable experience of 
WTOs (Italy and Spain), to those with fairly limited experience 
(Denmark and West Germany). 
Attempts at WTOs, and support for them, are one of a number of respon-
ses - including 'management buy-outs', 'community businesses' and 
other local economic initiatives - to company and plant closures under 
conditions of rising unemployment and economic restructuring. There 
is no clear demarcation between some of these developments and some 
WTOs. For example, some management buy-outs (that is, the purchase of 
an economic unit from its owners by a group of its managers) involve 
substantial and widespread employee shareholdings; and some community 
businesses utilise the premises, and some of the equipment and 
employees, of failed enterprises. For the purpose of this study a WTO 
is defined as a case in which a business is continued, or created,on 
the basis of the assets of a failing or bankrupt enterprise, by the 
workforce, or a part of it, within either a cooperative framework, or 
one satisfying the following conditions: 
(i) A substantial proportion of the voting shares are held by members 
of the workforce; 
(ii) A substantial proportion of the members of the workforce own 
voting shares (or are members of a corporate body owning the shares); 
(iii)The voting shares are fairly evenly distributed among those who 
own them, or in some other way it is ensured that ultimate control 
resides with the workforce. 
Although many WTOs utilise co-operative legal frameworks to form 
workers' co-operatives, these conditions can be, and often are, 
satisfied by a wide range of structures using conventional company 
law. However, this definition does not include cases where an 
enterprise is purchased by a national Trade Union body and controlled 
by that body (as in Denmark). 
While the better known cases of WTO have occurred where a company or 
plant was being closed down as uneconomic or, indeed, bankrupt, an 
increasing number of cases occur where a company, or part of it, is 
still profitable, if marginally so, but where its underlying competitive 
position is weak. Such cases have been included in the scope of the 
study. 
Using these definitions, WTOs may occur at any of three points in the 
decline of an enterprise or plant: 
(i) 'conversions' refer to WTO that are arranged before the unit ceases 
trading or goes into receivership. 
(ii) 'rescues' refer to WTOs that are arranged generally with little 
or no loss of trading continuity, when the enterprise is under the 
control of the receiver. 
(iii) 'phoenixes' refer to WTOs based on some of the residual assets 
of a liquidated enterprise after trading has ceased, sometimes many 
months later. 
1.3 Approach. 
The study did not undertake more than a very limited amount of origi-
nal investigation or research. In general, very little systematic 
data has been gathered or is available on the numbers of WTOs, their 
characteristics and outcomes. The 'hard facts' simply do not exist 
and in the time available there was no question of being able to 
remedy such an extensive deficiency. For example, even the most rudi-
mentary questions about the numbers of worker take-overs, the numbers 
of jobs involved or the proportions of WTO enterprises that collapse, 
survive or expand, are generally impossible to answer except with 
crude estimates based on the opinions of those in support organisa-
tions . 
nevertheless, although the amount of published material on WTOs is 
limited, and tends to be case-specific, work in this area is now 
increasing and unpublished documents, conference reports etc. were 
obtained. Given that the existing learning regarding WTOs is often 
poorly articulated and disseminated within member states - let alone 
between them - the study concentrated on drawing together and 
integrating the available information. 
The study also refers to the views of various bodies, such as Trade 
Unions, and of leading practitioners, either as a result of 
discussions with them or their staff, or on the basis of documents or 
reports. It was not always realistic or possible to check these sum-
mary accounts of the perspectives of such bodies with them. Obviously 
the risk remains that they may be uneasy about particular emphases, or 
points omitted. Such procedures and risks are virtually inevitable 
in policy studies but it is most unlikely that any deficiencies, while 
regretted, would be such as to materially affect the main thrust of 
this report. It should also be noted that the views of many of the 
parties referred to are currently changing in the light of experience 
and debate. 
1.4 Introduction to the countries studied 
Italy has had the most extensive, and the most successful, experience 
of WTOs, with perhaps 1000 cases over the last decade. These 
generally involve small or medium size enterprises, and usually 
employ, between say, 30 to 200 people in the re-established enterpri-
ses. This experience has been concentrated in particular areas of 
Northern Italy, creating a context in which WTOs have become a normal 
feature of economic life. 
These developments have occurred in the context of an established and 
growing cooperative movement, which, although institutionally divided 
according to political orientation, nevertheless commands broad all 
party support. The cooperative movement has evolved sophisticated 
networks both of commercial consortia and of regional and sectoral 
support organisations, that ensure close collaboration with political 
authorities and Trade Unions. Such networks have been able to provide 
the financial, marketing and managerial assistance to re-orient 
failing and failed enterprises in a range of sectors. However, these 
efforts have put a considerable strain on the resources of the 
cooperative movement which is increasingly reluctant to accept respon-
sibility for the failures of the private sector. While public funds 
have been provided to support the transformation of enterprises in 
crisis, this has sometimes been at the expense of efforts to promote 
longer-term developments of the cooperative movement in more dynamic 
sectors, and a range of legal institutional and policy issues remain 
to be resolved, particularly surrounding the long-delayed implemen-
tation of the potentially far-reaching measures provided in the 
'Marcora' law. 
Tlie industrialised regions of Spain have also seen very large numbers 
of WTOs, reflecting both the severity of the economic restructuring it 
has undergone and the extent of public support for WTOs over the last 
10 years. However, the particular instrument used to provide support 
initially took little account of commercial requirements and many of 
the WTO enterprises created by it fared badly. In the last few years 
new measures have been introduced to provide funds on a more realistic 
basis, as well as other support, and the situation has changed con-
siderably. One unique feature of the Spanish experience is the large 
number of WTOs - a majority in fact - that have used the framework of 
conventional company law, forming Sociedades Anónimas Laborales, 
rather than cooperatives. Such SALs are now developing their own sup-
port organisations, and in general the institutional environment for 
WTOs is evolving quite rapidly at the present time. 
In France the incidence and reputation of WTOs have both fluctuated 
sharply over the last decade. During the 1970s the number of WTO 
increased gradually, to between 25 and 50 per year in the closing 
years of the decade, augmenting other changes in what had been a 
modest and homogenous worker cooperative sector. Between 1981 and 
1983, following the election of a left government and a marked change 
in policy by major unions, the number of WTOs averaged about 100 per 
year, and included a greater number of larger enterprises. In 1984, 
however, these policies were abandoned at a national level, following 
the failure of a number of these WTO enterprises. Nevertheless bet-
ween 50 and 100 WTOs per year have continued to occur since then, with 
the most promising results being achieved in sectors where cooperati-
ves have traditionally had a presence. Throughout this period a 
number of changes in related national and local government policies, 
and the evolving expertise of CGSCOP (the representative body of the 
worker cooperative movement) have significantly increased the capacity 
for support for WTO, even if Trade Union support has been erratic. 
British experience has been far more limited, with only about 80 cases 
in total. The poor publicity associated with the three large 'Benn' 
cooperatives in the mid-seventies, the weakness of the existing worker 
cooperative sector, and the considerable popularity of management buy-
outs (both with finance houses and, it would seem, with Trade Unions) 
may have contributed to this, along with sceptical or negative attitu-
des among many trade union leaders. However, the number of WTOs has 
tended to increase in recent years, particularly through the efforts 
of local authorities in relation to local economic initiatives. More 
WTOs are beginning to emerge in certain areas; and Trade Union attitu-
des are being reconsidered. Hence the capacity to support WTOs is 
increasing and it is likely that their numbers will continue to 
increase. 
In Denmark only 14 WTOs have occurred (with a higher proportion of 
'conversions' and fewer 'rescues' and 'phoenixes'). The great 
majority of these have been commercially successful so the interesting 
questions are why there have not been more and why there is not an 
increasing trend. Answering these questions highlights the importance 
of economic and cultural factors, and the traditions of the labour 
movement in understanding the conditions which give rise to WTO and 
make it a realistic strategy. Nevertheless, the continuing recession, 
a strong alternative movement, and a renewed interest in worker 
ownership (in relation to debates about economic democracy) suggest 
that WTOs may not always be such a peripheral issue. 
In West Germany, there have been 13 WTOs in the last two decades, but 
well over 30 attempts, most occuring in the last few years. Many of 
these, and have occurred where large plants have closed. These 
efforts have had to overcome a number of obstacles related to the 
highly centralised and formalised traditions of industrial relations 
in Germany, including a hostile attitude from many Trade Union leaders 
(though the metal workers union is becoming more sympathetic). In 
addition the traditional cooperative movement has been politically and 
culturally remote from these efforts, with support being provided 
instead through informal networks that have drawn on assistance from 
the alternative and ecological movement. Perhaps partly as a result 
of this several German WTOs, and attempted WTOs, have explored the 
scope for converting to socially useful and ecologically sound pro-
ducts. In general, the experience of and capacity to support WTOs has 
increased quite rapidly in the last few years - particularly around 
Bremen - but starting from a very limited base, so that the institu-
tional obstacles remain considerable. 
1.5 Overview 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 summarise the main features of the experience of 
worker take-overs, from the conditions under which attempts are likely 
to be made, through the problems that have to be overcome if a WTO is 
to be achieved, to the eventual success or failure of those enterpri-
ses created. Considerable attention is paid to three aspects: the 
different types of WTO in terms of their size and economic 
circumstances; the social dynamics of the WTO in terms of the indivi-
dual and organizational learning that is essential; and the role of 
support agencies and networks. These aspects are essential in order 
to appreciate what can realistically be expected from a policy of sup-
port for WTOs and the dilemmas any such policies will have to face. 
The final chapter draws together the policy implications arising from 
this experience. It examines criticlly the different objectives that 
support for WTOs may be designed to achieve, it highlights some of the 
more common pitfalls and dilemmas in providing support, and it sets 
out a range of general principles concerning the nature and location 
of support services. Finally it identifies a number of issues that 
require particular attention if support for WTOs is to be enhanced. 
Throughout the report reference is made to specific aspects of the WTO 
experience in the six countries studied. These 'country studies' are 
also available, and provide an account of the relevant legal, politi-
cal and institutional context, recent trends and the extent of WTOs in 
each case. They also provide a range of illustrative material, 
exemplifying particular points made in this report in much more 
detail . 
2. Attempts at WTO: Why, When and Where 
Attempts by workers to take-over and revive companies in crisis have 
been a recurring response to the threat of closure, particularly in 
times of economic recession. In Italy, WTOs have occurred periodi-
cally throughout this century and a majority of the worker co-
operatives in Italy today originated in this way. Similarly, in the 
United Kingdom, there are substantial and successful co-operatives 
that were formed through WTOs over 100 years ago. during the recession 
of the 1870s. Thus the current wave, beginning in the 1970s and mani-
fest in varying degrees throughout the European Communities, conforms 
to a clear pattern. Nevertheless, while rising unemployment and eco-
nomic restructuring provide the general context, the incidence of WTO 
still varies enormously both within and between countries. So other 
factors must be considered in order to understand the phenomenon. The 
aims of this section are to indicate the variety of circumstances in 
which WTO have been attempted and to identify the underlying economic, 
institutional and cultural factors that seem to favour this response 
to the threat of enterprise closure rather than others. It offers a 
broad overview of the phenomenon as a context for later, more speci-
fic, discussions of WTO problems and policy options. 
2.1 Varieties of closure and workforce response 
Attempts at WTO are more common in industries - such as metal 
working, woodworking and textiles - that are currently in decline, or 
being restructured, whether as a result of cyclical down-turns, tech-
nological change, changes in tariff regulations (e.g. in Spain), or as 
part of wider changes in the international division of labour. In 
such cases, resisting closure of a plant or firm may be impossible 
because the owners see no scope for a return to profitable operations 
and no buyer is available. Hence unless the workers take it over, the 
plant will close and remain closed. If unemployment is already high 
or rising this may provide incentive enough to consider the WTO 
opt ion. 
Two factors accentuate this general tendency. First, where the failing 
business is a major employer in the locality, the consequences of clo-
sure are likely to be far more severe for the community. An extreme 
case of such circumstances is provided in areas of Spain where the 
threat of closure may effectively mean the de-industralization of the 
locality in which the plant in question had provided the first signi-
ficant step towards industrial development. In such cases Local 
authorities, suppliers and other business interests, and the regional 
trade union officials, are more likely to support (or even promote) a 
WTO - indeed the national government may come under strong political 
pressure. 
Secondly, where many of the skills in the threatened plant or firm are 
industry-specific, the effect of closure on the local labour market 
will be severe, even if unemployment in general is not particularly 
high. 
These two factors - local economic dependency and industry-specific 
skills - occur in many of the larger and better known cases of WTO, 
such as Manuest (France) Olympia (FRG) Clems (Italy) and the Scottish 
Daily News (UK). Such large scale attempts constitute a particular 
type of WTO and are discussed in some detail in due course. They are 
not, however, typical. Most attempts at WTO occur in enterprises of 
less than 200 employees, and often the number is between 10 and 50. 
But whether large or small, the WTO attempts arising in the cir-
cumstances outlined so far are usually characterised by three 
features : 
(i) they arise where the social need for job preservation is great, 
(ii) they arise in extremely adverse economic conditions. 
(iii) they are undertaken 'as a last resort', when other ways of 
resisting closure have had to be abandoned. 
Notwithstanding the prevalence of well-publicised WTO attempts in such 
circumstances, it is essential to realise that very many WTO do not 
conform to this pattern. In the first place, some WTOs occur where 
employment is not really a problem. For example, where a small or 
medium-sized enterprise with harmonious internal relationships becomes 
insolvent, a worker-takeover may be mounted in order to preserve and 
financially re-structure the business. This has occurred even in cases 
where the labour market for the skills concerned is comparatively 
buoyant and most employees are unlikely to face unemployment. The 
motivation in such cases is primarily firm-saving, rather than job-
saving - the case of IKP in the Danish study provides an example and 
there have been others in the Italian newspaper industry. Although a 
pure firm-saving motivation is much less common, such a concern has 
often provided an important supplementary motivation for a WTO (for 
example, the strong desire of the Meriden workforce to continue pro-
ducing the Triumph motorbike). Moreover, firm-saving WTO can and do 
occur in more dynamic sectors of the economy - a point of considerable 
significance for co-operative movements concerned to avoid marginali-
zation in declining sectors. 
Secondly, many attempts at WTOs although primarily aimed at job-
preservation, are directed towards viable or potentially viable 
enterprises and plants. It is simply not the case that WTO only occur 
in economic units with no prospect of viability. If the owners 
and/or managers of an economic unit are unable or unwilling to arrange 
its profitable operation this does not necessarily mean the unit can-
not be made viable; new owner/managers may succeed - as the con-
siderable literature on business 'turn-arounds' testifies (1). 
However, if other purchasers for the business are not forthcoming it 
is commonly assumed that therefore the business has little if any 
prospect of profitability. Such an assumption may or may not be 
just ified. 
The general reason for questioning this assumption is that the market 
in firms, like other markets, has its imperfections. The transac-
tions costs associated with the purchase of a plant or enterprise are 
very high. Considerable uncertainty usually exists regarding the sta-
tus of human and capital assets and market trends - an uncertainty 
likely to be accentuated by doubts about the competence and motiva-
tions of those selling the unit. Such uncertainties may be accen-
tuated by time pressures. In addition, the management of acquisitions 
is notoriously difficult, especially where the acquisition involves 
unfamiliar (if related) processes and is geographically distant. The 
difficulties, costs and uncertainties associated with reducing 
staffing levels (especially where the plant is strongly unionised or 
where employment protection legislation significantly reduces freedom 
of action) may be a particular disincentive, government industrial 
policy may make the alternative of opening a 'green field' site more 
attractive. Clearly, the greater the transaction costs and perceived 
risks, the higher the return prospective purchasers will require to 
justify the investment. Hence, a marginally or potentially profitable 
unit may not attract purchasers. 
Such circumstances can arise in a variety of ways. First, the number 
of possible purchasers may be very restricted for reasons that have 
nothing to do with the status of the threatened plant. For example, in 
regions where industrialization is just starting there may be very few 
entrepreneurs with anything approaching the necessary resources or 
experience. Or the location of the plant in region affected by poli-
tical instability may deter purchasers from outside the region. 
Second, there are cases where a group of companies has collapsed but 
contains profitable (or potentially profitable) units within it. 
Where the group's collapse is spectacular, possible purchasers may 
fail to appreciate the business opportunity available because they 
lack the inside information. Such circumstances have also provided 
the occasion for successful management-led buy-outs (2). 
Third, there are cases of corporate divestment (usually of smaller 
units) that fail to find buyers. Such divestments may arise because a 
unit is insufficiently profitable, or may follow from changes in busi-
ness strategy, or may be the result of conglomerate mismanagement and 
under-investment leading to poor results. A fairly typical example 
is provided by the supermarket chain in the UK that decided to con-
centrate on larger outlets in a more restricted geographical area. 
This meant closing a number of smaller outlets in North Wales, two of 
which were taken over as worker co-operatives and continue to trade 
successfully. Publications Elysee in Paris and the SWA case (see FRG 
study) are other examples. (Again, many management buy-outs have ari-
sen in similar circumstance.) Such divestments have also occurred as 
part of strategies of productive decentralization; that is, par-
ticular production activities are closed down and contracted out to a 
smaller firm. In Italy the workers concerned have sometimes taken 
over the necessary equipment and formed a co-operative based initially 
on sub-contracting to their former employer. This has also occurred 
in Denmark where employers in the newspaper industry have wished to 
avoid being directly involved in managing industrial relations in a 
period of technological restructuring. 
Fourth, there are the cases (again usually smaller units) where an 
older owner-manager dies or wishes to retire. If, despite being pro-
fitable, the competitive position of the firm is weak, it may be hard 
to interest prospective purchasers. Where management-worker relations 
have been harmonious, all concerned may consider a WTO the obvious 
solution, and it may be fairly straightforward to arrange. This has 
occurred in all the countries studied (with the possible exception of 
the UK). 
Fifth, where a company is in some difficulty (because of e.g. high 
labour costs, obsolescent plant or products, financial mismanagement 
etc) its efforts to resolve the problems may be resisted by the 
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Unions, which can lead in due course to threats of closure and esca-
lating conflict. As a result, possible purchasers of the enterprise, 
and private and public sources of finance, may be put off from 
investing by strikes, occupations and poor industrial relations - even 
though the underlying commercial problems are not particularly severe. 
Such situations have been quite common in Italy (the CLG case in the 
Italian study has many of these features). The usual pattern is for 
a prolonged period of uncertainty, and conflict during which produc-
tion is suspended and demonstrations, and negotiations with a range of 
interested parties, take place in pursuit of a solution that will pre-
serve the enterprise. In due course (perhaps after some of the work-
force have drifted away and thus solved the redundancy problem) a WTO 
with the support of a Co-operative Association may be arranged. That 
such an outcome should result from the original difficulties is cer-
tainly not planned or intended - and sections of the workforce may at 
first be strongly opposed to a WTO. 
Nevertheless, the underlying logic of such cases is clear: where 
industrial relations are a major factor in the enterprise's problems, 
then the strategy of a WTO and the formation of a co-operative is 
likely to have a competitive advantage, and to be viable where others 
would not be, - because it provides a different foundation to worker-
management relations. This seems particularly to be the case in 
labour-intensive industries where performance is strongly affected by 
the cost and quality of labour. (Of course, the suggestion that the 
co-operative option will often possess a competitive advantage in such 
circumstances does not mean that all industrial relations problems 
disappear in a co-operative.) 
Sixth, there are cases where the only prospective purchasers are unac-
ceptable to the parties involved. This occurs when the purchasing 
company has a reputation for 'asset-stripping', or is openly proposing 
to run down the plant for short-term financial gains. In such cases, 
local political interests may join with the workforce in pressing the 
existing owners to reject the offer, and in preparing a counter-offer 
based on the maintenance of productive activities in the locality. 
In all such cases, an offer by the workforce to purchase and run the 
unit prevents a failure in the market for enterprises and the closure 
of a profitable or potentially profitable unit. The fact that other 
purchasers are not available cannot therefore be taken as 
demonstrating that a WTO will not be viable. A worker's 'turn-around' 
may be perfectly possible. The impression generated by well-
publicised cases, that WTO only occur in the most adverse economic 
circumstances, does not fit the facts and is seriously misleading. 
Given that WTOs can be and are attempted in a variety of closure 
situations, it is, nevertheless, quite clear that the threat of clo-
sure and unemployment does not automatically lead to a WTO being con-
sidered. The WTO option is frequently ignored or overlooked. One 
explanation is that in countries that have a well-developed welfare 
state the 'costs' of unemployment for individuals are much less severe 
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than in countries where social security provisions are far more 
limited. It would be surprising if this fact did not contribute to 
the frequency and intensity of attempts at WTO. Thus Denmark, where 
generous earnings-related unemployment benefit is virtually guaranteed 
for many years, with normal social security thereafter, has had very 
few WTO. By contrast, Italy and Spain, where unemployment benefit is 
more limited, have seen many. 
More fundamentally, however, WTO attempts arise from the beliefs of 
the workforce - that it will not be possible to resist closure in 
other ways; that the plant is capable of profitable operation 
(management claims not withstanding); and that they will be capable 
of running it themselves. Above all, a WTO attempt is much more 
likely where the idea of WTO is available to the workforce and has 
credibility. 
2.2 The Credibility of the WTO Option 
Whether or not a WTO will be seriously considered by a particular 
workforce facing closure often depends on the credibility of the idea 
with a range external bodies, - such as local government departments, 
trade unions and co-operative movement organizations. Where the WTO 
option is generally considered by one or more of these bodies to be 
worth exploring, then they are likely to support, or even promote, a 
WTO attempt by the workforce. By contrast, where the WTO option is 
widely discredited or distrusted, fewer WTO attempts tend to occur. 
Hence the attitudes of these bodies are an essential factor in 
understanding the incidence of attempts at WTO. This section reviews 
the range of attitudes towards the WTO option that are held by these 
external parties and indicates some of the ways in which they can sti-
mulate or undermine WTO attempts in particular countries or regions. 
2.2.1 Trade Union Attitudes 
The WTO option is not easily reconciled with many established trade 
union strategies and it is often dismissed for this reason. In 
Denmark the labour movement has traditionally adopted a centralised 
approach which is reflected both in the preference for Trade Union 
(rather than worker) buy-outs of enterprises in crisis, and in the 
current proposals for economic democracy based on central funds. 
Similarly, the ideological and institutional attachment of the labour 
movement in the Federal Republic of Germany to co-determination in 
industrial relations has been incompatible with stratgies of self-
management and autonomy. Likewise, the fundamental commitment of 
trade unions in the United Kingdom to collective bargaining has meant 
that a management buy-out has commonly been seen as preferable to a 
WTO which would threaten conventional collective bargaining. More 
specifically, common Trade Union arguments against WTOs are that: 
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o Supporting attempts at WTO can undermine the fight against closure 
(and privatization). 
o WTOs can lead to splits in the labour movement - as when workers 
elsewhere in the same industry feel their jobs are being threatened 
by support for workers in a WTO (e.g. the response of workers at 
Small Heath, Birmingham to the Meriden cooperative; similar 
situations have occurred in Spain). 
o Support for a WTO will involve collaboration in job losses, wage 
reductions and the violation of other Trade Union principles (e.g. 
concerning craft skills and job demarcations); in general, 
WTO are seen as producing marginal enterprises in which 
market pressures force 'self-exploitation'. 
o Support for WTOs diverts scarce skills and financial resources away 
from trade unions' primary responsibilities; and diverts atten-
tion from the responsibility of governments to maintain 
employment. 
o Enterprises arising from WTO do not usually survive for long. 
Traditional approaches to the regulation of enterprises and the 
labour market have proved more effective, historically. 
Such arguments have generally ensured that mainstream Trade Union 
movements are at best doubtful or indifferent, and at worst hostile, 
towards WTO. However rising levels of unemployment and the failure of 
traditional strategies for saving jobs have prompted a reconsideration 
of the WTO option within the labour movements of all the countries 
studies (except, so far, Denmark). The main arguments for Trade Union 
support for WTOs are: 
o Self-management and producer initiatives are closely related to 
traditional labour movement aspirations. 
o The enterprises created through a WTO can and do survive for many 
years. 
o The membership in threatened plants frequently calls for Trade 
Union support. 
o Unrealistic attempts to resist closure (and privatization) can 
seriously jeopardize the prospects for a WTO and continued 
employment by Trade Union members. 
o Trade Union involvement is essential to prevent declining standards 
of employment, or to contain any modest or temporary reductions if 
these are genuinely necessary. 
o Even if it does not like it, the labour movement cannot ignore the 
growth of the social economy, nor the increasing trend towards wider 
employee involvement in the ownership of enterprises, nor the 
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trend away from large enterprises in heavy industry towards 
smaller organizations in service sectors. By becoming involved in 
these developments it may influence them; it is bound to lose 
influence if it simply ignores them. 
Hence although WTOs are still considered mainly as a 'last resort' 
strategy Trade Union attitudes towards this option have become more 
varied and complex. Considerable differences exist between Unions 
(e.g. in France, in the Federal Republic, in the UK) but also within 
the same Union - local officials, for example may actively support WTO 
although the national policy is hostile or equivocal (e.g. IG Metal in 
the Federal Republic). Likewise, Union attitudes can vary between 
regions - as in Spain, where the experience of WTO varies very con-
siderably in different parts of the country. The Italian Trade Unions 
have had the greatest involvement with WTO and have probably come clo-
sest to a serious endorsement of the WTO option - in the form of 
agreements reached with the Co-operative Associations. But even here 
local trade union attitudes vary widely. 
In any event, such variations in the legitimacy and support which 
Trade Unions provide for the idea of WTOs help to explain the marked 
variations in the number of attempts at WTO that occur in different 
regions and countries, and for the general increase in WTOs during the 
80s. This is most sharply illustrated in the statistics for WTOs in 
France where the CGT union changed from opposing WTOs to supporting 
them - and then changed back again, a few years later. These shifts 
in the unions position were one important factor generating a marked 
but temporary increase in the numbers of WTOs occurring during this 
period. 
2.2.2 Co-operative Movement Attitudes 
The presence of successful worker co-operatives in the region or sec-
tor in which a closure is threatened greatly increases the likelihood 
that the WTO option will be considered by the workforce. In general, 
when the worker co-operative sector is broadly based and integrated 
into an established co-operative movement - as in Italy and parts of 
Spain - WTO attempts are much more common. By contrast, where 
established co-operative movements do not include worker co-operatives 
and are distanced (for cultural and historic reasons) from the labour 
movement - as in Denmark, Germany and the UK - then a WTO is rarely 
attempted. More recently, however, the new social movements based on 
alternative and ecological concerns in Germany, and an embryonic 'new 
wave' worker co-operative movement in the UK, have promoted the idea 
of WTOs and provided practical support. This has contributed to the 
increased incidence of WTOs in these countries, though the numbers 
remain small in comparison with Italy and Spain. Finally, France 
has an established worker co-operative movement, but one that has been 
concentrated in particular industrial sectors and that is not closely 
tied to the wider co-operative movement. The incidence of WTO has 
fluctuated but it is higher than in the UK and less than in Italy. 
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Thus it provides an intermediate case that confirms the general pat-
tern. 
While it is likely that the presence of worker co-operatives and 
worker-owned firms in itself lends credibility to the idea of a WTO, 
the actions and attitude of co-operative movement bodies are very 
important. This is most obvious in Italy where some WTO have occurred 
as a result of interventions by the Co-operative Associations: the 
closure or divestment of an economic unit may be seen as providing an 
opportunity to make a strategic investment at a low price. Thus, if 
the enterprise in question can be readily integrated into a network, 
strengthening the market or geographical position of the Association, 
it may encourage and support the workforce in mounting a take-over. 
In general, however, support for WTOs is a controversial issue within 
worker co-operative movements. The main arguments for actively sup-
porting WTO are: 
o WTOs, despite the difficulties, provide the most promising means 
for rapidly extending the size, range and capital intensity of 
the cooperative sector. If WTOs are neglected the cooperative 
sector will be largely restricted to a few traditional and 
marginal sectors. 
o Support for WTOs provides an opportunity to demonstrate practical 
solidarity and build up links with the Trade Union movement that 
will be important in the long term. In particular, it may provide 
an occasion to promote alternative and ecological ideas within the 
labour movement, especially regarding socially-useful production. 
o A great deal has been learnt about when and how to support WTOs. 
A greater proportion of successes can realistically be anticipated 
in the future. 
o Collaboration with local and national governments in relation to 
policies for supporting WTO provides an opportunity to gain 
political support and promote long over-due legal and fiscal 
reforms of benefit to co-operatives generally. 
The arguments for more limited, cautious, and selective support for 
WTOs are: 
o The workers in enterprises subject to a WTO are often reluctant 
cooperatore for whom other (temporary) forms of worker ownership 
are more appropriate. In addition cultural differences between 
the trade union and cooperative movements make collabora-
tion extremely difficult. 
o The publicity associated with many WTOs and their subsequent failure 
discredits the cooperative movement. 
o The risks of failure are considerable; hence support for WTO will 
jeapoardise the limited financial resources available to cooperati-
ves . 
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o Support for WTOs will mean the co-operative movement providing care 
to the geriatric survivors of declining sectors. It will not pro-
vide a basis for future growth. The government and the private sec-
tor should take responsibility for their own failures. 
Not surprisingly, the position of co-operative movement bodies on this 
issue tends to be influenced by the perceived success of those 
enterprises formed through WTOs - as the policy reversals of the 
French federation (CG-SCOP) exemplify very clearly. Hence the degree 
of support which co-operative movements have provided for WTOs has 
varied at different times and in different areas. And this, too, 
helps to explain when and where WTO are more likely to occur. 
2.2.3 Government Attitudes and Policies 
Attempts to mount a WTO commonly include appeals to governments -
whether local, regional or national - for support. Where this is pro-
vided it constitutes a tacit invitation to others to request similar 
support. In consequence, questions concerning whether, in what ways, 
and to what extent public support should be given to WTO have arisen 
in most of the European communities. Moreover, it is clear that 
governments do not simply respond to pressure - they have also, on 
occasions, adopted measures that have more or less explicitly 
encouraged and supported WTO. The clearest example is provided by the 
instrument used by the Spanish Ministry of Labour to make funds 
available to workers to enable WTOs to be established. Although this 
instrument has since been redesigned to provide commercially more 
appropriate support, its existence encouraged numerous attempts at WTO 
and induced the formation of hundreds of 'Labour Companies' in the 10 
years from 1976.Hence one cannot explain the current wave of WTOs 
without considering the attitudes and actions of governments. 
The extent of government support, and the reasons for providing it 
vary enormously. Apart from a concern to preserve employment for 
political reasons, governments of the right have provided support for 
WTO on the grounds that: 
o wider employee ownership will in due course contribute to improved 
industrial performance; 
o WTO are a form of economic self-help that will help in the deve-
lopment of an 'enterprise culture'; 
o where practical pressure makes intervention necessary, support for a 
WTO is preferable to other forms of government intervention (e.g. 
subsidies, tarrifs etc) 
On the other hand, right wing governments have opposed support for 
WTOs, or restricted the extent of support provided, on the grounds 
that: 
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o government support for 'lame ducks' wastes public money and hinders 
the process of economic adjustment 
o support for WTO will discriminate against other firms in the 
industry 
o WTO are generally unsuccessful and support for them encourages 
unrealistic expectations concerning the ability of a workforce to 
run an enterprise. 
o governments should not provide support for a work force that has 
occupied a factory and engaged in legally questionable forms of 
industrial conflict. 
When governments of the left have supported WTO it is usually for such 
reasons as: 
o other measures to preserve employment are inadequate or inefficient; 
the net cost of support for WTO is very limited. 
o WTO can form part of a broader strategy to preserve the local eco-
nomy 
o WTOs create new forms of social ownership and provide useful experi-
ments in industrial democracy, self management and socially-useful 
production. 
o WTO are a means of supporting the growth of the co-operative move-
ment and the social economy. 
However left-wing parties and governments do not always support WTO. 
Support may be withheld for some or all of the reasons that Trade 
Unions have withheld support (see section 2.2.1, above). 
In general, however, the political orientation of the party in power 
is less important in understanding its stance than the experience and 
reputation of WTOs in that country or locality. For example, in 
Italy, where the co-operative movement has all-party support, and is 
organised in separate politically-oriented associations, the principle 
of providing public funds to assist WTO has long been accepted; in 
Denmark there is all-party agreement not to promote WTO; and in 
France the left government which was initially sympathetic to WTO when 
it came to power in 1981, withdrew its support partly because of the 
publicly perceived failure of WTO enterprises. 
The picture is further complicated by differences in attitude towards 
WTO between national and local or regional government. For example, 
in the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany the national governments 
have not been sympathetic to WTO, while various local authorities and 
State governments have taken steps to support them, or have introduced 
Local Employment measures from which WTO have been able to benefit. 
Such local and regional initiatives are reflected in the number of 
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actual and attempted WTO reported from those areas. Similar 
variations in regional and local government support for WTO have 
occurred in Spain, France and Italy. 
Overall, then, many WTO are no longer an entirely spontaneous 
phenomenon: whether the idea of a WTO is likely to arise among the 
workforce, and whether it will be seriously considered, is affected by 
government actions and policies - whether governments like it or not. 
2.3 WTO as a cultural phenomenon 
The preceding sections have considered, in turn, the role of Trade 
Unions, co-operative movements and governments in promoting (or not) 
the idea of WTOs. However, the attitudes and measures of these 
various bodies do not develop in isolation. They affect each other, 
and, moreover, they arise from and embody broader cultural and insti-
tutional traditions. For example, it is striking that the con-
centrations of WTO are highest in Catalonia and Emilia-Romagna, 
regions that have a strong cultural tradition of mutual aid and self-
reliance (apparent in their strong anarchist movements earlier this 
century). From this perspective, the sharply contrasting socio-
economic structures of Denmark and Italy can be seen as different 
'historic solutions' to the labour movement's search for greater eco-
nomic security. Such differences both express and reinforce signifi-
cant cultural differences - for example, the strong tradition of a 
well-developed welfare state and of individualist entrepreneurs in 
Denmark, compared to the more collective entrepreneurialism of Italy, 
in which labour solidarity can be achieved through the market, not 
only in opposition to it. 
In these terms, recent developments in the labour movements in France 
the UK, and parts of Spain and Germany, can be seen as tentative 
exploration of possible new 'solutions', given the perceived inade-
quacy of older strategies. As such, the WTOs in these countries are 
not just a desperate and temporary expedient to preserve employment, 
but the seeds of possible cultural developments. Whether and to what 
extent WTOs and worker co-operative or worker owned sectors will in 
due course become an established element in the socio-economic 
landscapes of these countries obviously remains to be seen - it is by 
no means certain. But if this does happen, the way in which it will 
gradually come about can be suggested from the limited developments 
that have taken place so far: in essence, success breeds success. 
A successful WTO tends to stimulate others to consider the WTO option 
seriously, just as the failure of a WTO, or the absence of any recent 
or local WTO, makes it more likely the option will be over-looked or 
discarded. At the same time, successful WTOs tend to legitimise sup-
port by the co-operative movement, trade unions and governments and 
their agencies (and failure undermines such support). In addition, as 
later sections demonstrate, the more extensive and widely based the 
support for WTO attempts, the more likely they are to succeed, and the 
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more likely the enterprises created are to survive and to consolidate. 
Thus, in due course, the enterprises created from WTO can strengthen 
the worker co-operative and worker-owned sectors, - which are then 
better able to support other WTOs in the future. 
Needless to say, these self-reinforcing tendencies either in favour of 
or against the WTO phenomenon do not operate invariably and automati-
cally. There are numerous cases of isolated WTOs. Nevertheless, the 
distribution of WTOs and attempted WTOs is far from random: over the 
last ten years marked concentrations of WTO activity have emerged in 
particular regions and localities. For example about one third of the 
WTO attempts, and about two thirds of the successful attempts, in the 
Federal Republic of Germany in the last five years have occurred in 
the city-state of Bremen, where an effective support network linking 
the 'alternative' groupings, labour movement organizations, and 
government agencies, has developed. Similar networks and con-
centrations of WTO activity seem to be developing within the UK in 
Scotland, Yorkshire and London. Likewise, the political and economic 
strength of the co-operative movement in Andalusia has increased con-
siderably in recent years and it has had considerable involvement with 
WTOs. 
However, if this longer-term cultural perspective offers some inspira-
tion to nascent worker cooperative movements and to those involved in 
supporting WTOs, it also provides a caution against assuming that the 
experience of one country can be readily reproduced in another. 
If ideas and practices are transferred it will always be in relation 
to existing institutions and traditions, and so considerable variation 
is to be expected. For example, in Spain, the legal framework for 
Labour Companies provided the vehicle for the initial rudimentary 
scheme of state support for WTOs. In consequence hundreds of such 
companies (and they are not co-operatives) were created, and they have 
now established their own secondary organization - a development that 
has no parallels in any of the other countries studied. Moreover, to 
the extent that institutionalising the practice of WTOs involves a 
cultural change, it is not something that can be easily or quickly 
engineered. For example, many situations which in Spain or Italy 
would prompt a WTO, have in the UK in recent years, prompted a manage-
ment buy-out - usually with the blessing of the Trade Unions involved. 
Although this is a recent phenomenon, the practice is already well 
established and has even stimulated the emergence of specialist finan-
cial institutions. In effect, management buy-outs have fitted easily 
into the existing cultural pattern. Even if WTOs were given more sup-
port and the number increased, it is hard to imagine, in the fore-
seeable future, the WTO option being preferred in many of the sorts of 




The great majority of attempts at a WTO are a response to the threat of 
unemployment. As such, they tend to occur: 
o in industries undergoing re-structuring 
o where the workforce possesses industry-specific skills for 
which demand is limited 
o where the threatened plant or enterprise is a major employer on 
which the locality is economically dependent. 
Such enterprises may be badly run down with little, if any, prospect 
of commercial viability. However attempts at WTO do not only occur in 
such circumstances. The owners of a viable, or potentially viable, 
enterprise or plant may wish to dispose of it for a wide variety of 
reasons and yet they may fail to attract a purchaser. Such failures 
in the market for enterprises arise, essentially, because of the high 
transaction costs associated with the decision to purchase an economic 
unit, and the likely difficulties of managing the acquisition effec-
tively. Hence the prospect of a high return will be necessary in 
order to justify the risks involved. In short, an enterprise or plant 
may be threatened with closure not because it is unprofitable but 
because it is not considered to be profitable enough. 
Whether or not the threat of closure and unemployment stimulates an 
attempt at a WTO depends on the confidence of the workforce and the 
credibility of the WTO idea. In this respect the attitude of various 
external parties is crucial. 
In general, mainstream Trade Union movements have been doubtful or 
hostile towards WTO. More recently, rising unemployment and the 
failure of traditional strategies for saving jobs have prompted a 
reconsideration of the WTO option and the position is now more complex 
and fluid with, for example, differences between unions, and between 
national and local levels, in several countries. 
In countries with worker co-operative sectors, the extent of support 
offered by movement bodies for WTOs has, on occasions, been a contro-
versial issue. WTOs have been seen as offering great opportunities 
and also great dangers. But in general the stronger the worker co-
operative sector in a country, the more credible is the WTO idea, and 
the more support for WTO attempts there is available. 
The actions of governments - whether at national, regional or local 
level - have also influenced the number of WTO attempts occurring in 
different countries and areas. Though their reasons have differed 
somewhat, governments of both the right and the left have on occasions 
provided support for WTO, and in other contexts, both have opposed 
WTOs. In general, government actions towards WTO are best understood 
in relation to political pressures for job preservation and to the 
prevailing reputation of WTO for that purpose. 
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Overall, it is clear that attempts at a WTO are no longer an entirely 
spontaneous initiative by the workforce. It is a response to the 
threat of closure which has variously been promoted or discouraged, -
either explicitly or tacitly. 
Success tends to breed success. The credibility of the WTO idea and 
the availability of support for WTO attempts is affected by the suc-
cess or failure of previous attempts. Over the last ten years, this 
has lead to concentrations of WTO activity in particular localities. 
In a historical perspective such self-sustaining tendencies may 
explain the very different institutional and cultural patterns of the 
labour and co-operative movements that have developed in, for example, 
Denmark and Northern Italy. In any event, it seems that the WTO 
response is more readily undertaken and accepted where collective 
entrepreneurship and decentralised self-help are established within 
the labour movement and the wider society. Such cultural con-
siderations provide a caution against assuming that the experience of 
one country or region can be easily reproduced elsewhere. 
3 Achieving A Worker Take-Over 
To be successful any attempt at a WTO must resolve a number of 
interrelated and complex issues concerning legal, financial, 
marketing, production and organizational questions. These questions 
will be unfamiliar to the workforce and its leadership, and tackling 
them commonly requires access to external advice as well as political 
support, especially regarding negotiations with third parties. These 
difficulties involve conflicting economic and social imperatives, and 
may be compounded by severe time pressure. Moreover, for a number of 
very practical reasons it is important that as far as possible these 
issues are addressed by the workforce as a whole - and not just by 
leaders or advisors on behalf of the workforce. The aim of this sec-
tion is to highlight the problems that characteristically arise in 
this complex and very uncertain process. 
It is not possible to provide figures on the proportion of WTO 
attempts that succeed, or to provide any kind of quantitative analy-
sis. Those involved with the support of WTOs find it difficult even 
to make estimates since a WTO may be considered but discarded without 
a serious attempt being mounted (often for very good reasons, of 
course). Hence there is a problem over what constitutes an 'attempt'. 
It also seems that the proportion of unsuccessful attempts varies con-
siderably between countries. Thus, in Denmark there seem to have been 
very few unsuccessful attempts - but this almost certainly reflects 
the fact that the idea is so uncommon that it only arises and is 
seriously pursued in quite favourable circumstances. Where the idea 
is better known but the support for WTOs is still limited and lacking 
experience, then there are far more unsuccessful attempts - an esti-
mate for the UK, for example, was that only one WTO is achieved for 
every five occasions when the option is quite seriously explored. This 
is comparable with the one in four succers rate in the FRG over the 
last five years. Finally, there are countries like Italy (and to a 
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lesser extent France and Spain) where there is much more experience of 
WTOs. In such cases the proportion of successful attempts seems, once 
again, to be much higher - partly because WTOs are more accepted and 
there is effective support for them; but perhaps also because the 
support agencies are more ready to discourage the idea in contexts 
that they recognise as having poor prospects. 
3.1 Formulating the Business Plan 
Any attempt at a WTO is based on a conception of what the enterprise 
may become. To begin with this conception will be vague, unrealistic 
and held by only a few of those involved. But it must develop rapidly 
into a scheme that is tolerably specific, realistic and widely shared. 
The essence of such a business plan is a cash-flow forecast which 
indicates the outgoings and income anticipated in the early months and 
years. Such forecasts must be based on credible proposals for who the 
customers will be and how they will be reached; the quantity, quality 
and price of the goods or services to be provided; the facilities, 
equipment and labour of different categories that will be needed; the 
borrowings, repayments and interest charges required to finance these 
activities; how the effective monitoring and co-ordination of opera-
tions will be achieved - and so on. Clearly, to develop these propo-
sals in any detail may require a considerable amount of time. Of 
course every question cannot be answered, not all the aspirations will 
be proved realistic, and everyone will not agree on everything - in a 
WTO as in any other business plan. But the more definite the propo-
sals, the clearer the grounds on which they are based and the greater 
the consensus on priorities, then the greater the confidence and unity 
of the workforce, and the more credible the plan will be with external 
bodies. 
There are two general requirements for the formulation of a credible 
business plan for a WTO. The first is that the workforce should come 
to appreciate the need for viability and all that this implies; the 
second is that the work force is able to obtain the information needed 
to prepare the plan. These requirements are discussed in turn before 
considering the advantages and disadvantages of the two main strate-
gies for WTOs. 
3.1.1 Viability, Job losses and Workforce Attitudes. 
The first requirement for developing a credible business plan is that 
the workforce should start to embrace the implications of their own 
responsibility for achieving viability. This is true even if the 
workforce is not directly involved in preparing the plan - because 
otherwise they may reject a well-considered plan prepared by others. 
In smaller units with good management-worker and worker-worker rela-
tions this appreciation of commercial realities may develop quickly. 
Needless to say, in some larger units especially in Britain, France 
and Italy, the situation is very different. In these cases a very fun-
damental re-orientation on the part of the workforce is required. 
Indeed, this re-orientation may not be achieved so that the pursuit of 
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a WTO and external support for it, is in reality another means to pre-
serve the existing enterprise, rather than a means of transforming it. 
The clearest indication of the extent to which this re-orientation is 
occurring is provided by the attitude of the workforce towards 
staffing levels. Since the rationale for the attempt is the preser-
vation of jobs, and given the pre-eminence of solidarity as a trade 
union value, the reluctance to countenance substantial reductions in 
the numbers employed is utterly understandable. Nevertheless, 
substantial reductions will often be required. In strictly commercial 
terms, most WTO are typical cases of the business 'turn-around' 
situation - and, in varying degrees depending on circumstances, the 
usual 'turn-around' strategies will be required (3). Indeed, one of 
the reasons for the crisis may have been a reluctance to cut back the 
business to a profitable core, soon enough. At the extreme, a large 
economic unit may contain only the basis for one or two quite small 
businesses, based on particular skills, assets, or local markets. More 
normally, a substantial part of the enterprise may have prospects for 
viability, based on cost reductions and a reorientation towards more 
specific market segments. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that insofar as figures are available 
(see e.g. the Italian and German Studies) substantially fewer workers 
are employed after a WTO than in the same enterprise before the WTO. 
Moreover, a reluctance to grapple with this issue may prevent the 
attempt succeeding (quite apart from prejudicing its longer term 
success). For example, a refusal by the workers' leadership to con-
template the job losses required for any chance of viability contri-
buted to the collapse of discussions on a WTO before the closure of a 
large factory in Clydebank, Scotland. Moreover it should not be 
assumed that in such cases the leaders are really hoping to maintain 
employment but have miscalculated the prospects for external support: 
more likely their decisions represent an informed choice reflecting 
both the view that closure is better than an abandonment of deeply 
held principles and a pragmatic assessment of the financial risks and 
complications in respect of redundancy payments etc. Which is another 
way of saying that, in the event, a WTO is not an option that everyone 
will choose, however dire the circumstances. 
On the other hand it often happens that steps are taken, more or less 
deliberately, by the workforce or by external parties, to accommodate 
the conflicting economic and social imperatives. That is, involuntary 
job losses are minimised in ways that are compatible with the 
workforce's acceptance of the need for enterprise viability. This can 
occur in one or a combination of the following ways: 
First, some of the older workers, appreciating the need for job 
losses, may volunteer for redundancy to assist the WTO. Government 
early retirement schemes, where they exist, have certainly made this 
easier; but the fact that redundancy or retirement in these cir-
cumstances directly assists the other workers in their struggle 
appears to make this drastic step a bit easier for some. 
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Second, the issue is not strictly one of job losses, but of cost 
reduction. Although not popular with Trade Unions, short-time and 
part-time work are options that have been chosen, usually as temporary 
devices. The Public Labour Administration in the Federal Republic of 
Germany has on occasions collaborated in such arrangements and paid 
unemployment benefit to those working less than a certain number of 
hours. It should also be noted that where jobs are lost, this may 
only be temporary. There are cases where some or all of those who lost 
their jobs have been offered the chance of re-employment later, when 
the business improved. 
Third, where the enterprise in crisis has ceased trading but the WTO 
attempt is subject to delay and uncertainty, workers may drift away -
for example, to take other jobs, or because they do not believe the 
project will succeed. This is one reason why some co-operative sup-
port agencies (e.g. in the UK) consider the 'phoenix' strategy to be 
preferable to attempts at a 'rescue', an issue discussed further 
be low. 
Fourth, the need to plan a viable operation does not necessarily mean 
the attempt is completely determined by existing market forces. As 
experience in the Federal Republic demonstrates, public funding may be 
available for specific services - such as industrial training, the 
production of particular non-market goods or the development of 
socially useful products - even though such schemes may be difficult 
to arrange. Likewise, the purchasing arrangements of local government 
can be used to assist a WTO. The point is simply that anticipated 
outgoingings must not exceed the anticipated income - wherever it 
comes from. 
Fifth, the extreme difficulty of the 'jobs issue' is most easily 
tackled in the context of an established co-operative movement, - as 
in Italy, where other co-operatives may assist the rescue either by 
taking on some of the redundant workers, or by placing orders with the 
new enterprise. As yet there are limits to the scope for such 
assistance. But numerous instances exist, and they suggest that the 
labour and cooperative movements may create conditions in which they 
can pursue solidarity more effectively among enterprises rather than 
simply within them. Such a model, mid-way between plan and market, 
overcomes the traditional dilemma between universalist and par-
ticularist solutions. Cooperatives need not always remain tiny 
'islands in a sea of capitalism'. 
3.1.2 Obtaining Information and Advice 
A credible business plan is based on information - in particular, 
information on markets and costs. In this respect the attidude of the 
existing owners and management, or of the receiver, is likely to be 
critical. Where there is a positive attitude, the necessary business 
information is readily provided - indeed, contracts may be offered to 
the new enterprise and the transfer of fixed assets, stocks etc, may 
be negotiated on reasonable terms (in some cases, as part of a redun-
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dancy settlement). Such assistance may be prompted by sympathy, a 
desire to maintain good public relations, a concern to manage the clo-
sure smoothly, or for other reasons (see especially the Danish study). 
By contrast, a negative attitude can result in even the most basic 
information being withheld, obstruction regarding the purchase of 
assets, or unrealistic valuations being placed on them. The extent of 
such obstruction, and the reasons for it, vary considerably, - from 
simple conservatism and the desire to avoid complications on the part 
of receivers, to an ideological or personal hostility to the attempt 
and its leadership. Whatever the reasons, such negativity often pre-
vents WTO from proceeding, and it is often one reason why external 
political support is so important: such support can be used to put 
pressure on the owners to provide information to the workforce. In 
addition, the problems of obtaining the necessary information - be it 
formally or informally - are accentuated when: 
o the members of the workforce attempting the take-over do not include 
any managerial or senior office staff; 
o the plant is purely a production unit with marketing design and finance 
functions located elsewhere; 
o the WTO cannot be based on the existing product or service, so infor-
mation about these will be less relevant; 
o the WTO has to develop a new customer base; 
o the imminent closure of the plant, or auctioning of assets, creates 
acute time pressure. 
The more of these conditions hold - as, for instance, in the case of 
many large plant closures - the more difficult it will be to prepare a 
credible plan. Moreover, the problem is not simply one of obtaining 
information: the very concept of a business plan is likely to be 
unfamiliar to those involved in the WTO, who will also have to make 
difficult decisions on a legal and organizational framework for the 
venture. Hence the workforce will require quite extensive support and 
advice in grappling with these issues. In practice, many WTO attempts 
have difficulty in obtaining the sort of competent, sympathetic and 
sustained advice that they require, for the following reasons: 
o the leaders of the workforce will not be aware of all that they 
need to know, - and they may even be reluctant to acknowledge 
their need for assistance. Hence they may fail to seek out, or to 
accept, offers of assistance from those with relevant expertise. 
Instead, they may rely on the efforts of union or co-operative 
association officials who may have more time, but still lack vital 
experience. 
o Conventional business advice agencies are generally quite unsuitable: 
they are unfamiliar with co-operative or self-managed legal fra-
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meworks; they usually do not identify socially or politically 
with a WTO project; and, above all, their conception of the 
consultant-client relationship is too restrictive for the require-
ments of a WTO. 
o Advice from more appropriate sources may be unavailable because: 
no support agencies or networks exist in the locality 
the support agencies or networks lack relevant experience or 
expertise 
the support agencies or networks lack the time and 
resources (they may even be working voluntarily) to sup-
port an uncertain venture over a prolonged period. 
o there may be cultural or other differences between those who might 
provide the support and trade union oriented attempts at WTO. For 
example, in Germany and the UK, the established co-operative move-
ments have sometimes been unsympathetic to attempts at WTO; and 
the marked cultural differences between the alternative or new co-
operative movements on the one hand, and industrial workers on the 
other, have proved an obstacle (though not insoluble) in some 
cases. 
o A wide range of expertise will often be required, including industry-
specific knowledge of market trends or production technology, 
expertise in business planning and financial appraisal, familiarity 
with company law and procedure regarding receivership and 
bankruptcy, negotiating experience and expertise, and familiarity 
with the numerous questions concerning legal frameworks. In addi-
tion, such potential advisors must have the credibility and 'con-
sulting skills' to work effectively with the workforce and its 
leadership during an intense, even traumatic, period. 
Some of these reasons also help to explain the difficulties that 
have sometimes arisen in the relationship between the workforce and 
the advisors. The advisors may become impatient with the reluc-
tance of the workforce to accept the realities of the situation or 
to follow their advice. The leadership of the workforce may feel 
their position is being undermined by the suggestion of new ways of 
involving the workforce; or that the aims of the WTO (and their 
position) are being subverted by managerial approaches. Or it may 
be that different advisors are involved in respect of different 
issues, but their approaches and suggestions are incompatible. 
(Cases in which splits have developed between the political and the 
technical leaders and their associated advisors are reported from 
France and Italy). 
3.1.3 'Rescue' and 'Phoenix' Strategies - and the Large Plant Problem 
Some WTOs ("conversions") are prompted by internal events (e.g. the 
retirement of the owner-manager) before the difficulties of the com-
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pany have produced a crisis. Most, however, are a response to closure 
or the threat of closure. In such cases the business plans for the 
new enterprise must be based on either a 'rescue' or a 'phoenix' stra-
tegy. Each has its advantages and disadvantages, and is more suitable 
in particular circumstances. Hence they provide a convenient way of 
analysing some of the key dilemmas in the preparation of business 
plans for WTOs of failed enterprises. 
A 'rescue' strategy is directed towards reaching agreement with the 
owners or receiver for a transfer of control of the business assets 
and activities to the workforce in such a way that there is little or 
no break in production and trading. Where it is possible, this stra-
tegy has the advantages of providing continuity of employment and of 
protecting the existing customer base. It also avoids a number of 
problems that may arise when the plant is allowed to close without a 
definite plan for it to re-open - such as the loss of key workers, and 
the difficulty of maintaining the organization of the workforce after 
the closure. Moreover, a workforce whose planning for a WTO is suf-
ficiently well advanced to arrange a 'rescue' may be well placed to 
negotiate the transfer of equipment and stocks on good terms as part 
of a redundancy settlement. 
On the other hand, the 'rescue' strategy also has some severe disad-
vantages. First, there will often be insufficient time for a thorough 
appraisal of business prospects or for the workforce to come to terms 
with the implications of commercial self-reliance. This may lead to 
the new enterprise losing money and having to make further reductions 
in labour in its early months. Secondly, in several countries the 
continuity of employment may compromise employees entitlement to 
redundancy benefit (even though this may be needed to finance the new 
venture). Thirdly , the workforce may have to pay a high price for 
the assets - because they are valued as a 'going concern', or because 
they are transferred in total, whereas not all are required for the 
new enterprise; or because some of the liabilities of the old busi-
ness (e.g. to suppliers) must also be accepted. 
The 'phoenix' strategy is marked by a clear break in production and 
trading. It is adopted when a take-over of the existing business 
without interruption is either impossible or undesirable. 
Characteristically, a group of former employees tries to purchase a 
selection of the residual assets from a receiver or liquidator to pro-
vide the basis for a new, and generally much smaller, enterprise. 
Hence, following a 'phoenix' strategy to form a workers' co-operative 
or worker-owned enterprise will be much more like starting up a new 
enterprise 'from scratch' - except that those involved will already 
know each other, having worked together in the old business; they may 
be able to obtain equipment and stocks cheaply; and they may already 
have a range of personal contacts among potential customers. 
This approach has a number of advantages: because there is usually 
more time it is easier to plan the business on a realistic basis (for 
instance by obtaining more suitable premises). The problem of job 
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losses becomes rather more tractable. Everyone has already lost their 
jobs - so the question is no longer 'who will be made redundant?', but 
instead 'who are suitable and willing to join the project?' As a 
result, selection and self-selection seem to ensure a more committed 
workforce, an effect often enhanced by the delay which allows time for 
attitudes to change and for additional training to be undertaken. On 
the other hand, the proportion of jobs saved in a 'phoenix' is usually 
much smaller; and too much uncertainty and delay may undermine com-
mitment and lead to workers drifting awayvital skills seeking 
employment elsewhere. 
Each of the strategies will be more appropriate in particular cir-
cumstances. Thus a 'rescue' is more likely to be attempted where the 
workforce has advance warning of closure, where the existing owners 
are no obstructing the WTO, where trading continuity is important, and 
where the new enterprise will provide a similar, or somewhat reduced 
range of goods or services. A 'phoenix' strategy will be more 
appropriate where the activity of the business must be more radically 
reduced or redirected, where trading continuity is less important, and 
where a smaller (and more coherent) group of workers is involved. 
In practice, of course, a workforce may set out to achieve a 'rescue', 
but in the end only a 'phoenix' may be realised. Or the result may 
fall somewhere between the two strategies. Nevertheless, the distinc-
tion is useful because it highlights the different commercial logics 
on which a WTO may be based. Moreover, the collective dynamic and 
organizational problems and processes associated with these strategies 
are usually very different. Finally, the distinction throws further 
light on the particular problems of 'large plant' closures, which, as 
the previous section noted, are often marked by conditions that make 
it difficult to prepare a business plan in the time available. In 
many cases key workers will have been transferred elsewhere, and the 
plant and equipment is obsolete, so the prospects for an enterprise of 
any size being salvaged will be extremely poor. However, it is not 
uncommon for plants with many skilled workers and containing quite 
modern equipment to be shut down. When this has happened it has been 
reasonable to consider whether a new range of products could be deve-
loped or introduced to provide the commercial basis for a WTO, thereby 
protecting the local community from the full impact of the closure. 
The obvious problem, however, is that the identification, development 
and introduction of new products requires time facilities and resour-
ces. Hence, it seems this can only be undertaken, if at all, by first 
achieving a WTO on the basis of some existing products (a 'rescue'), 
or on the basis of some niche in other markets, such as sub-
contracting (a 'phoenix'), thereby providing a financial, technical 
and organizational basis for the development of new products. But in 
practice this approach is precisely what is so difficult in the case 
of large plant closures. A rescue, for example, will often be 
impossible because of e.g. parent company control of existing 
markets, the fact that the plant is solely a production unit lacking 
other management functions, over-capacity in the sector, etc. (and 
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where 'rescues' of large plants have been achieved by the workforce, 
it has proved very difficult to undertake product development 
thereafter - for reasons discussed later). A 'phoenix' strategy, on 
the other hand may well generate one or more viable businesses, but 
generally these will only involve a fraction of the workforce and will 
be too small to sustain the facilities and costs of product develop-
ment. 
Hence, even if there is an efficient production unit and a desperate 
need to maintain employment, the development of new products has 
proved very hard to undertake within either a 'rescue' or a 'phoenix' 
strategy. This serious limitation on the scope of WTOs may perhaps be 
reduced by the growth of 'product development networks' (based on the 
labour and alternative movements and their sympthisers in Universities 
etc). However, other strategies clearly need to be developed for 
workforce initiatives in the context of 'large plant' closures. In 
this respect the experience of the Bitteswell Employment Alliance -
formed out of the closure of an aero-space factory - is interesting 
(see the UK study). Although B.E.A's achievements have been fairly 
limited, the underlying approach was novel - in effect, a radical 
extension of the phoenix strategy. These issues are considered 
further in a later section. 
3.2 Getting Organized 
The planning activities discussed in the last section require the 
creation of an organization - who is included in the project and on 
what terms? Who is entitled to negotiate with other parties? how are 
the contents of the plan decided? What legal entity will take-over 
the assets? Hence the planning process is simultaneously an orga-
nizing process. Moreover, the forms and style of organization that 
emerge will have enormous implications for the success, or otherwise, 
of the WTO - for instance: 
o the extent to which the organization is initiated and steered by 
the work-force itself affects their understanding of and commit-
ment to the project. 
o the emerging organization will be expressed in a choice of legal 
framework, and in a constitution and structure that will constrain 
many future developments. 
o the planning, negotiation and preparation for the take-over are a 
formative experience for the enterprise that emerges - its prece-
dents, un-written rules and myths are being created, its character 
and identity are taking shape. This process continues into the 
period after the take-over, but even if they have to be re-
assessed later, these initial assumptions, practices and norms 
will profoundly affect the development of the enterprise. 
It is this organizing process - the urgent creation of a business 
organization of, by and for the workforce - that gives a WTO its spe-
cial character (and distinguishes it from conventional 'turn-arounds', 
management buy-outs, 'new start' co-operatives, and other employment 
initiatives). Hence an appreciation of the distinctive organizational 
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dimensions of a WTO is essential in understanding the WTO phenomenon 
and is an absolute precondition for any consideration of measures and 
strategies to support WTOs. 
3.2.1 The importance and difficulty of workforce involvement. 
WTOs have on occasions been stimulated and guided by external parties 
Trade Unions, Co-operative Associations, or agents of the local 
state. They may also be initiated, directed and executed by a com-
paratively small group of established leaders (shop stewards, tech-
nical or administrative staff) on behalf of the workforce and with 
their acquiescence. In such cases the WTO itself may be achieved in a 
very orderly fashion. More commonly, however, a WTO is a somewhat 
desperate collective undertaking in which a substantial proportion of 
the workforce is, for varying periods, actively involved. In these 
cases it is not uncommon for the process to be marked by confusion, 
uncertainty and conflict. Which, then, of these types of WTO tends to 
be more successful in the longer run - the orderly, directed and 
"well-organised"; or the disorderly, improvised and self-organised? 
Allowing that the question is simplistic - most WTO have elements of 
both patterns and fall between the pure cases - it could certainly be 
argued, on the basis of available case material, that those WTO 
achieved through a "disorderly" process perform at least as well if 
not better than their "orderly" counterparts. A more cautious answer, 
in the absence of anything like adequate data, is that both patterns 
may succeed or fail - depending on circumstances. 
Thus,it is clear, especially from the French experience, that directed 
WTO often run into commercial difficulties - they fail to achieve the 
necessary improvements in performance. On the other hand, where, for 
example, a re-capitalising of the enterprise is the main requirement 
for viability without a need for far-reaching changes in production 
activities and organization; or where the workforce does not wish to 
take on management responsibility as well as ownership; then the 
"orderly" WTO process is likely to provide a very appropriate foun-
dation for the new enterprise. In a comparable way, it is clear, 
especially from the Italian experience (eg, the case of CLG), that a 
"disorderly" process need not be debilitating and doomed to failure -
though these certainly can be the effects. It seems that a good 
measure of disorder can often be creative and lead to more effective 
forms of organisation in due course. 
Apart from indicating some of the variety in the organizational pro-
cess of WTOs, these observations point to the fact that a WTO is often 
a moment of rapid organisational change - and hence it is not 
surprising if it often appears passionate, untidy, and incoherent. In 
such circumstances, static and conventional conceptions of "proper 
organization" are quite inappropriate. In particular, the widespread 
and active involvement of the workforce in the organisation of the WTO 
is often essential for the following reasons: 
(i) Substantial cost reductions in the production area are usually 
required and may involve reduced wages, reduced staffing levels, new 
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working practices and a changed approach to management-worker rela-
tions. Attempting to impose such changes on the workforce achieves, 
at best, far less than is possible when the workforce themselves iden-
tify the problems and formulate their own solutions. 
(ii) the workforce will usually need to make a financial contribution 
in one way or another through individual loans or shares, or the nego-
tiation of redundancy terms that partly substitute collective compen-
sation in the form of assets for individual payments. Again, this is 
only likely - and, indeed, proper - if the workforce has debated the 
problems and possibilities in sufficient depth to appreciate the risks 
involved. 
(iii) The sheer range of tasks to be undertaken in order to formulate 
a credible scheme requires the time and effort of a wide number of 
'activists'. Such tasks may include enlisting community and political 
support as well as working on business, organizational and legal 
issues. 
(iv) A significant proportion of the workforce will expect to be clo-
sely involved in mounting the attempt at a WTO. Especially when the 
failing enterprise has a history of poor industrial relations, a WTO 
is likely to become a vehicle for aspirations towards worker's manage-
ment and democratic control. For a minority, such views are an 
expression of an explicit political ideology and commitment; more 
commonly these aspirations are less specific and reflect a populist 
ethos of collective self-reliance. The extent of the greater 
influence desired, and its significance for individuals, usually 
varies greatly. Many will not be interested; and others because of 
their personal economic prospects will consider it entirely secondary 
to the primary concern of saving jobs. Such differences in orien-
tation may be hard to reconcile and they have on occasion contributed 
to severe conflicts between political and technical leaders. Hence, 
occasions that enable a widespread involvement in preparing the WTO 
are needed not just to satisfy the expectations of some workers, but 
also because it is important to generate a shared understanding of the 
philosophy of the project - this will usually be needed for the 
constitution of the enterprise as a legal entity, quite apart from 
other reasons. 
In short, it is through their involvement in the take-over process 
that the workfoce take on the psychological ownership of the project 
and evolve a shared appreciation of its meaning and priorities. It is 
from this psychological ownership and common understanding that the 
determination and willingness to change established patterns of work 
arises. Nevertheless, the difficulties in achieving and sustaining 
such involvement are formidable. 
In the first place, the complexity, uncertainty and unfamiliarity of 
the issues involved in preparing a WTO may be intimidating and 
overwhelming for many of the workforce. Passivity, fatalism and a 
sense of powerlessness are understandable reactions. Hence, even if 
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workers attend meetings they remain spectators. This is partly a 
problem of understanding - arising from the difficulty of grappling 
with unfamiliar issues and ideas (legal questions, cash flow, market 
trends etc.). More fundamentally, however, the social process of the 
WTO is actually rather threatening: a WTO undermines established 
occupational roles - e.g. of clerk, supervisor, trade unionist. But 
these are a large element in our social and personal identities. 
Hence especially for those who have over many years become accustomed 
to restricted roles, the demands of a WTO are often unsettling: it 
offers the anxiety of autonomy in place of the security of dependence. 
For example, at the end of long conference to plan a WTO one shopfloor 
worker expressed ouright fury at the proceedings: he had come to hear 
what he as an ordinary machinist would have to produce, and he had 
heard nothing concrete all week - only vague talk about problems and 
possibilities that he considered were nothing to do with him. Because 
he had expressed his frustration, it could be discussed and the 
underlying assumptions about his role in the WTO explored. The person 
concerned went on to play a leading part in the rescue and enterprise 
created. 
In short, involvement in a WTO often changes people's lives - and 
partly for this reason it may be very stressful. Thus, because of 
the demands it makes on them, many of the workforce maybe very hesi-
tant or reluctant to become involved. 
Such reluctance may co-exist with the diffuse expectations of greater 
influence and control mentioned above, and hence the attitudes of the 
workforce will often be varied and complex. Some will be determined 
to be closely involved; some will refuse to become involved insisting 
that the leadership should be trusted and widespread participation is 
unnecessary and dangerous; many will be ambivalent, uncertain and on 
occasions inconsistent. How many of the workforce respond in these 
different ways obviously varies greatly, but in general it seems that 
the older and less skilled the employees, the more hesitant or reluc-
tant they are likely to be about becoming actively involved in the 
WTO. 
A second obstacle to widespread active involvement may be provided by 
the social divisions among the workforce. For example, traditional 
tensions between different occupational groups (skilled and unskilled; 
manual and non-manual) may generate distrust, tension and defe.n-
siveness. Or existing authority relations may be carried over into 
the organization of the WTO so that participation is inhibited. Or 
the presence of different Trade Unions with rival strategies and phi-
losophies may generate conflicts which deter some workers from 
becoming involved and restrict the accepted contribution of others. 
By contrast, it is noticable that when only a fairly homogenous group 
of the manual workers remains to attempt the WTO, it is usually far 
more cohesive and effective - though obviously the absence of other 
types of worker creates other problems. Thus it seems to be the case 
that more people become more effectively involved in a 'safe' social 
setting. Such an atmosphere is more difficult to achieve where the 
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social divisions run deep - which is, of course, more common in larger 
enterprises. 
A third obstacle is often provided, paradoxically, by the very trade union 
organization through which most WTO attempts arise and are pursued. The 
structure of a Trade Union branch is strongly hierarchical and unitary: 
decision-making and consent is achieved through representatives, mass 
meetings and a heavy emphasis on the norm of solidarity. These generally 
provide appropriate mechanisms for democracy in the adversary contexts of 
industrial relations, where decisions can be reduced to simple binary 
choices (accept the offer or not; take industrial action or not; etc). In 
planning a WTO, however, the business and organizational issues involved 
cannot be sensibly handled as if they are binary choices. This is because 
by the time the issues have been structured and simplified to this point, 
most of the key decisions will already have been resolved. In reality, the 
decision-making process in preparing a WTO involves a multiplicity of 
options, great uncertainty and considerable ambiguity. As the discussions 
proceed, as the external situation changes, as more information becomes 
available, as attitudes change, the issues are continually reformulated. At 
particular points, important strategic choices sometimes become, or appear, 
evident. But the process is iterative, as much concerned with re-defining 
options as with choosing between them. Hence those who are not involved in 
this process and the learning associated with it are often unable to 
appreciate the options that result from it. 
Different ways of organizing participation are therefore necessary in order 
to facilitate involvement and promote cohesion - mass meetings, single 
representative channels and appeals for solidarity, are insufficient. Such 
problems are accentuated where the initiative for a WTO arises externally 
from Union or Cooperative Association officials adopting a 'top-down' 
approach (France, Italy). They are also accentuated where there is conflict 
between unions or groups of workers: in such situations wider participation 
may be seen as a threat to unity and the leadership's control. 
The inadequacies of conventional Trade Union organization as a vehicle for a 
WTO and se If-management are shown most clearly in cases of 'trade union 
management' - where the leaders attempt to combine their trade union 
position with that of senior day-to-day management. This pattern has 
occurred quite often in both France and the UK and it is usually disastrous 
- both commercially and in terms of worker participation and influence. 
However, there is nothing at all inevitable about such developments and 
trade unionists have on occasions abandoned their traditional practices and 
experimented with much more open and flexible forms (the cases of AN in the 
German study and CLG in the Italian study, are relevant). 
Fourthly, external pressures commonly provide a further obstacle to 
widespread participation. The shortage of time - sometimes a very few days -
may mean that the WTO has to be arranged by a small group of leaders and 
external advisers, even if their own preferences are for wider involvement 
and se If-management (e.g. Barnsley Metal Finishers). Likewise, the need for 
continuity of personnel in negotiations with external parties tends to 
concentrate information, decision-making and authority in a few hands. 
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Indeed it is probable that the more the WTO depends on achieving the support 
of one particular external body (e.g. a bank or state agency) the more 
centralised and decisive the organization of the WTO becomes. Where a 
larger group of activists is engaged in a range of external contacts, both 
commercial and political, this obviously increases involvement; but 
maintaining the co-ordination and cohesion of this group then becomes a 
priority, and a gulf may arise between it and the workforce at large. 
In summary, despite its importance, the widespread pa:ticipation of the 
workforce in mounting a WTO will often be hard to achieve and maintain. This 
is likely to be true even if the workforce, its leaders and its advisers are 
committed in principle to workforce involvement and self-management -
because the obstacles are structural, cultural ai.d contextual. As such, the 
problems of developing effective se If-management of the WTO attempt 
anticipate many of the problems of se If-management that arise after a WTO 
has been achieved. Hence, the importance of the process of organizing the 
WTO as a formative experience and a learning process for the enterprise that 
is created. 
Given these obstacles, it is not surprising that the workforce some-
times allows a take-over to be managed on their behalf, or that the 
numbers who become involved and the extent of their participation are 
both fairly limited. On the other hand, the threat that the workforce 
faces, and the simple desire to do something to protect themselves, 
can generate a powerful collecting dynamic towards action and involve-
ment. Hence, despite the obstacles, it is not unusual for substantial 
numbers of workers to become fully involved in the discussions and 
preparations leading up to the take-over. In such cases the same fac-
tors that tended to restrict involvement become reasons why the orga-
nizational process is often conflict ridden and disorderly. 
Thus the complexity and uncertainty of the issues can lead to con-
fusion and rumours and sharply fluctuating attendance at meetings. 
The social divisions in the workforce can give rise to distrust and 
power struggles as different groups try to exercise control or protect 
their positions. Trade union structures may reflect and polarise these 
divisions, or become a base for the political leadership in conflict 
with the technical/managerial leadership and its advisors. The 
centralization of authority required by urgent and vital external 
negotiations makes it difficult for the workforce to feel it can 
influence the process, and may undermine trust - or alternatively, the 
preparation of the WTO becomes unco-ordinated and inconsistent because 
many of those involved feel entitled to act and speak on behalf of the 
project. 
Such problems can be severe and they raise serious questions about the 
feasibility of widespread workforce involvement. Thus many commen-
tators and some of those who have tried to advise WTOs, consider such 
'politicization' and 'radicalization' of the process to be an unfor-
tunate and damaging perversion of the real purpose of the project -
the preservation of employment in a credible commercial undertaking. 
In these terms, the excitement, rhetoric, controversy and confusion 
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are at best an understandable consequence of the tension and anxiety 
the workforce is experiencing; and at worst the seeds of conflict and 
disillusion for the future when, after the WTO has succeeeded, the 
commercial requirements for 'proper management' must reassert itself. 
Such views generally appreciate that there are real commercial advan-
tages in improved worker-managment relations and a more committed 
workforce. What they criticise is the undermining of management and 
the underestimation of its importance which they see as the consequen-
ces of attempts to develop participative forms of se If-management. 
In general, it is clear that participation in WTOs as in other con-
texts can have costs as well as benefits. However, as a general com-
ment on the organization of WTOs such views are unduly negative 
towards ideals of se If-management and co-operation. Two con-
siderations, in particular, suggest that these ideals can play a cru-
cial role in the success of WTOs. 
First, aspirations for democratic organization and workers control can 
provide an important bridge between a pre-existing workforce culture 
of opposition to management on the one hand, and a responsible atti-
tude towards (self-)management, on the other. In other words, 
apparently populist or radical ideologies of worker autonomy can be 
functional in facilitating a change of attitudes; they help maintain 
self-respect and consistent identifications when long-standing assump-
tions and roles are being transformed. 
Second, self-management may be a necessity, because a managerial 
vacuum exists that cannot realistically be filled by recruitment. It 
is quite clear that many attempts at WTOs fail or are abandoned 
because no-one is available or willing to take on management roles. 
To the extent that a commitment to se If-management encourages indivi-
duals to take on new roles and responsibilities - and thereby discover 
and develop new abilities - it makes a crucial contribution to the 
success of WTOs. 
3.2.2 Legal Issues in the Formation of a Workers' Enterprise. 
Any attempt at a WTO must choose or devise a legal framework for the 
proposed enterprise. The basic options are as follows: 
o a workers co-operative, under co-operative legislation, 
o a (single) worker-owned enterprise, under conventional company law. 
o a 'two-tier' structure, in which the workforce as a whole controls 
an organization that owns (in whole or in part) the operating company 
(registered under conventional company law). 
Each of these options covers a wide range of possibilities generated 
by two underlying issues: 
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o who will exercise ultimate and day-to-day control of the enterprise; 
o who will provide capital for the enterprise and on what terms. 
Hence the choice of legal framework must produce feasible and accep-
table answers to the questions of management accountability and finan-
cial structure. In addressing such questions, the workforce must 
resolve issues like: 
o the underlying philosophy of the enterprise - whether 'cooperative', 
radical or 'worker-capitalist', collectivist or individualist. 
o the equity base required to obtain loans 
o the extent of individual financial contributions expected (lower 
and perhaps upper limits) and the terms of such loans/shares, par 
ticularly as regards withdrawals of capital. 
o the terms for external contributors as regards both financial 
returns and control. 
o the voting rights, transferability, redemption rights etc of shares 
o the structure of control as regards directors, managers, members 
and employees. 
o the distribution of benefits, including residual assets, especially 
if the workers decide later to revert to an ordinary firm. 
In addition, the choice of legal framework must take account of 
complex taxation rules in order to minimise liability, and of the 
funding criteria used in local or national government policies (e.g. 
concerning greater than 50% employee ownership in Labour Companies, in 
Spain) 
The implications of these points are as follows: 
o the underlying issues are of considerable importance. Although the 
work-force may be impatient just to establish "some kind of legal 
framework", these matters do need to be carefully addressed if 
the attempt is to succeed and if problems for the future are to 
be avoided. Nevertheless, there are occasions where it is more 
important that some framework is chosen quickly, than that the 
'best' framework is chosen; and compromises between what is 
desired and what is feasible will often be needed. 
o Often the decisions on a legal framework cannot be made unila-
terally by the workforce, let alone by a group within it. 
Negotiations with external parties commonly affect decisions over 
the constitution of the enterprise. 
o The complexity of legal and taxation possibilities, constraints and 
language make sympathetic expert advice essential. Such advice may 
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not be available, - and may not be best provided by a lawyer. 
Given the uncertainties, conflicting views, and time available, the 
workforce maybe unable to reach an informed agreement on a legal 
framework. In such cases a transitional form may be desirable 
though thèse are not readily available either (but see below). 
In general, practically any organizational and financial structure is 
possible in principle. The problem for a WTO attempt is to establish 
a match between its requirements as these are progressively clarified, 
and the terms of appropriate legisation, in a way that minimises 
delays and uncertainties for the future. 
As regards the three basic options listed at the start of this 
Section, each has its characteristic advantages and disadvantages: 
o The choice of a co-operative structure virtually ensures support 
from the secondary organizations (associations) of worker coopera-
tives, where these exist. However, co-operative principles 
require that there is a limited return on capital and that ulti-
mate control lies with the membership on a one person one vote 
basis. This normally excludes the possibility of external equity 
capital (but see below). Arranging finance thus becomes much more 
difficult. On the other hand, it has been argued (4) that because 
co-operatives hold most of their assets collectively, as social 
capital which cannot be appropriated privately, they are the 
appropriate form for the investment of public funds. In some 
countries the option of a workers co-operative does not exist -
Danish law does not allow for such a form, and in the FRG the com-
pulsory economic examinations associated with co-operative 
membership render this form inappropriate. By contrast, in Italy 
the advantages of a co-operative legal framework are considerable 
so it is very rare for any other form to be chosen. The co-
operative framework is also widely used in France and the UK. 
o Conventional (single-tier) companies are generally easy to set up 
and offer considerable flexibility. However, complicated provi-
sions regarding voting rights, redeemability and transferability 
must be devised if there is any concern to prevent the firm gra-
dually reverting to conventional external ownership (e.g. as 
employees leave, sell shares etc). Where radical or co-operative 
motivations exists, the individualist basis of such a framework is 
generally viewed with suspicion, and in the FRG this form is also 
disliked because it obligates shareholders to provide additional 
capital under certain circumstances. On the other hand, it is 
clear that in some cases the ease with which the enterprise may 
revert to being a conventionally owned firm, and the possibility 
of the shares eventually appreciating in value, are attractions 
for the workforce or sections of it. This is the more common form 
for WTOs in Spain and it has also been used in Denmark and occa-
sionally in the UK. 
o Two-tier structures cover a wide range of possibilities for part-
nership between the workforce as a collectivity and external 
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bodies. The principal draw-back is the additional complexity 
involved and the fact that each one has to be devised almost from 
scratch. This is the preferred form in the FRG where it is seen as 
administratively more simple and as providing a useful vehicle for 
maintaining the organization and morale of the workforce even if 
the WTO is abandoned. 
In practice, the choices between and within these three options are 
often greatly simplified - for better or for worse - by the personal 
preferences or established positions of the support personnel and 
agencies. In addition, it should be emphasised that in several 
countries this is an aspect of WTOs that is receiving considerable 
attention. For example, a proper legal basis for Labour Companies has 
recently been introduced in Spain; and in the UK model rules have 
been devised for "Equity Participation Co-operatives". It is too 
early to evaluate how these work in practice, but it is hoped they 
will provide both a transitional framework and a solution to some of 
the problems in achieving a satisfactory capital structure. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that other legal issues may also 
have to be considered in the course of a WTO (for example, a WTO, or 
the form it takes, may affect employees entitlement to unemployment 
benefit or redundancy payments). This is particularly true in Germany, 
where the law plays a major role in defining rights and respon-
sibilities in industrial relations: thus certain activities are for-
bidden to the leaders if they hold positions in the works council; in 
addition, a works council cannot negotiate with a state body (and 
hence the need for a new organization of the workforce to be created 
will be particularly urgent). This contrasts starkly with Italy, 
where WTO are so normal, that the parties involved are often content 
to proceed in negotiations on the basis of informal agreementa while 
trusting that legal niceties can be resolved in due course. 
3.3 Securing External Support 
No amount of careful planning and organising will achieve a take-over 
if the workforce is not also able to secure the support of a number of 
external parties. Suppliers must be persuaded to supply materials -
and preferably on normal credit terms, or better. Customers must be 
found - and preferably ones who will give undertakings or sign 
contracts that will demonstrate to others that a market exists. 
Premises may have to be arranged and equipment purchased or leased -
again, on the most favourable terms possible. The receiver and major 
creditors may have to be persuaded to allow more time while prepara-
tion for the WTO are completed. But above all, a bank must be per-
suaded to provide loans - either for working capital, or additionally, 
to assist in purchasing the fixed assets. An analysis of the problems 
that WTOs face in obtaining finance from banks helps to explain why 
often they must also secure a significant measure of political sup-
port. 
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3.3.1 WTOs and the banks 
Not all attempted WTOs have the potential to develop as viable busi-
nesses. But those that do are still likely to have trouble in 
obtaining the finance they require from commercial banks. The reasons 
for this concern the capital structure of WTO enterprises; the 
problems of assessing the commercial prospects of a WTO; and the fact 
that financial institutions are unfamiliar with WTOs. These points 
are dealt with in turn. 
Capital structure 
Where substantial finance for the start of a new and unproven business 
is being sought the normal practice would be for a financial institu-
tion to take an equity stake in the enterprise - thereby allowing some 
supervision of the conduct of the business as well as ensuring a much 
higher return in the event of the risk being rewarded with success. 
However, external equity participation is seen as violating at least 
two of the basic co-operative principles (limited return on capital; 
one member one vote) and is therefore generally not an option for WTOs 
choosing a co-operative legal framework. Moreover, if a co-operative 
framework is not being used the workforce may still wish to retain 
ultimate control - and whether or not this is so, financial institu-
tions may be very reluctant (for reasons given below) to take an 
equity stake in such a venture. 
Hence WTOs normally seek to obtain loans to meet their financial 
requirements. This is immediately problematic, however, because of 
the need to provide security for the loans. Even if redundancy 
payments and savings are invested in the enterprise, the workforce 
will often be unable to provide sufficient collateral. Moreover, even 
if a third party (e.g. the local state) is prepared to guarantee the 
loans or provide some unsecured loans itself, the financial structure 
of the enterprise will be weak. The high gearing ratio (of loans to 
equity) will burden the enterprise with disproportionately high 
interest payments. Especially in the early years, the need to service 
high levels of borrowing may raise doubts over the viability of the 
enterprise. 
Assessing the commercial prospects. 
When financial institutions assess a business proposal they basically 
consider two aspects - the idea, and the people. Assessment of the 
idea concerns the 'hard' business aspects - costs, prices, the extent 
of the market and so on. Such aspects will usually be subject to con-
siderable uncertainty, and this is almost always the case for a WTO. 
Some proposals are obviously sound and others are obviously unsound. 
But most are not obviously one or the other. For example, how does 
one judge the prospects of an enterprise that has been offered con-
siderable sub-contracting work from one or a few major companies? 
a common situation for WTOs. Such work may be profitable in the 
short-term, while leaving the enterprise dependent and vulnerable in 
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the medium and longer-term. Nevertheless, in principle, assessing the 
basic business idea of a WTO is no more (and no less) difficult than 
assessing the business idea of other more conventional enterprises. 
Assessment of the people in the project is, however, quite a different 
matter in the context of a WTO. Normally, banks make judgements about 
the competence and experience of the person or persons in charge of 
the project - because without effective management even good ideas 
will fail, while with effective management even uninspired ideas may 
be made to work. In the context of a WTO, however, this otherwise 
reasonable approach is quite inappropriate. This is not because the 
management of the project (in a broad sense) is any less important, 
but because control of the project is likely to be more fluid and 
dispersed; and because those playing leading roles are likely to be 
learning very rapidly - for all the reasons discussed in Section 3.2. 
It must be emphasized that judgements about the capacity of those 
involved to run the enterprise effectively must still be made - com-
mitment and determination are not in themselves sufficient. Table 1 
lists the sorts of factors that are relevant in forming such judge-
ments, and which those who have been closely involved in supporting 
WTOs would normally take into account. Clearly, it is hardly 
surprising if a banker used to assessing conventional small busi-
nessmen finds it difficult to assess these factors instead, or even to 
recognise their importance. 
· 4Π 
Table 1: Factors affecting the management capacity of proposed WTOs 
Internal 
o The capacity of the workers leadership 
ability and willingness to involve the workforce (e.g. 
frequency and type of meetings; attention given to 
informing them etc) 
ability to respect the commercial as well as the social 
concerns of the project (e.g. attitude to job losses). 
attitude to management (e.g. recognition of importance 
of managerial functions even if former structure is rejec­
ted). 
o The workforce 
adaptability (e.g. age; skill; division of labour; 
willingness to undertake additional responsibility or 
training) 
o - solidarity and commitment (e.g. homogeneity; shared 
priorities; attendance at meetings; financial contribu­
tions etc) 
appreciation of commercial requirements (e.g. 
willingness to modifify working practices etc) 
o The management 
- commercial abilities (e.g. role in failure of 
source company; skills and experience etc) 
- suitability for and commitment to the WTO (e.g. 
management style, financial contribution) 
External 
o Advisory support 
suitable advisors available on a continuing basis. 
relationship with the workforce and its leaders. 
o Trade Union support 
attitude and experience of local officials 
regarding WTO 
o Co-operative movement (or equivalent) support 
technical or managerial expertise 
cultural support for management and workers (e.g. 
training; transfer of relevant experience) 
possibility for commercial support (e.g. contacts, 
joint ventures with other enterprises etc) 
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The unfamiliarity of WTOs 
A WTO is usually an unconventional proposition which is likely to 
challenge numerous widely held preconceptions about the capacities of 
workers to direct their own enterprise. While this may result in an 
outright ideological rejection of the very possibility, a more common 
problem is simply excessive caution. As was pointed out above the 
'facts' of any business proposal are usually ambiguous and uncertain 
and different consultants or experts may produce quite different 
judgements about the same situation. The 'mental set' of the persons 
making the appraisal (which is likely to be sceptical with regard to 
WTO) is therefore an inescapable element in the social definition of 
'commercial prospects'. Such considerations do not rest easily with 
conventional notions of expertise and objectivity. Nevertheless, they 
are taken for granted in many commercial circles, to the extent that 
they are the basis for much professional practice in the area of 
public relations. 
These observations about the frailty of human judgement are not 
offered as an argument for the view that the matter of commercial 
prospects should simply be treated as a game or ritual. But they do 
mean that WTOs face peculiar difficulties in securing the support from 
banks. Even if "in principle" the evaluation of the business idea is 
no more difficult in the case of WTOs, in practice it seems that the 
unconventional nature of the undertaking evokes more cautious and cri-
tical judgements than would normally be expected. 
These three separate problems - of capital structure, of assessing 
viability (particularly regarding the people involved and their 
capacities) and of the attitude of banks towards WTOs - have been 
explained separately. In practice they are very closely intertwined 
and it is very difficult to judge their relative importance. For 
example, the lack of familiarity with WTOs adversely affects the 
assessment of the management capacity; and if often exaggerates the 
problem of capital structure (for example, in many contexts members 
loans are far more sensibly considered as part of the equity base -
during the critical years of the enterprise neither they nor the 
interest they earn can really be withdrawn, and guarantees to this 
effect can be easily arranged.) Likewise, the perceived risks asso-
ciated with an untried and unfamiliar form of management will increase 
the concern that any loans are well secured... and the fact that an 
enterprise is being proposed with such high financial gearing will 
confirm the reservations about the competence of those running it, and 
the wisdom of the whole idea. 
Hence, taken together, thee three factors mean that WTOs fee uniquely 
difficult problems in obtaining adequate finance - regardless of the 
actual commercial prospects. Moreover, since the amount of finance 
available to an enterprise and the terms on which it is provided, are 
important in affecting its viability, the whole question can easily 
become circular and judgements about commercial prospects can be self-
fulfilling prophecies. 
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In consequence, and in the absence of specialist funds for LEIs or co-
operatives, WTOs have to seek capital from other sources. Sometimes 
significant amounts of 'sympathy capital' have been raised - from 
Trade Unions, the Co-operative movement, or by public subscription 
within the local community. But commonly a WTO has to turn to the 
state, either locally or nationally, for support. 
3.3.2 Patterns of Political Support. 
The scope for obtaining political support for a WTO, and the form that 
such support takes depend on a wide range of factors: the scale of 
the impending closure, the previous experience of WTOs, whether 
appropriate instruments exist through which funds can be obtained, and 
the extent of the financial or other assistance sought, - not to men-
tion the proximity of elections (see the German study, for example). 
Nevertheless, two different patterns can be broadly distinguished. In 
one, the political and the commercial support for the WTO are loosely 
coupled; in the other they are tightly-coupled. 
The 'loosely-coupled' model has been common in Italy where it was 
described by Rossi in 1980 as "the ritual for companies in crisis." 
The elements of this are: 
o Public meetings promoted by the workers' council in association with 
the political parties and other bodies. These discuss the causes of 
the Italian industrial crisis and call on the authorities to act to 
safeguard employment in the factory in question. 
o The owners and the workers' representatives are summoned to meetings 
with the prefect where both sides agree to discharge their respon-
sibilities, the problems of the industrial sector are recounted, 
the desire for a new buyer is expressed, inquiries to Rome are pre-
pared, and so on. 
o Messages of encouragement, sympathy, solidarity etc are received 
from social institutions, other workers' councils, trade unions etc. 
The result of all this activity - which may take some time - is a gra-
dual acceptance that the only way to preserve the enterprise and its 
employment is through a WTO - and a public commitment for this course 
has by this time been built up. It is only at this stage that the Co-
operative Associations and advisors can begin serious work on pre-
paring a business proposal. 
Hence the political commitment to support the WTO, based on a rather 
loose appreciation of the commercial possibilities, precedes the 
detailed technical planning, the calculation of financial requirements 
and so on. 
By contrast, in the 'tightly-coupled' model, the political support is 
dependent on the apparent viability of the project' as represented in a 
detailed plan. But since, for the reasons set out in the previous 
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section, the commercial prospects of the WTO are likely to depend on 
the extent of a political commitment, this means that efforts to 
obtain the support of the banks and the public authorities are itera-
tive, and proceed together in close conjunction. Thus, an initial 
proposal for the WTO is discussed with both banks and government offi-
cials. The responses are cautious but indicate the sorts of con-
ditions that will have to be met, the additional information required, 
and so on. In due course a revised proposal is prepared and pre-
sented, and if it is seen as showing sufficient promise, the extent of 
support that may be provided is discussed along with a more detailed 
set of conditions regarding the further modification and elaborations 
of the plan that will be expected. This process continues until 
agreement is reached - or until it is clear agreement cannot be 
reached. 
Both these models can work effectively, though the 'loosely-coupled' 
oine may depend on the existence of strong Co-operative Associations 
that have the desire and the capacity to support the new enterprise, 
and the right and duty to step in and take over trusteeship if it is 
in serious difficulty. Where this expertise and experience is 
lacking, the 'loosely-coupled' model is often disastrous. For example, 
in France, Spain and the UK there have been cases where a strong poli-
tical commitment to rescue an enterprise has been made, and as a 
result WTOs were achieved. But the enterprises quickly ran into dif-
ficulties because important commercial considerations had been 
neglected. 
On the other hand, the 'tightly-coupled' model can also be abused. 
This happens when in the end the public authorities effectively use 
the unwillingness of the banks to support the project on a normal com-
mercial basis as grounds for denying its viability and thus for with-
holding support (see the FRG study for an example). This position 
ignores the particular problems that WTOs face with the banking 
system. It also overlooks the possibility that a project may appear 
insufficiently profitable to justify the risks if funded on a normal 
commercial basis while still having sufficient prospects of profitabi-
lity to justify a measure of public support - in other words, that it 
may very well be appropriate for public authorities to use a less 
demanding standard of viability than a commercial bank in assessing 
such projects (which is certainly not to suggest that viability is 
unimportant). 
3.4 Summary 
When a workforce attempts to take over a business this involves the 
preparation of a business plan, the creation of a new organization, 
and the mobilization of external support. These three areas of acti-
vity are closely inter-related. 
The willingness of the workforce to accept responsibility for ensuring 
viability is critical for the formulation of a realistic business plan 
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- and the discussion and preparation of the plan by the workforce is 
the vehicle by which it starts to discover and come to terms with the 
implications of a WTO. Decisions over job losses present these impli-
cations most starkly. While a substantial reduction in employment is 
commonly required there are a number of ways in which the difficulties 
this poses can be handled without jeopardising the WTO - particularly 
where there is external support from public agencies and other worker 
co-operatives. 
The preparation of a credible business plan also depends on whether 
the workforce can obtain the necessary information and advice. In 
this respect, the attitude of the existing owners or managers, the 
extent to which the new venture can adopt the products, markets etc of 
the old, and the availability of appropriate support agencies or net-
works, are particularly important. 
The business plans for most WTOs can be understood as variants of two 
basic strategies. The 'rescue' strategy is more like a conventional 
recovery plan intended to cut costs and abandon unprofitable lines. 
It tries to avoid any break in production and hence has the advantages 
of preserving the customer base and maintaining continuity of 
employment. On the other hand, the time available may not be suf-
ficient to assess business prospects in detail, or for the workforce 
to come to terms with commercial self-reliance. 
A 'phoenix' strategy is more like starting up a new enterprise -
except that it is based on some of the employees, assets and perhaps 
customers of the old business. Characteristically there is a break of 
several months before production re-starts. This can lead to problems 
if key workers seek employment elsewhere. On the other hand, the 
additional time often makes it easier to plan the business realisti-
cally, and allows for attitudes to change, training to be undertaken, 
and the self-selection of a committed and cohesive group of workers. 
In addition a selection of the assets can often be purchased com-
paratively cheaply from the liquidator, thus avoiding taking over the 
entire plant (which may be valued as a 'going concern', and carry with 
it some liabilitites, in the case of a 'rescue'). 
In practice these two strategies are more or less appropriate in dif-
ferent circumstances and many WTOs develop schemes that fall somewhere 
between them. However the distinction does highlight the particular 
difficulties of achieving a viable WTO in the case of the 'large 
plant ' closures that have often attracted considerable publicity and 
political controversy. For a variety of reasons (e.g. parent company 
control of markets, obsolete but capital intensive production facili-
ties, etc) a rescue strategy is unlikely to be viable; a phoenix 
strategy will only support a small fraction of those previously 
employed; and neither approach is likely to sustain the high cost of 
the new product development often required. 
The organization of a WTO is a formative experience for the enterprise 
created. Although some WTO are promoted by external parties and the 
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leadership, with the workers themselves in a passive role, it is more 
common for many of the workers to be actively involved. Ensuring the 
effective involvement of the workforce in the direction of the project 
poses severe problems - for structural, cultural and contextual 
reasons. Hence the procerss may at times appear passionate, disor-
derly, and 'unprofessional'. Nevertheless this involvement is often 
essential for a'number of very practical reasons - it generates the 
shared understanding and the commitment necessary for new patterns of 
work and organization to develop. Hence, too, the ideals of self-
management often (but not always) associated with WTOs cannot be 
dismissed as being irrelevant in principle and damaging in practice, 
in relation to the primary objective of job preservation. These popu-
list and radical ideologies of worker autonomy appear often to be 
highly functional - for example, in facilitating a change of attitudes 
(e.g. from opposition to management to the acceptance of 
(self-)management responsibilities); in encouraging individuals to 
come forward to fill the managerial vacuum that commonly exists. 
These and other organizational issues are often highlighted by dif-
ficult choices over the legal constitution of the enterprise - choices 
which will express the individualism or collectivism of the 
enterprise's philosophy, affect its financial structure, and determine 
how it is to be controlled. The absence of appropriate legal fra-
meworks has been a serious problem in several countries and contrasts 
with the situation in Italy where the legal status of a co-operative 
provides clear advantages over other forms. 
Although attempts at a WTO must gain the support of a range of exter-
nal parties - suppliers, customers, the receiver, etc - the financial 
support of a bank is generally most critical. To do so means over-
coming three problems that are quite independent of the actual 
commercial prospects: 
o the problem of capital structure (the workforce's resources pro-
vide insufficient security for loans - and if loans are obtained 
the financial gearing may be excessive). 
o the crucial question of the management capacity of the enterprise 
is more difficult to assess (and this cannot sensibly be done on a 
conventional basis) 
o in most countries the banks are unfamiliar with WTOs; this, quite 
apart from an ideological antipathy, often involves misconceptions 
and evokes excessive caution. 
In practice these closely interrelated problems mean that WTOs must 
obtain a measure of public funding - eg as loans or guarantees - to 
reduce their commercial borrowing requirement, or the risk associated 
with it. Hence WTO commonly seek political support as well. 
The somewhat uneasy combination of political and commercial logics 
poses problems for the workforce and usually follows one of two cour-
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ses. In the 'loosely-coupled' model, a political commitment to the 
WTO precedes the detailed planning of the WTO and its financial 
requirements. In the 'tightly-coupled' model, political support 
depends on the commercial appraisal, and vice versa, so the process is 
iterative rather than sequential. Each of these patterns can generate 
sound business plans, a committed workforce and adequate financial 
support - and each, too, has its own way of failing. 
4 After the Take-Over: Varieties of Success and Failure 
4.1 Overview: Collapse, Marginality and Consolidation. 
This chapter reviews the experience of the enterprises established as 
a result of WTO attempts that were successful. Such enterprises com-
monly start in a mood of optimism or even exhilaration, with the work-
force feeling (justifiably) that affecting the take-over was itself a 
substantial achievement. Nevertheless, the commercial situation of 
the enterprise will often be precarious, with enormous and unfamiliar 
problems needing to be tackled. Before considering the commoner orga-
nizational processes that arise in grappling with these problems it is 
helpful to distinguish a number of characteristic outcomes: 
Collapse. This refers to cases that never look like achieving viabi-
lity. The failure may occur relatively quickly - as when an expected 
major contract is suddenly withdrawn. Or it may happen progressively. 
A particularly important case is that of the large plant in a 
declining industry established under the most severe conditions: the 
rescued enterprise gradually contracts before finally becoming 
bankrupt. Such cases make little sense when considered as attempts at 
a business 'turn-around'. Nevertheless, the social and economic func-
tions they perform, often in areas of acute need, may be considerable: 
in effect, they provide a vehicle for managing the decline of a major 
employer and may deserve support simply on this basis. 
Marginality. Like many other small and medium-sized enterprises, many 
WTO enterprises achieve a marginal status in their sector. They are 
trapped in a poor competitive position with precarious profitability 
(e.g. as sub-contractors, or because of obsolete equipment, or because 
they produce 'mature' products with declining markets). In any year a 
proportion fail; but many continue for years. 
Consolidation. A minority of cases effect a 'workers turn-around' -
profitable, competitive and expanding businesses are developed. 
Although some WTO provide clear examples of these types (see the 
country studies) the categories are not clear-cut and many cases are 
hard to classify. Hence it is hard even to estimate the proportions 
of WTOs that are of each type. In addition, the proportions vary bet-
ween countries - for example Denmark appears to have had an unusually 
high proportion achieving 'consolidation', and in Italy 'collapse' is 
much less common because of the strong role of the Co-operative 
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Associations. As a rough indication, however, it seems that generally 
up to 25% of WTOs result in 'collapse', and likewise up to 25% achieve 
'consolidation'. The remainder can be classified as 'marginal' (even 
if some of these fail after a number of years). Of course, such pro-
portions reflect the extent of the continuing support available for 
the enterprises, as much as their 'inherent' potential. 
It should also be pointed out that in some cases of marginality and 
consolidation, the rescued enterprises may cease to be worker owned. 
Both weakness and success can provide the conditions under which 
ownership and control are surrendered to another company or entrepre-
neur . 
The remainder of this section addresses some of the characteristic 
social and commercial processes, and the circumstances surrounding 
them, that generate these outcomes. 
4.2 Reducing Costs 
Cost reductions tend to be achieved in two main areas: management 
overhead costs, and production costs. Savings in the former are par-
ticularly significant where the unit has been subject to standard head 
office charges. It is not uncommon, too, for the enterprise to bene-
fit considerably from the ending of inappropriate central policies on 
e.g. purchasing and pricing (Red Dragon stores in North Wales 
illustrates this point; similar advantages are reported for manage-
ment buy-outs). 
As regards productions costs, it seems that WTOs may have a potential 
comparative advantage in this area (in relation to other takeovers or 
buy-outs). This is the area about which the workforce have the most 
knowledge and experience, and where the achievement of improvements 
depends critically on their active involvement. The scope for such 
cost reductions will depend on the quality of the previous management 
and on technological limits but may be considered under two headings: 
o reduced labour costs: these will often be attendant on changes in 
production methods and organization. In general they can arise in two 
ways : 
reductions in manning levels, consequent on e.g. the closure of 
unprofitable lines, increased labour flexibility, increased work 
rates, a reduction in supervisory staff (with self and peer monitoring 
being substituted), and the 'screening out' by the workforce of less 
motivated and productive workers. 
wage reductions, often as a result ofv or in conjunction with, 
reduced wage differentials. 
o improved working methods: most conventional enterprises, especially 
larger ones, fail to enlist the intelligence and knowledge of the 
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workforce in devising production methods. A WTO provides the motiva­
tional and organizational context for this latent ability to be 
realised - and the results may be spectacular. Well documented cases 
include productivity improvements at Manuest and the conversion of 
the presses at the Scottish Daily News, from broadsheet to tabloid 
(this was achieved quickly without any losses of production against 
expert predictions that it would be impossible without them being out 
of commission for at least a month.) These and a wide number of other 
examples, along with a review of the reductions in unit labour costs 
chieved (generally between 35% and 50%) are provided in Bradley and 
Gelb (5) 
The means of reducing labour costs listed above are the basis for Trade 
Union anxieties about 'self-exploitation' and the undermining of 
established terms and conditions in the industry. However it seems 
that objections to WTO on this basis are more common where Trade 
Unionists have little direct experience of WTO. Where trade unions 
have more experience, and are informed and consulted, any problems are 
more likely to be quickly resolved, and flexible arrangements for a 
transitional period can generally be agreed (eg France, Spain.) 
It must be emphasised however that the potential comparative advantage 
of a WTO in relation to reducing production costs may not be 
realised. This depends entirely on the extent to which the workforce 
have accepted both psychological ownership of the enterprise and the 
realities of its commercial situation and are prepared to collaborate 
in tackling intensely difficult decisions. Hence, the crucial impor­
tance of involving the workforce fully from the beginning of the take­
over process, and ensuring that a climate favourable to continued 
learning is maintained. 
4.3 Implementing New Product-Market Strategies 
If WTO enterprises have a comparative advantage as regards production 
management and costs, this is rarely the case in other areas of mana­
gement, for the following reasons: 
o key managers may have left, and those that remain may be ineffec­
tive (poor quality management is ε common feature of firms that 
have been in decline over a period of years - being both 
cause and effect) 
o sympathetic and suitable managers may be hard to recruit 
(especially given the uncertainty, and perhaps an egalitarian wages 
policy) 
o the workforce will commonly underestimate the importance of skills 
and activities they are unfamiliar with. At worst, there will be 
widespread hostility towards any conventional managerial roles or 
personnel, on grounds both of cost and ideology. 
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Hence, rescued enterprises tend to be 'under-managed' in terms both of 
quantity and quality, particularly in the areas of marketing and 
finance. Such problems are not uncommon among small and medium-sized 
enterprises. (There is a sense in which only the most successful can 
afford to be we 11-managed.) However they tend to be more severe after 
a WTO, and the low status and role ambiguity of managers may accen-
tuate the difficulties. 
One common pattern is for a former shop steward to assume the role of 
general manager or managing director. While there are cases of this 
succeeding, it is prone to failure - the role change (or combination 
of roles) is hard to accommodate and the individual has too much to 
learn, too quickly. In larger units this can result in a further 
undermining of the position of management (6). In smaller units it 
may mean a managerial vacuum - an example is provided by the WTO 
bakery in Scotland which traded profitably for 6 months on the basis 
of a particular hot pie. Advisors persistently warned that a summer-
time product was needed. This problem was ignored as the leader worked 
very long hours with his colleagues producing the pies. When the 
warmer weather came, demand fell away sharply, it was too late to 
identify a suitable alternative, and the co-operative collapsed a few 
months later. 
In any event, a rescued enterprise must attempt to evolve new product-
market strategies - a new 'entrepreneurial formula'. Such attempts 
commonly experience the following difficulties: 
o inadequate systems of financial information and control mean that 
available resources may be draining away, the profitability of dif-
ferent activities may be unclear, and agreement on difficult deci-
sions may be hard to achieve. 
o the enterprise may be so under-capitalised that the costs 
of entering new markets, re-investing to reduce the cost advantages 
of competitors, or developing new products are prohibitive. More 
commonly, some funds will be available, but these are insufficient. 
o management adopt a series of desparate stop-gap measures in order 
to ensure some work is available and in the hope of 'buying time'. 
For example, small sub-contract orders, or selling goods through 
Trade Union branches. At best such measures may make a contribu-
tion to overheads; at worst, they generate a pattern of short-term 
and ineffective management which makes any attempt to tackle the 
strategic problems even more difficult. 
By contrast, where consolidation is achieved the following conditions 
commonly exist, often in combination: 
o the combination of financial restructuring and cost reductions is 
sufficient to ensure profitable operation; the competitive posi-
tion is basically sound and any modifications to the product-market 
strategy of the old firm are limited and obvious. 
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o an up-turn in demand restoree profitability and the additional 
resources that become available are directed towards improving the 
enterprise's competitive position. 
o the initial basis of the enterprise, or the improvements achieved 
shortly after the WTO, ensure survival for a number of years during 
which a more effective management team develops within the 
enterprise - e.g. young junior staff develop abilities they never 
expected to possess. 
o the enterprise receives and accepts continuing advice and support 
from a competent advisor associated with the co-operative movement, 
and gradually evolves a focussed and effective product-market stra-
tegy 
o the rescued enterprise receives advice, orders, finance and mana-
gerial personnel from other co-operatives, or co-operative consor-
tia. On occasions, in Italy and France, the enterprise may be 
merged into another co-operative either permanently, or in order to 
build it up again for a secure and independent future. 
o the enterprise attracts the investment (either from commercial 
banks or from co-operative or public sources) needed to re-equip 
and increase productivity. 
o the workforce's ability to manage day to day production is matched 
with external management of marketing and strategic considerations, 
within a policy framework determined by the workforce (the case of 
TCS in the French study has some of these features). 
4.4 The Problems of Institutionalising Collaborative Management 
In the early days, the management and workers in a rescued enterprise 
commonly display high levels of solidarity and commitment. The 
achievement of the take-over, the experience of successful collabora-
tion in devising new production methods, the uncertain economic 
prospects along with hopes of greater rewards in the future, may all 
combine to create an exhilarating climate. Not suprisingly, such an 
atmosphere cannot be sustained for long and it gradually subsides to 
some more 'normal' level. What is crucial, however, is the degree of 
commitment and the quality of relationships that become 'normal' in 
the enterprise. High levels of individual commitment, personal 
responsibility and trust between management and workers (and between 
different groups of workers) are not just a commercial asset; they are 
also a source of pride and satisfaction for many workers, compensating 
for a lower wage and vindicating the philosophy of the enterprise. 
However, WTO enterprises face a number of problems in institutiona-
lising new values and a collaborative form of management: 
o Intense production pressures and long hours of work may undermine 
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morale. More seriously, they make it difficult to afford the time 
for the meetings required to resolve disagreements consensually, and 
to ensure a continuing appreciation of other people1s views and 
circumstances. 
o The 'old' values may still be embedded in the production technology 
and organization, in the form of repetitive highly routinised work 
and a clear separation between those who plan and control, and 
those who are operators. To the extent that the experience of 
responsibility, discretion problem-solving and control at the level 
of the work group provide a foundation for an involvement in 
enterprise decision-making, this constrains the scope for institu-
tionalising the new values - especially if the capital and training 
costs of a more progressive production system are high. Moreover, 
the social divisions associated with fragmented labour generate 
conflict and undermine the cohesion of the workforce. 
o With employees often expecting much greater influence in day to day 
decision-making, the role and responsibility of managers can become 
confused. While it may be accepted in principle that 'managers 
must manage', they are usually accountable to the workforce and 
they may be unclear as to the extent of their authority (this is 
especially true when the worker's leader effectively combines the 
roles of shop steward's convenor and managing director). Such 
problems tend to be particularly acute in larger enterprises with a 
history of an authoritarian style of management and poor industrial 
relations. In such cases, old suspicions and stereotypes are 
likely to reassert themselves and those involved may lack any model 
or experience of a more participative style of management. 
At worst, these factors will combine with a deteriorating financial situation 
to produce a vicious circle of decline. Morale and commitment 
collapse, decision-making is paralysed, and disputes break out as 
further sacrifices are called for, in order to reduce costs still 
futher. Amid the bitterness and mutual recriminations, anyone with a 
prospect of work elsewhere (often key personnel) leave. 
Happily, such extreme cases seem fairly rare. More commonly, there is 
a gradual or partial reversion to some more traditional pattern of 
management. The workers expectations of influence are progressively 
reduced; various practices and bodies designed to express worker con-
cerns cease to function; the authority of newly appointed or inter-
nally developed managers increases; the commercial stabilisation of 
the enterprises both reduces the need for major change and provides 
greater material rewards to compensate for reduced social 
satisfactions; staff turn-over and recruitment dilutes the body of 
workers who remember the 'great days'; memories fade. The need to 
promote more participation may even be recognised as a problem. 
Such tendencies are neither inevitable nor irreversible. A signifi-
cant minority of rescued enterprises succeed in instituionalising new 
values - in quite considerable measure, even if not to the extent that 
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some had hoped. In other cases, deliberate efforts are made to arrest 
or reverse the processes of 'degeneration' (see especially the Danish 
and Italian studies for a discussion of some typical patterns). The 
conditions which appear to favour such developments are as follows: 
o integration of the WTO enterprise in the networks and associations 
of an established co-operative movement. Such integration can pro-
vide 
realistic models of participative management 
a chance to recruit capable and committed managers 
support for the social ideals of the enterprise 
advice and training in co-operative organization 
the opportunity to learn from peers who have faced similar 
experiences. 
o a leadership which is competently committed to both social and 
commercial objectives and which can balance short and long-term 
considerations. This may be provided by a single individual, or 
by a coherent group. What must be avoided is an (other than 
temporary) dominance by either type of objective; or a failure to 
integrate the different objectives (which leads to conflict and 
inconsistency). A common pattern in Italy is for an older genera-
tion of worker's leaders to make up a board of management, to whom 
managers are accountable. These leaders then negotiate terms and 
conditions of employment and any disputes with a fresh generation 
of shop stewards. The former group effectively argues for longer 
term commercial interests of members; the latter represents their 
immediate or sectional concerns. But both groups share a common 
experience in and commitment to the labour movement. 
4.5 Summary 
Although the proportions seem to vary somewhat between countries, a 
rough estimate is that, overall, up to 25% of WTO fail without ever 
achieving viability; up to 25% are able to consolidate as secure and 
competitive enterprises; the remainder become marginal enterprises 
with fluctuating profitability. In any year a number of these margi-
nal ones will fail - but some will continue for many years. 
Cost reductions are the principal source of improved performance 
following a WTO. These commonly arise from reductions in management 
overheads, reduced labour costs, and improved production methods. The 
productivity improvements associated with WTOs have regularly been 
very substantial. On the other hand, shortages of capital, obsolete 
equipment, a lack of financial and marketing expertise, and a neglect 
of strategic management, have meant that the underlying competitive 
position of many enterprises remains weak (marginality). 
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Where consolidation is achieved the infrastructure of the co-operative 
or worker-owned sector (support agencies, consortia, financial 
institutions) has usually played a vital role. The importance of a 
worker co-operative or worker-owned sector is also apparent in pro-
viding cultural and organizational support for WTO enterprises as they 
progress from the intense commitment, solidarity and egalitarianism of 
the early days to more sustainable forms of collaborative management 
or self-management. 
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5 Policy issues 
It is obvious that WTOs, and a policy of support for them, do not 
offer more than a modest contribution towards the solution of the 
problems of mass unemployment. Nevertheless, considered as one policy 
instrument among others, support for WTO deserves consideration on its 
merits in the particular circumstances of different countries and 
regions. In the light of the preceding analysis of the problems and 
achievements of WTOs, this chapter considers the different purposes 
that may be served by policies and instruments enabling WTOs; it 
reviews the experience so far of efforts by public authorities to sup-
port WTOs; it sets out some general principles covering the nature and 
extent of government support in respect of WTOs; and it highlights a 
number of key areas for the attention of those who consider the WTO 
option warrants additional recognition and support. 
5.1 Rationales for the Support of WTO. 
Support for WTO may be intended to serve a number of rather different, 
if related, objectives. Policies and instruments that will achieve 
some of these objectives will be inappropriate or inadequate for 
others. Hence clarity over the reasons for providing support is 
essential. This section reviews the principal aims and justifications 
for the support of WTOs, in the light of the experience of WTOs so 
far. 
Job saving. This is the first, the simplest, and the most important 
reason for providing support. In the context of Local Employment 
Initiatives support for this purpose is likely to be realistic and 
well-justified. The number of WTOs in an area does respond to policy 
initiatives. Comparatively modest amounts of public funding is often 
able to facilitate substantial investment by the workforce, the banks 
and other parties. Compared to the jobs created in many other LEI 
projects, the number of jobs saved in WTOs is often high. In general, 
the time and resources committed to WTO support appear to generate 
more jobs than an equivalent effort spent on 'new starts'. The sur-
vival rates of WTO enterprises, as far as they can be estimated, do 
not support the popular view that these enterprises soon fail. 
Finally, in terms of labour market management, it is clear that sup-
port for WTOs is entirely consonant with the trend towards supporting 
enterprise creation efforts by the unemployed that is apparent through 
the European Communities. 
Managing Decline Bradley (7) has argued that in the case of 'large 
plant' closures support for a WTO will often be justified even if the 
prospects for viability are poor. In such cases an important objec-
tive fjr governments is simply to manage the decline of the large 
plant so as to minimise the adverse effects on the local economy and 
labour market. Bradley presents a detailed economic analysis to 
justify this view and detail the conditions under which such support 
will be economically justified. The argument is not one in favour of 
economic intervention as such; it simply demonstrate that where some 
intervention is inevitable for social or political reasons, then sup-
port for a WTO in the form of a co-operative or other worker owned 
enterprise will normally be the preferred instrument on strictly eco-
nomi c grounds . 
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These arguments are important. They highlight the need and the scope 
for managing the decline of large plants on which a locality or a 
workforce with industry specific skills, is dependent; and they pro-
vide a rigorous justification for a somewhat more relaxed attitude to 
the commercial appraisal of job-saving projects in such contexts. On 
the other hand, this rationale has the severe shortcoming that in 
practice it cannot really be admitted. To maximise the efficiency 
gains under workers ownership and management there must be a 
widespread belief - founded, ultimately, on actual possibilities -
that economic recovery can be achieved. But to support a WTO while 
admitting one does not believe this actually to be the case, would 
seriously undermine it. For example, it is hard to imagine such a 
venture attracting significant financial contributions from employees 
and the local community; or stimulating a willingness to adopt lavour 
saving production measures. Nor would it be endorsed by cooperative 
associations whose support is so important; it would risk draining 
their resources in the most adverse circumstances, with the inevitably 
high proportion of failures attracting adverse publicity. But if the 
rationale for the policy is not made explicit, then it is likely to be 
politically unrealistic. A policy whose declared intention is to 
facilitate 'workers turn-arounds' cannot result in a significant pro-
portion of 'failures' without being seen as a waste of public funds -
even if, in fact, such 'failures' fall within the range of acceptable 
outcomes. Such seems to be the lesson from the UK in the mid 70s and 
France in the early 80s. 
Nevertheless Bradley's economic arguments may still justify a measure 
of public funding for workforce-based re-employment initiatives that 
combine a gradual run-down of the former activities, with the explora-
tion and preparation of potential 'phoenix' enterprises based on dif-
ferent products. 
Economic re-structuring. The rationale for this objective is based on 
two propositions: 
(i) Re-structuring that arises within a declining enterprise is 
very much preferable, both socially and fiscally, to restructuring 
that results from the closure of one enterprise and the opening of 
another, often in a different region. 
(ii) WTOs can succeed where others have failed or are unwilling to 
try. Even if (inevitably) WTO enterprises are marginal to begin with, 
they can consolidate and develop. 
These two propositions are basically sound - all the countries studied 
provide examples of WTOs that have achieved economic success of this 
sort. So this objective deserves serious consideration. 
On the other hand,this objective is far more ambitious than simple 
job-saving. A job-saving policy might have a time horizon of, say, 
3-7 years, and be considered successful even if the enterprises 
created were economically 'marginal'. But support efforts intended to 
promote economic restructuring would aim to ensure that wherever 
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possible WTO enterprises were able to escape their marginal status and 
secure a longer-term future. It is clear especially from the Italian 
Study that the financial resources, the expertise and the experience 
required to achieve this are very much greater. Hence it is unlikely 
that this is an objective that could be both widely and cost-
effectively pursued in the short-term, in countries and regions with 
limited WTO experience - pilot projects will be necessary first. 
Promoting a Worker Co-operative sector and/or employee ownership A 
cooperative sector and/or more widespread employee ownership are 
widely considered to be desirable for a variety of reasons (see, e.g. 
Section 2.2 above). The very substantial contribution that WTO 
enterprises have made to growth of the worker co-operative sector in 
Italy, and the emergence of the SAL phenomenon in Spain, demonstrate 
that support for WTO can be an effective means of promoting 'economic 
pluralism'. Hence this rationale is reasonably well-founded. 
However, this objective is closely associated with that of promoting 
economic restructuring. Achieving the latter will also contribute to 
achieving the former - a dynamic sector can hardly be based entirely 
on marginal enterprises. In addition, the development of a worker co-
operative sector with its own infrastructure (or equivalent secondary 
organizations for employee-owned firms) increases the prospects for 
economic restructuring through the support of WTOs. Hence, like the 
objective of promoting economic restructuring through WTO, the pursuit 
of 'economic pluralism' is a longer-term objective and subject to the 
same caveats concerning the additional resources required (for 
example, some public investment in the infrastructure of employee-
owned sectors will be needed - as has recently been acknowledged in 
Spain). In general, although support for WTO may contribute to the 
growth of worker co-operative and/or employee owned sectors, it is 
not, on its own, an adequate means to this end - additional measures 
will also be appropriate (the Italian experience is particularly 
instructive). 
Overall, then, in broad terms and with some important qualifications, 
the main rationales for supporting WTOs are well-founded. The 
appropriate scope means and extent of support for WTOs will obviously 
depend on the context and on the relative priority given to the dif-
ferent objectives. But judicious support for WTOs should be con-
sidered no more controversial than other forms of support for 
enterprise creation or recovery and employment preservation. 
5.2 Instruments, pitfalls and dilemmas 
At different times and in different places, WTOs have been supported 
in a wide variety of different ways. The principal initiatives and 
measures are listed under various headings in Table 2. It must be 
stressed first, that many of these initiatives have occurred as part 
of more general efforts to develop local economic strategies or to 
support the cooperative sector; secondly that many measures have 
occurred, whether appropriately or not, only at local or regional 
(rather than national) level; and thirdly, that in very few areas 
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indeed have significant proportion of these measures and practices 
become effectively institutionalised. At least initially support for 
WTOs has always been ad-hoc - it has usually been accidental (as when 
WTOs have been able to use measures designed for rather different 
purposes), or reluctant (as when an administration was giving way to 
political pressure), or impromptu (hastily devised and implemented). 
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Table 2 Policy measures and initiatives to support Worker Take-Overs 
Pro-active Initiatives and Measures: 
o Publicity and information dissemination 
o 'Early warning' systems to give notice of firms that are in difficulty 
o Promoting dialogue with and between TUs and Coop movements 
o Formulation of policy guidelines and strategies 
Initial Enabling Support: 
o Funding for feasibility studies, advisors and other preparatory expenses 
o Assistance with premises 
o Funding and facilities for preparatory courses and meetings 
o Assistance with negotiation and lobbying of third parties 
Financial Measures: 
o Enabling the capitalisation of unemployment benefit 
o Adaptation of other industrial and regional policies to include WTOs 
o Ad-hoc loans and grants 
o Providing financial guarantees 
o Purchase and lease-back of assets 
o Block loan or grant to coop financial institution 
o Creation of special loan fund 
On-going Support: 
o Training courses for members and managers 
o Facilitating secondment/recruitment of managers 
o Purchasing contracts for products or services (including training, work 
experience , etc) 
o Rate relief 
o Tax relief 
o Reinvestment tax incentives 
Infras tructural enhancement: 
o 'Standing arrangements' with independent agencies for funding 
feasibility studies when required 
o Regular financial support for independent agencies 
o Creation of roles/departments for WTO and coop support 
o Creation of semi-independent agencies 
o Procedural changes to speed up WTO support 
o Training for WTO support workers 
o Research and dissemination on new model rules, taxation practices etc 
o Research and dissemination on 'good practice' in WTO support 
o Promotion of coop support networks (conferences etc) 
o Promotion of networks between sources of product ideas and unemployed/ 
coop and labour movements 
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As such the efforts to support WTO have been characterised by a number 
of common weaknesses: 
(i ) Expecting too much, too soon. 
Hastily prepared measures, limited time horizons, and over-ambitious 
policies have resulted in what is seen as an unacceptably high propor-
tion of failures. This was the experience at a national level in 
France between 1982 and 1984, after which the policy on WTO was 
reversed. The underlying misconception in such cases is the failure 
to appreciate the essential social dynamics of a successful WTO and 
the commercial pressures to which they are subject. Thus the short 
term concern to preserve employment has undermined longer-term 
prospects for self reliance and economic regeneration. Local authori-
ties in both France and Britain have also intervened in this way. 
Similarly in Britain WTOs have been seen as a vehicle for pursuing a 
range of othe social objectives - for example, concerning equal oppor-
tunities and model employment practices - with insufficient regard to 
the commercial constraints and pressures affecting the enterprises, or 
the time and support required to institutionalise such values in an 
effective way. 
(ii) Inadequate support measures. 
Common weaknesses in the form and extent of support provided for WTO 
inc lude : 
o providing insufficient funds - as with the Benn Co-ops in the UK, 
when the government was divided. 
o providing funds on an inappropriate basis - i.e. as grants in 
Italy; on a per capita basis, as in Spain. 
o providing funds, but no other support - failing to invest in sup-
port agencies and networks, because access to appropriate infor-
mation and advice was not seen as problematic (Spain). 
(iii) Insufficient attention to smaller WTOs. 
The greater political pressure created by the threat of large plant 
closures provides an obvious explanation for the attention and support 
they have attracted. But the results have been perverse with the 
greatest effort (and the largest financial and political investment) 
being made in the most difficult cases, while the much more straight-
forward opportunities have been neglected. Simply in terms of job 
years preserved, and the investment required, it seems likely that a 
number of small or medium sized WTOs will fare better than one large 
and capital intensive WTO. Moreover small and medium-sized WTOs pro-
vide a valuable pool of experience in assisting more substantial 
attempts at a later date. 
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(iv) No evaluation of support policies. 
The absence in any of the countries studied of any systematic efforts 
to assess policies of support for WTO is striking. Even where the 
support was explicitly provided on an 'experimental' basis - as with 
the 'Benn' cooperatives in the UK - there was no requirement for any 
documentation and dissemination of experience. In consequence, it 
seems that only one serious study (8) has ever been conducted on the 
direct and indirect costs and benefits of measures to support a WTO. 
As a result, it is not possible to compare the cost-effectiveness of 
support for WTOs either with other measures, or with doing nothing; 
and major errors in support for WTOs have had to be painfully re-
discovered even when firms in the same industry were involved. 
These weaknesses have been increasingly recognised and in areas with 
considerable WTO activity the support policies and instruments have 
been, and still are, evolving steadily (e.g. Italy, Spain, parts of UK 
and the FRG). 
Apart from the common weaknesses of initial or existing policy instru-
ments, the experience of WTOs also highlights a number of dilemmas 
that are inherent in any attempt to support WTOs. A clear appre-
ciation of these dilemmmas is important in considering the feasibi-
lity, and possible consequences, of different means of support. These 
dilemmas include the following: 
o Realism versus encouragement. Any policy to support WTO is likely 
to have the unintended consequence of encouraging attempts on an 
inappropriate basis, or of raising false hopes, where the prospects 
are poor. Conversely, it is essential for those who assist the 
workforce in a WTO attempt to confront them with the requirements 
of pursuing such a course. But this must not be done in a way that 
is unnecessarily discouraging. Such a balance may be particularly 
hard to strike if those concerned are under politically derived 
pressures to 'do something'. 
o Financial assistance versus financial dependence. Where public 
funds (or guarantees) are provided for a WTO, the danger arises 
that the workforce may see itself as being rescued, rather than 
being the rescuers. The ethic of self help may only extend to the 
engineering of political support, and not to commercial reconstruc-
tion. The obvious solution is for such support to be provided on 
unambiguous terms, either as a once and for all contribution, or in 
relation to pre-determined performance targets. Thus the workforce 
will know where they stand, and any further assistance must be 
earned. In practice, however, the uncertainties associated with a 
WTO may make it difficult to develop sufficient contractual clarity 
on a realistic basis - and so the door maybe left open for further 
assistance, and thus dependence. 
o The short-term versus the long term; The extent of unemployment, 
pressure from particular closure situations, and the need to 
justify policies in support of WTO in relation to competing alter-
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natives, will all generate strong pressures on policy makers and 
agencies to achieve results. On the other hand where existing 
experience is limited, the cost of failure will be high and the 
infrastructure to support WTOs effectively cannot be created over 
night: the expertise, institutional changes, local networks and 
social climate for significant results can only build up gradually. 
o Support versus direction. A WTO is a collective learning 
experience whose success depends signficiantly on an ethic of self-
reliance. While a great deal can be learned from sympathetic advi-
sors, there are limits to how far and how fast it is possible to 
develop a practical understanding simply on this basis. Moreover, 
the scope for that most vital of all forms of learning - learning 
by the correction of errors - is likely to be strictly limited by 
the precarious financial situation. The nature of the support 
relationship is therefore problematic. On the one hand a reluc-
tance to insist that particular proolems are faced may lead to 
costly mistakes jeopardising the enterprise. On the other hand, efforts 
to prevent failure may easily be counterproductive: insisting that 
particular issues are tackled may undermine the relationship, 
leading to a rejection of the advisor; or it may lead to depen-
dence, and ah erosion of the psychological ownership of the project 
and self-reliance, that are so important for its success. 
5.3 Some General Principles 
o Any support for WTO must recognise that the workforce are the 
central figures in the project. WTO are achieved through and 
because of the workforce. If the workforce is not interested in a 
WTO - and they may have good reasons for rejecting the option -
then the idea cannot sensibly be pursued. Their perspectives, con-
cerns, needs and potential contribution must central be throughout 
the planning and negotiations to support the project. Likewise, 
they are responsible for the success or failure of any adequately 
funded venture. 
o Financial support for a WTO should not be an entitlement. It must 
always be justified in relation to the prospects for developing a 
viable enterprise. It should be provided as far as possible on a 
contractual basis that allow additional support to be obtained 
where past results and future prospects warrant it. 
o Advisory support for a WTO is not the same as normal business 
advice, nor is it effectively provided by conventional business 
advice agencies. Such agencies may well have a contribution to 
make in providing specialist back-up to a WTO and its advisors. 
But they commonly lack or fail to appreciate the social commitment, 
specialist information and extent and style of involvement 
required. 
o The financial support provided for WTOs should be commensurate with 
the other support services available, and vice versa. Money 
without real services is foolhardy; support agencies without 
access to finance are pointless. 
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o Close state involvement in the provision of support is undesirable 
because of the dangers of bureaucratization, of a shortage of 
appropriate skills and expertise, of short-term considerations or 
political patronage, and of imposing additional social requirements 
on the WTO without providing the resources to achieve them (See 
especially the UK study where, e.g. the Greater London Enterprise 
Board expected it to take four months for funds to be made 
available after a loan request was approved). 
o While the backing of the relevant trade unions is important, the 
trade union movement and officials should not be the main source of 
support and advice for a WTO, - unless this is provided through a 
separate agency free from day-to-day pressures and able to develop 
the necessary expertise (as has happened in Wales). 
o The secondary organizations representing WTO enterprises 
(Co-operative Associations, SAL federations etc) and agencies asso-
ciated with them, should be the principal locus of support for 
WTO. The staff of these organizations are most likely to have the 
information, expertise and experience needed, and their interests -
in achieving successful long-term outcomes - are most likely to 
ensure poor prospects are not encouraged. Where such organiza 
t ions do not yet exist, LEI and new social movement networks should 
be recognised as the primary source of support. 
o The state has three roles in relation to the support of WTO. 
(i) Guaranteeing equal access - e.g. in relation to information, 
government programmes, etc. 
(ii) Enabling not directing - e.g. providing resources to support 
those who choose the WTO option and can meet its requirements 
(revolving loan funds, capitalising unemployment benefit, as in 
France and Spain, etc) 
(iii) Co-ordinating and reviewing support for WTO - e.g. promoting 
networks and collaboration among the interested parties, the 
evaluation of policies and practices etc. 
o Given the extreme urgency affecting most WTO, it is essential that 
the provisions of any government measurs are clear, and that they 
can be effected quickly. A complicated generous programme will be 
less useful than a simple strict programme. 
o Support for WTO should be focused on small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Rescues of larger (above say, 300-400 employees) and 
more capital-intensive plants and enterprises should be considered 
exceptional and undertaken only under very favourable circumstan-
ces . 
o Some sectoral and geographic concentration of support for WTO will 
assist in building commercially and culturally integrated networks 
of enterprises and hence is likely to be more cost-effective in the 
long run. 
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5.4 Priorities for enhancing the support of WTOs. 
Within the broad framework provided by the preceeding section the 
following issues deserve particular attention in any efforts to deve-
lop public policy in relation to WTO. 
5.4.1 Removing unwarranted obstacles 
As the country studies illustrate, a range of administrative, legal 
and fiscal obstacles hinder attempts at WTOs. These obstables are 
unwarranted in the sense that they can be neither explained nor 
justified as deliberate decisions intended to produce the effects they 
have. Commonly they are the unintended consequences of legal, policy 
or administrative decisions which were formulated, quite understan-
dably, without regard to the peculiar circumstances of WTOs. For 
example, in Germany some receivers have refused the workforce access 
to company information to which they would normally be entitled on the 
grounds that the relevant laws did not apply to companies under the 
control of a receiver. Likewise, in several countries regulations 
covering entitlement to social security, pensions, redundancy payments 
and unemployment benefits may be framed in ways that effectively pena-
lise those that undertake a WTO. Similarly, the absence of 
appropriate co-operative law (in Denmark and the FRG), deficiencies 
within co-operative law (e.g. the strict limit on the proportion of 
non-manual members of worker co-operatives in Italy) and restrictions 
on the development of co-operative financing (e.g. regulations 
governing deposit-taking institutions in the UK) all present unne-
cessary difficulties for WTOs and their support networks. 
Some of these obstacles are specific to WTOs; others affect cooperati-
ves more generally. Some are minor irritants; others are of major 
significance. A few might require significant legislative time 
because they involve fairly complex legal and other issues; many could 
be resolved by minor additions or amendments to existing provisions or 
even on a purely administrative basis. In no cases would removing 
such obstacles require additional financial commitments by govern-
ments, beyond those already committed to existing programmes. 
For each of the countries studied a considerable number of such 
obstacles can be identified. However they are often difficult to 
describe briefly to those unfamiliar with the legal, fiscal or insti-
tutional context of the country in question. Hence it is beyond the 
scope of this report to provide a comprehensive inventory - and in any 
case many of these obstacles have been discussed in earlier reports in 
th is series . 
The principle of equal access that justifies the removal of admi-
nistrative legal and fiscal anomalies that obstruct WTOs may also 
justify measures of positive discrimination in favour of WTO. The 
argument in this case is that the workforce of a closing plant or 
enterprise is so disadvantaged in its attempts to mount a WTO in rela-
tion to other interests (creditors, asset-strippers, mother company 
etc), and so obstructed by a general lack of understanding of WTO 
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(among banks, suppliers, customers, Trade Unions, receivers etc) that 
only government measures to legitimise and facilitate WTO will prevent 
failures in the market for enterprises and allow the full benefits of 
this option to be realised. Such measures might include: 
o extensions to employee rights to information in the context of 
plant and company closures. 
o modifications to receivership law which are currently framed 
entirely in terms of creditors and shareholders rights 
o under specific conditions the introduction of a 'right to buy' for 
the workforce. (A possible model in this context is provided by the 
provisions under Danish law that give tenants an option to buy a house 
that their landlord has arranged to sell to a third party: if within 
a specified period the tenants can raise the finance to match the 
third party's price, they are entitled to purchase it at that price). 
5.4.2 The Marginality Problem 
A long-standing criticism of the WTO option is that it produces margi-
nal enterprises with poor long-term prospects and unsatisfactory terms 
and conditions of employment. Since most WTO are undertaken and sup-
ported with a limited, job-saving objective, criticism on the grounds 
that they have not also achieved restructuring and consolidation is 
rather severe. Nevertheless, this criticism points to a serious issue 
for worker co-operative and worker-owned sectors. Of course, at any 
point, a substantial proportion of small and medium sized enterprises 
can be considered 'marginal' - any economy, or sector, is bound to 
have some - and they will still contribute substantially to 
employment. Hence the problem is not one of 'marginality' as such. 
Rather, it is, firstly, that the worker co-operative and worker-owned 
sectors have a disproportionate number of marginal enterprises placing 
an undue burden on their resources; and secondly, that those enterpri-
ses with the potential to escape their marginal status frequently lack 
access to appropriate finance and real services to allow this to hap-
pen (for reasons discussed in Chapter 3 and 4). Hence it is important 
that the marginality problem is recognised and correctly understood -
the problems of WTO do not end when they have started trading, or even 
when they have stayed in business and made a profit for a year. 
Support to escape marginality should be provided selectively to the 
most promising cases. But having the capacity to do this will mean 
developing the infrastructure of the worker co-operative (or 
worker-owned) sectors in general, especially in such areas as: 
o Sectoral collaboration and joint ventures 
o Consulting and advisory services 
o Training and 'cultural' support for both workers and management 
o The development of institutions for co-operative financing 
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Although a detailed discussion of co-operative financing is beyond the 
scope of this report, two comments are worthwhile. The 'Marcora' law 
in Italy illustrates one important point. It recognised the need for 
a fund to assist selected enterprises in escaping a marginal status. 
This fund was intended to be quite distinct from other funds provided 
to support WTO in their initial efforts to preserve employment in 
enterprises in crisis. Although the implementation of the 'Marcora 
law" remains problematic (see Italian Study), the proposed arrange-
ments were based on a sound appreciation of the short and the longer-
term requirements and problems of WTO enterprises. 
Secondly, it is clear that co-operative movements and their financial 
institutions must devise ways of sharing more substanially in the suc-
cess of co-operatives that they have supported, and not just bear the 
burden of the losses among those that fail (as some inevitably, will). 
The co-operative principle of a limited return on capital does not 
require that the return be either low or invariate regardless of per-
formance. If public or co-operative movement funds are being risked 
to support a WTO, or to develop a marginal enterprise, the workforce 
must be expected to make some payment for that risk. Indeed this is 
essential if revolving loan funds are not gradually to run down. 
Hence, the need to adapt financial principles and practices to the 
particular context of WTOs does not mean that they should be aban-
doned . 
Public support for measures to address the marginality problem 
(through the development of the infrastructure of the worker co-
operative and worker-owned sectors) would obviously have to be commen-
surate with the social benefits anticipated, but it appears well 
justified on employment grounds (both directly as regards the 
enterprises themselves, and indirectly, in maintaining the credibility 
of the WTO option with employees, Trade Unions, Co-operative 
Associations and other such bodies); as a socially and fiscally effi-
cient contribution to restructuring; and as a longer term investment 
in 'economic pluralism'. 
5.4.3 The 'Large Plant' Problem 
New approaches to the 'large plant' problem are required. On the one 
hand, the social need and pressure for action is particularly great in 
such contexts and there are good grounds for providing public support 
with a view to managing the decline of the plant and creating new 
enterprises and employment. On the other hand WTOs based on a rescue 
strategy have a poor record and the publicity surrounding them has 
discredited the idea. They have generally been commercially unsuc-
cessful, and further support for them is probably politically 
unreal is tic . 
As an alternative it is important to explore the possibility of other 
frameworks within which workforce-based employment initiatives could 
be supported in such cases. The sort of contractual framework within 
which interim funding would be provided, and the appropriate means of 
administering it, would require detailed discussion in relation to 
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particular circumstances. But the basic rationale for trying to 
devise more appropriate arrangements in such cases is clear and it 
would have to be reflected in those arrangements. The aim would be to 
gain the advantages of a WTO - in enlisting the skills and intelli-
gence of the workforce, in cultivating an ethic of self help and self-
reliance, in providing a resource and organizational base for product 
and business development, in protecting the locality from complete and 
sudden closure - without the project becoming demoralized, or 
appearing as a failure because it was unable to achieve commercial 
viability, and unable to provide continuity of employment for all 
those involved in it. 
Despite its difficulties, the experience of the Bitteswell Employment 
Alliance (see UK country study) is suggestive of the scope for work-
forced based initiatives of this sort which, by being less indivi-
dualistic and paternalistic, would seem to have considerable 
advantages over the usual employment advice services introduced in the 
context of large plant closures (limited to employment counselling, 
re-training guidance, business advice, etc). 
5.4.4 The Evaluation and Exchange of Experience 
The following issues are seen as deserving particular attention in 
future studies and conferences, both nationally and internationally: 
(i) Management training and development. 
The role of management in WTOs and other LEIs is both crucial and 
problematic. A shortage of appropriate and competent managers is 
widely believed to be a major constraint on future development. Little 
is known about the profiles and career paths of those who do undertake 
managerial roles in such projects. Currently there are reports of a 
number of experimental management training and development initiatives 
underway, or being prepared, in several European countries. A com-
parative review of these initiatives would be timely. 
(ii) Support methodologies. 
WTOs and other enterprise creation projects require advice and support 
over a range of issues. Such support can only be provided by people 
with the requisite business know-how and with the appropriate coun-
selling skills and approach. In practice, the latter skills are less 
well recognised and are more difficult to find and develop. A study 
of the different models and methodologies for providing such support 
in LEI contexts would raise awareness of this issue and help to disse-
minate good practice. 
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(iii) Cost-benefit studies. 
Although many case studies exist, very few provide information helpful 
to policy-makers. The general case for supporting WTOs set out in 
this report needs to be tested against a few more rigorous studies of 
selected WTOs. The aim would be to enable comparisons with alter-
native measures for both job-saving and re-structuring. 
(iv) Trade Union - co-operative relations. 
A comparative study of recent developments in trade union - coopera-
tive relations is needed to review and disseminate experience of the 
agreements that have been reached, the new initiatives that have been 
promoted (such as co-operative sector branches, courses for Trade 
Unionists in respect of WTOs, collaboration with the new social 
movements) and the extent to which the legitimate anxieties of both 
sides are actually borne out in practice. 
67 a 
References 
1. See, for example, Slatter, S. Corporate Recovery, Penguin Books 
1982 
2. Wright, M. and Coyne, J. Management Buy-Outs, Croom Helm 1985 
3. Slatter, S., op cit 
4. Vienney, C. Socio-economie des organisations cooperatives, Paris, 
ed. CIEM 2 tomes 1980-82 
5. Bradley, K. and Gelb, A Worker Capitalism: the new industrial 
relations, Hienemann Educational Books 1983 
6. Eccles, T. Under New Management, Pan, London, 1981 
7. Bradley, K. Employee-ownership and economic decline in western 
industrial democracies Journal of Management Studies 23:1 January 
1986. 
8. The case of the Scottish Daily News, in K. Bradley and A. Gelb, op cit, 
II. - WORKER TAKE-OVERS IN DENMARK 
by 
Ann Westenholz 
Institute of Organization and Industrial Sociology, Copenhagen 




1 CHARACTERISTICS OF WORKER TAKE-OVERS IN DENMARK 
1.1 Number, ownership form and product range 
1.2 The establishment phase 
1.3 Management forms 
1.4 The role of trade unions 
1.5 Efficiency 
2 WHY ARE THERE SO FEW WORKER TAKE-OVERS IN DENMARK? 
2.1 Political and institutional climate in the 1980s 
2.2 Unemployment benefit in the Danish welfare state 
2.3 The tradition of centralization in the labour movement 
2.4 The tradition of individual entrepreneurs 
3 CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS 




1 CHARACTERISTICS OF WORKER TAKE-OVERS IN DENMARK 
1.1 Number, ownership form and product range 
During the last 15-20 years in Denmark there have been 14 recorded 
worker take-overs involving five or more employees and in which there 
has been some sort of threat of company closure (1). There have also 
been a few attempts, which never succeeded - primarily because the 
workers could not raise sufficient capital, or because they were 
doubtful about of the possibility of keeping their jobs even if they 
contributed capital to the firm (2). Besides these defensive worker 
take-overs there have also been a few offensive ones, where the firms 
were prosperous at the time of the take-over. These have not been 
included within the scope of this study, but an example is provided in 
Case A Appendix 1. Such offensive WTO are generally promoted by a 
concern to prevent the sale of the firm to a third party. 
In all of these enterprises the staff own at least half of the share 
capital. Within this broad boundary we have differentiated as to 
whether the enterprise are: 
Fully employee-owned 
Partly employee-owned 
The fully employeed-owned enterprises are those in which the 
"intensity of employee ownership" (3) is more than 67 per cent. There 
are seven enterprises of this type. The partly employee-owned 
enterprises are those in which the intensity of employee-ownership is 
between 33 and 67 per cent. There are seven of this type (see Case Β 
in the Appendix). 
The definitions of "fully and partly employee-owned" have been 
invented by Danish researchers, because in Denmark there are no offi­
cial or legal demarcations pertaining to such an enterprise form. 
This lack of legislation has meant that these enterprises have had to 
adapt themselves to existing company legislation, and we thus find 
several different company forms represented - limited companies, pri­
vate foundations etc. In the case of fully employee-owned enterprises 
in particular, the legislation is considered to be unsatisfactory 
because the ideology of these enterprises has led to expectations of a 
more democratic ownership form, which is not really provided for in 
law. In the meantime they have solved their problems by using an 
existing company form and appending regulations that define the 
democratic element. 
These enterprises employ a negligible part of the workforce: 500 
employees in all. The largest enterprise has 150 employees. The 
lower limit is five employees. If the limit had been lower, there 
would have been many more worker take-overs in Denmark. (4) 
The enterprises' activities range from mechanical-industrial tasks, to 
craft production, to simple services, and to more complicated 
intellectual service tasks. 
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This rather small number of worker take-overs raises the simple 
question; why are there so few in Denmark? Before attempting to 
answer this question the conditions in the existing worker take-overs 
are briefly outlined. 
1.2 The establishment phase 
At the time of establishment of employee ownership, all the enterprises 
were at the point of closure for one reason or another. 
o some were in an economic crisis 
o some were economically sound but upon the death of the previous 
owner could not find a new owner to keep them running 
o some were a sound part of a concern that was itself in an economic 
crisis 
o some were a sound part of a larger concern but did not fit into 
managements' chosen product - market strategy, so they wanted to 
close the enterprise. 
The employees' motivation for taking over the enterprise can be 
divided into two categories; 
o Job-saving 
o Enterprise-saving 
In the job-saving enterprises the individual employees have faced a 
real threat of unemployment, whereas employees in the enterprise-
saving enterprises could have found other jobs on the labour market 
but wanted to preserve the particular work entity that the enterprise 
provided. (See Cases Β and C in the Appendix). 
The previous owner's attitude towards a worker take-over has been an 
important factor. Table 1 provides a categorization of such attitudes 














Table 1 Former owner's attitudes towards WTO 
Type 1 - These previous owners were usually facing an economic crisis 
in which the employees' offer was the only one, or the employee had 
simply outbid the other offers. In these cases the previous owners 
had been positive and often supported the employees in the first 
chaotic establishment period. 
Type 2 - These owners considered that they could get a better offer 
from elsewhere or that it was economically unsure whether the 
employees would be able to run the enterprise and pay back outstanding 
debts. They, therefore, sought other solutions, which led to a real 
conflict between the owner and employees. The result has usually been 
that the employees have had to form a new company in order to keep the 
enterprise running. 
Type 3 - These owners "donated" the enterprise to the employees 
because of a positive ideological attitude, believing it was now the 
turn of the employees to prove that they could keep the enterprise 
running. However, for these owners, the economic loss was bearable 
because the enterprise had all been in some economic difficulties 
anyway. 
Type 4 - These owners have had a negative attitude towards worker 
management/ownership and this attitude has actually strengthened the 
employees' desire to take over the enterprise, especially since they 
had a quite reasonable fear that the previous owner would close down 
their part of the enterprise. 
The sort of support and advice network that has been used in the 
establishment phase is characterised by its informality. As indicated 
above, the previous owner has played a large role in some cases. In 
addition workers have contacted family and friends who had a pro-
fessional knowledge of business. A third source of advice has been 
customers and suppliers - in a few cases they have provided con-
siderable assistance. More formal contact to public institutions is 
virtually absent. 
It is usually the case, especially in the partly employee-owned 
enterprises, that the employees themselves have contributed a con-
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siderable amount of the equity capital. On average, it has been 
equivalent to 20 per cent of a skilled indust rial worker's annual 
salary. In the fully employee-owned enterprise the employees invest-
ment has often been of a more symbolic nature. The reason is partly 
th at the previous owner has sold the enterprise to the employees 
under favourable conditions, or that the capital intensity is low. 
The establishment phase has been especially difficult for several of 
the enterprises, for a variety of reasons such as: 
1 For the fully employee-owned enterprises, as mentioned earlier, 
company law has been considered inprecise - but these firms have been 
able to devise their own solutions to that problem. 
2 Time has been a problem because, in the nature of these things, it 
took longer to arrange the support for an employee purchase than for a 
single person to ma ke such a decision. This problem is accentuated 
where the owner has not been positive. 
3 In Denmark regulations concerning the possibility of remaining 
entitled to unemployment benefit as an employee-owner are unclear. As 
several of the enterprises started in difficult economic circumstances 
this has been an acute problem for the employees (see case C). 
4 For some of the enterprises there have also been problems with bank 
demands concerning collective liability for loans. 
1.3 Managagement Forms 
The employees have used their democratic voice in different ways, that 




In talking-democracy, the employees attempt to arrive at a consensus 
as to problem definition and solution. In voting-democracy, most of 
the decisions are reached by voting among the employees. Both forms 
are direct in the sense that the employees personally participate. 
This is in contrast to the third form, in which the employees elect 
representatives as management, directors, etc. to look after their 
interests. 
In the fully employee-owned enterprise there is usually a combination 
of these three forme, the weight attached to each varying. In every 
case there is an employee assembly which often meets several times a 
year (up to once a week). Attendance is often greater than 50 per 
cent - up to 100 per cent - and important problems such as capital 
expansion, new investment, hiring and firing of staff, and long-term 
policies are discussed. The management and board of directors are 
also elected here, which provides the element of representative 
democracy. 
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The partly employee-owned enterprises have a much more traditional 
management form. In this case the decision making authority as 
regards important matters lies with the management and board of direc-
tors. Because the ownership is only partial, only a limited number of 
employees participate in the election of the day to day management. 
In most cases, however, there are information and discussion meetings 
approximately every second month. Thus even though these forums do 
not have any decision-making authority, the daily management is 
influenced by what takes place at these meetings. 
If the way management forms develop with time, after the worker take-
over is considered, one can differentiate between four patterns of 
development (6): 
o Degeneration of democracy 
o Regeneration of democracy 
o Growth of democracy 
o Stable democracy 
The degeneration of democracy has taken place in six cases. In the 
establishme nt phase of the worker take-over they all developed a 
degree of democracy which was later abandoned in favour of a tradi-
tional management. However, this transformation happened, in all six 
cases, because the ownership degenerated. The firms either needed 
capital or employees - and the problems were solved by attracting 
either external capital (and control, or new employees (who did not 
become owners). Thus the degeneration process did not follow the life 
cycle-model developed by Meister which stresses the contradictions 
between democratic management and the efficiency requirements of the 
market (7). 
There is only one example of a regeneration process. In this case the 
workers developed a direct democracy immediately after the take-over 
(about 10-12 employees were involved). They all meet once a week. 
However the meetings seemed to produce more problems and conflicts 
than they solved, and after a year or so they appointed three people 
to take care of the management in collaboration with the board. They 
had heavy economic problems. The direct democratic element disap-
peared - old members left the firm - and new ones were taken in 
without involving them in the decision-making process. Some of the 
new members were not even told that the firm was more or less collec-
tively owned by the employees. But after two or three years they 
decided again to introduce meetings for all employees, while still 
keeping the element of the representative democracy. Hence the pro-
cess in some way resembles the life cycle-model developed by Batstone (8), 
The growth process is respresented by two cases. (One of which is 
case B). These enterprise start at a moderately democractic level, 
but then through various learning processes develop and improve the 
employees' capacity to manage the enterprise. This requires that the 
sub-cultures found in enterprises that have existed for several years, 
are altered and 'softened up' so that the employees can move from 
'political' decision processes towards more dialogue-based processes, 
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in which they can learn from each other. This improved capacity makes 
them able to gradually to take over a greater and greater part of the 
traditional managements power without the enterprise's survival being 
jeopardised, and without them forgetting their more idealistic aspira-
tions e.g. for greater equality amongst the employees. As there is 
seldom agreement as to how far one can go with democracy, the process 
does not occur without some use of various power bases. 
There are two cases of stable democracy. The workers have choosen a 
form of democracy which suits their aspirations and which has a rather 
good fit to the demands of the production process. This means that 
there are few contradictions between the ideals and the requirements 
from the market. Those contradictions which always show up are 
tackled by learning processes by the workers so that in the long run 
they are able to maintain a stable democracy. 
1.4 The role of trade unions 
The trade union movement as such has not played an active role in con-
nection with the formation of worker take-over enterprises. However, 
the local shop stewards at the enterprises have often played an impor-
tant role in the establishment phase, because they had a good 
understanding of the enterprise's problems, and had a broad-based con-
tact with the employees. 
Employee-ownership has resulted in a reduced role for the union in 
opposition to day-to-day management. Trade unions have largely come 
to function as a guide for acceptable working conditions. The future 
role in the enterprises seems to be unclear because the employees 
become involved in new problems and groupings that the trade unions 
are not used to tackling. 
After the take-over all union members have continued their membership, 
and there is a small trend in the direction of becoming a member of 
trade unions. The reason for this has been either ideological, or to 
protect ones interests against other groups in the firm. 
1.5 Efficiency 
Of the total number of worker take-overs (14 in all) in the past 15-20 
years, two have closed down and six have gone over to traditional 
ownership (9). Of the two closures one did so as one of the last in 
that sector after the market all but disappeared, and the other 
collapsed shortly after being established when it was in deep economic 
crisis. The six who degenerated did so, either because they needed an 
injection of capital which the workers could not contribute, or 
because the firm grew rapidly and the new employees did not become 
owners. 
Mygind (10) has analysed the efficiency of Danish employee-owned 
firms. Unfortunately for our purpose he has not made a separate ana-
lysis for the worker take-over cases. His conclusions cover these 
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firms together with the more offensive examples, and it is not 
possible in any easy way to separate the data. Therefore, we can only 
refer to the total population of employee-owned firms in Denmark in 
1983. His analysis covers 18 examples. 
An important aspect of Mygind's analysis was to test the so-called 
' Illyrian hypothesis' which has been the subject of considerable 
debate in the literature on the economics of self-management. In 
essence, the suggestion is that in a perfect market of collectively 
owned and financed firms pursuing the objective of maximum income per 
worker, such firms will operate at lower levels of output and 
employment than comparable conventional firms, and, moreover, they 
will respond perversely to an increase in the price of their output by 
reducing, rather than increasing, output. (11). However, the assump-
tions on which the 'Illyrian Hypothesis' are based are extremely 
narrow, and even minor amendments can lead to major changes in pre-
dicted behaviour (12). 
Mygind concludes on the basis of the Danish data that, in contrast to 
the Illyrian hypothesis, the fully employee-owned enterprises with the 
greatest degree of democracy actually have the lowest degree of 
"perverse" adjustments of production and employment. The tendency 
was, in fact, for output and employment to increase, especially for 
the fully employee-owned firms. The explanation could be that changes 
in the cost-relations are less important than changes in demand; the 
response to greater demand may entail greater production, employment, 
wages and surplus per worker, all together. Surprisingly, the fre-
quency of Illyrian adjustments was highest for the capitalist firms, 
indicating that the workers in these firms, just as in the Illyrian 
model, receive wage-increases when the firms' net income per worker 
increases. Furthermore, the fully employee-owned firms have the 
lowest degree of Illyrian adjustment and this may indicate collective 
objectives at work. 
All the employee-owned firms have a relatively low net worth. This 
is, however, not because of Illyrian self-extinction, but because of 
low initial net worth. Contrary to the Illyrian predictions, the 
fully employee-owned and collectively-owned firms have a relatively 
high rate of accumulation. This strongly suggests that (contrary to 
'Illyrian' assumptions) the workers in these firms have collective 
rather than individual objectives. 
Both the fully and partly employee-owned firms have relatively low 
capital intensity, measured by total assets per worker. But measured 
by machines per worker and by investment divided by production, they 
lie near the average for their industries. 
The productivity of both labour and capital are quite high especially 
for the fully employee-owned firms. Only the newly established firms 
have relatively low productivity. The wage level follows the same 
pattern. Most of the workers receive relatively high pay in the 
employee-owned firms. However, some professional managers are paid 
quite low salaries, because of the equalization of wages among the 
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workers in nearly all of the employee-owned firms. More than half of 
the fully employee-owned firms have equal wages. This radical equali-
zation further supports the theory that the fully employee-owned 
firms, in particular, are driven by collective objectives. None of 
the partly employee-owned firms have perfectly equalized wages. 
Profitability is about the same for the fully employee-owned firms as 
for other in their industries, and a little lower for the partly 
employee-owned. But again the newly established firms have quite low 
results. 
The equalization of wages can be taken as one example of the workers' 
preference for alternative means of organising production. The speci-
fic preferences of the workers lead to choices different from those in 
capitalist firms. This view receives support from interviews, and 
concrete instances of job-rotation, as well as from choices of pro-
ducts and technology. This active participation and the high degree 
of satisfaction expressed in interviews both indicate that the self-
managed firms have a high degree of internal efficiency. 
2 WHY ARE THERE SO FEW WORKER TAKE-OVERS IN DENMARK? 
The low number of employee-owned enterprises in Denmark is not a 
result of their being less competitive. In fact, the existing ones 
are doing rather well according to most measures. Why then are there 
so few of them in Denmark? There is no easy answer to this question, 
but I will draw attention to four factors which may be interrelated 
and complementary: 
o The absence of a positive political and institutional climate for 
worker take-overs. 
o The level of unemployment benefit in the Danish welfare state. 
o The tradition of centralisation in the labour movement 
o The tradition of individual entrepreneurship. 
2.1 The political and institutional climate in the 1980s 
Danish politicians have a very limited knowledge of actual examples of 
employee-owned enterprises, which is hardly surprising as this form of 
enterprise is so difficult to find in the Danish business structure. 
Such knowledge as the politicians themselves claim to have, stems from 
enterprises which are publicly, but mistakenly, referred to as being 
employee-owned. These are usually trade union owned enterprises where 
the employees only own a small part of the capital (see also below). 
These enterprises have often gone bankrupt and this has formed the 
basis for rumours of poor management in such enterprises. 
Both rightwing and leftwing politicians believe that employee 
ownership will increase the motivation of the employees, and they 
believe that economic efficiency will be more or less the same as in 
traditionally owned firms. 
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The leftwing politicians are all ideologically opposed to individual 
employee-ownership. However, some of the leftwing politicians see 
collective employee-ownership as an element in a strategy for the 
future - but they are far from unanimous about this because others 
prefer trade union-owned cooperatives or municipally-owned enterpri-
ses . 
The rightwing expresses an indifference concerning business ownership 
conditions, seeing it as a question that should be decided locally 
between previous owners and employees, which is what has happened in 
Denmark (see also below). In addition, they consider the existing 
measures for industrial democracy to be far more desirable than deve-
lopments of centralised economic democracy. 
In Denmark there have not been any policies adopted with the direct 
aim of furthering employee-owned enterprises. However, the leftwing 
has put forward proposals concerning advisory and economic support, 
and they are positive towards legislation on a special company form 
for this type of enterprise. In addition they support workers having 
the first option to buy the enterprises where they work. 
Several of the rightwing parties are positive towards parliamentary 
regulations which secure employee-owners the status of wage-earners 
(so that they can obtain unemployment benefit). In addition they will 
support regulations for tax-subs idised employee share-holding schemes 
and support the establishment of special consultant expertise within 
the present public consulting service. 
That the parties across the political spectrum from left to right have 
not been able to agree on concrete policies is explained by their 
disagreement on whether a collective or individual form of ownership 
is to be preferred. In addition the area does not have a very high 
priority in relation to other strategies and issues. 
As regards the institutional environment, there are no existing public 
arrangements for advisory, financial or legal support specially aimed 
at employee-owned enterprises. This also applies to private bodies. 
Hence such enterprises would only have access to the normal business 
advisory services available in Denmark. 
In Denmark, state-supported business advice (both economic and 
technical) is provided by the technological service institutes. None 
of these institutes have been used by the employee-owned enterprises. 
This is partly because of a lack of knowledge of the possibilities, 
and partly because business advice aimed at "founders" is to a large 
extent aimed at the individual. Cooperatively orientated advice has 
not been pursued administratively, either by the Ministry of Industry 
or by the regional technological service institutes. 
The advisory possibilities at a local level (i.e. business consultants 
employed by the local government, business councils etc.) have only 
been involved in the establishment of one employee-owned enterprise. 
The reason for such limited involvement is that no experience of the 
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employee-owned alternative exists at the local level. Thus employee-
ownership does not figure in the spectrum of advisory alternatives 
that the local government commercial officials or business councils 
usually have at their disposal. 
As far as other interested parties are concerned, the employers side 
has never been involved in a single case. On the other hand, par-
ticular worker organisations have given both financial and legal 
advice to a few of the employee-owned enterprises. The local trade 
unions usually become involved in connection with contractual 
agreements . 
The financial institutions advisory services are usually limited to 
narrow commercial appraisal in conncetion with the granting of a spe-
cific service (overdraft, loan etc.). The financial institutions do 
not have any special information or instructions concerning employee-
ownership. Even though the financial institutions do not consider 
themselves to be particularly negative towards employee-ownership, it 
is the experience of such enterprises that they are too sceptical. 
Thus very few enterprises have used the financial institutions as 
advisors in a broader way. 
The traditional branch organizations and larger enterprises of the 
consumer cooperative movement have not been involved in supporting 
WTO. On the other hand, a less traditional source of advice, namely 
the secretariat of the the society of production collectives (SAPA) 
has been used in one case (13). 
As mentioned above the employee-owned enterprises almost always relied 
on informal networks for support. In this respect they do not differ 
from many other small enterprises - and this raises a general problem 
with respect to how one establishes a connection between the enterpri-
ses and the support bodies. 
As can be seen in this section neither the political nor the institu-
tional climate has been at all favourable towards worker take-overs. 
It can be characterised as rather indifferent towards this phenomenon 
and the lack of support may be part of the explanation why there are 
so few. But of course, it can not explain this completely. 
2.2 Unemployment benefit in the Danish Welfare State 
An additional explanation may be found in the higher unemployment 
benefit in Denmark, compared to most other European countries (except 
the othe Nordic countries). 
There are a little under 3 million wage-earners in Denmark. In recent 
years unemployment has hovered around 10 per cent, but it has 
decreased to about 7 per cent in the last year. When the crisis 
started in the early seventies, it was about 3.5 per cent. 
An unemployed person receives unemployment benefit for 2.5 years. For 
an unskilled worker this is about 80-90 per cent of the previous 
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wages, whereas for a person with a higher education it is about 50-65 
per cent. After the 2.5 years receiving unemployment benefit, you 
have to be offered a job for a period of 7-9 months. If the job does 
not continue after that period, you can receive unemployment benefit 
for a further 2.5 years. In this period the unemployed can choose a 2 
year education program. If that does not result in a job, then 
unemployment benefit is reduced to 70 per cent and some years later to 
50 per cent. 
As can be seen, Denamrk certainly has an unemployment problem, but the 
consequences of being unemployed are not the same as in some other 
countries. This may offer a part of an explanation why fewer workers 
take over their firms: there is some sort of alternative even if this 
alternative is very problematic. 
However this factor should not be overemphasised. In a Nordic reserch 
project recent data has shown that Sweden has 70 WTOs in the 
industrial sector only, established in the last few years (12). This 
is nearly as many as Great Britain has in the entire economy, and 
Great Britain has about 5-6 times as great a population! At the same 
time Sweden has a low rate of unemployment, and an unemployment bene-
fit similar to the Danish! This suggests that worker take-overs may 
also occur in a well-developed welfare state, where some sort of sup-
port structure has been developed (as in Sweden). But the reasons for 
WTOs and the economic conditions under which they occur may be 
somewhat different in welfare states than in other countries with a 
less developed social security system. One possibility is that firm-
saving worker take-overs are more frequent in a welfare state than the 
job-saving enterprises which will be more common in a class-society. 
2.3 The tradition of centralisation in the labour movement 
As in other European countries some producer cooperatives existed in 
Denmark in the second half of the last century. There were very few 
and they all disappeared at the end of the 1870s. The reasons are 
unknown today, but the result was that a strategy of decentralised 
self-help was abandoned by the labour movement. In the years that 
followed, the political and professional organisation and centralisa-
tion of the Danish labour movement took place. 
At the turn of the century a widespread lock-out took place on the job 
market and this once again opened the eyes of the workers to the 
cooperative form of enterprise. Several were set up in close coopera-
tion with the trade unions as a means of struggle. Since then the 
number has increased, especially in the baking, dairy, brewing and 
building sectors. 
These enterprises, which today employ about 7,500 employees, are 
called workers' production cooperatives. They are predominantly owned 
by the labour movement's organisations, and thus cannot be considered 
as employee-owned, even if they are often mixed with that category of 
enterprise. There has, as far as can be judged, never been any desire 
to limit ownership to just the enterprises' employees. Such a solu-
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tion has been considered unnecessary, one that should not be impo sed 
on the individual worker, and one which, in the worst case, could 
divide the labour movement and undermine its solidarity. 
For a number of years after the second world war the labour movement 
concentrated on the introduction of various measures of industrial 
democracy in order to secure for the workers a moderate influence in 
their enterprises. Cooperation agreements were entered into in 1947; 
later there followed a law on working conditions and safety, together 
with employee representation on the board of directors (today one 
third of the board members are elected by the employees). 
The results of such measures for industrial democracy were strongly 
questioned in the labour movement. This led, in the middle of the 
1960s to the movements interest being directed towards the introduc-
tion of economic democracy, in which the workers would gradually 
acquire the ownership of capital (rather than trying to undermine 
ownership rights, which is the idea with the industrial democracy). 
Economic democracy was at first formulated as an offensive demand 
during a boom period. The intention was (a) to change the ownership 
relations, (b) to ensure industrial democracy at the individual work 
places, (c) to ensure social control of the capital growth and econo-
mic conditions in general. The funds were to be raised through obli-
gatory wage deductions and placed into a central fund. The fund was 
to invest in shares and in that way form the basis for changed power 
relations in the enterprises. The workers (represented by officials 
of the trade union movement) would then appear at the general assembly 
and at board meetings with capital behind them. 
The central fund was especially important. It was to ensure that 
solidarity among the workers would not be jeopardised for the benefit 
of individual enterprise ambitions. At the same time it would be an 
important instrument for the control of capital; and finally it would 
redistribute capital earnings within society . All workers would thus 
have an equal share in the fund, independent of whether they were 
employed in the public sector in a badly running private enterprise or 
in an enterprise giving a large profit. 
At the same time democracy at the enterprise level would be 
established on the basis of retained earnings held on behalf of the 
work force. This, together with the capitalists' capital and the 
central funds' investment, would form the to al capital mass of indi-
vidual enterprises. The wage earners at the individual enterprises 
would, therefore, be represented at the general assemblies and in the 
boards, in relation to that share of the capital that was saved up in 
the enterprise. In short, it was a solution that had the ingredients 
of something that, with time, could have lead to partial empolyee-
ownership and a form for representative democracy such as is found in 
the workers' production cooperative enterprises. 
The original proposal from the labour movement provoked a great hosti-
lity among employers. In addition since the proposal was first put 
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forward, the prosperity of the 1960s has been replaed by the crisis of 
the 1970s. These two conditions have together made conditions dif-
ficult for ideas of economic-democracy. On top of this, the leftwing 
parties have not supported the proposal. In brief, the employers are 
against (a) every type of obligatory arrangement, (b) every type of 
central fund, (c) collective ownership of enterprises, (d) the indivi-
dual ownership conditions being separated from the individual profit 
from the enterprises. Operation and profit should go together. Some 
of the leftwing parties do not like the idea that the proposal 
strengthens the central organisations at the expense of the rank and 
file members and instead demand a return to more militant forms of 
struggle. 
Resistance and the changed economic situation have meant that the 
labour movement has not had any of its economic-democracy demands met, 
despite the fact that during the last 15 years they have changed and 
modified their proposal several times. The latest initiative from the 
Social Democrats and the trade union movement has just been made 
public: they have kept obligatory saving, but the investment of it at 
the individual enterprise is voluntary. The central fund has been 
supplemented with regional funds. Interestingly the fund is also 
intended to be used to support take-overs of enterprises when it is 
the employees who are the buyers. That will usally mean the labour 
movement placing risk capital in the enterprises, i.e. that they will 
have an influece in relation to the capital invested. The whole pro-
posal was immediately punctured by opponents, who amongst other 
things, rejected the obligatory arrangements, rejected the funds, and 
rejected the collective ownership of enterprises. So once again the 
debate is treading water. 
In recent years there thus seems to have been a slight softening up of 
the labour movements position on what can be called decentralised 
collective entrepreeurship (which the establishment of an employee-
owned enterprise represents). 
But decentralised collective entrepreneurship certainly does not yet 
fall within what the labour movement would actively support (see also 
Case C). 
To summarise: there is within the Danish labour movement a tradition 
of owning firms centrally, and a strong tendency for centralisation in 
solving problems. This tradition is of course not very favourable 
towards support of decentralise d worker take-overs. This is an 
essential explanation why the political and institutional climate is 
so indifferent towards WTO in Denmark, and at the same time it tells 
us a great deal about how the "ordinary" worker thinks about the way 
problems (such as unemployment) should be solved , - or rather, how 
they should not be solved. To the extent that one can talk about a 
work-culture of decentralised collective entrepreneurship, this would 
be an alien phenomenon within the Danish labour movement. 
83 
2.4 The tradition of individual entrepreneurs 
In 1981 there were rather more than 360,000 private enterprises. Of 
these, 75 per cent were small enterprises with under 50 employees. 
These enterprises employ only 1/4 of the workforce, however, while 1/2 
are employed in larger enterprises with 50-499 employees and the last 
1/4 of the work-force work in large enterprises with over 500 
employees. Each year new enterprises corresponding to 8.5 per cent of 
the total number are opened, but these are counterbalanced by a 
slightly greater number of closures. All these new firms are 
established by individual entrepreneurs. They have a quite different 
lifestyle from traditional wage-earners: their daily working hours 
are long, their holidays are shorter, the economic risks are greater 
and their futureless secure. For these people there are no differen-
ces between ownership and management and elements of their ideology 
are clearly at odds with a worker take-over process: they want to 
keep control for themselves and they do not believe that the employees 
are able to manage the firm. The consequences of this ideology are 
that individual entrepreneurs are sceptical towards either selling 
their firm to the employees or buying a firm with other employees. 
They prefer to do it alone. 
3 CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS 
The small number of worker take-overs in Denmark which arose where the 
firms were threatened with closure are interesting because they show 
that the employees were able to develop democratic management forms 
without jeopardising survival. The most interesting question, 
however, is why there are so few cases in Denmark. 
There is no easy answer to what turns out to be a complicated 
question, and this article has only been able to point to four factors 
which may be interrelated and complementary. 
First of all there is no positive political and institutional climate 
for worker take-overs. A specific support structure is lacking. 
This is partly so because of the traditions of the labour movement: 
the party and the unions have long favoured centralised approaches to 
social problems. One aspect of this is a tradition in Denmark for 
union-owned firms, and the labour movement has until now been in 
favour of supporting this type of ownership structure instead of 
employee-owned companies. 
Besides these factors the development of the welfare state in Denmark 
has ensured an unemployment benefit which is better than in many other 
European countries . This does not mean that there is no unemployment 
problem in Denmark. At about 10 per cent there certainly is; but the 
situation for the unemployed is not as economically desperate as in 
other countries. This factor should not be over-emphasised however. 
As was shown, Sweden has quite a few WTOs and they also have 
unemployment benefit similar to Denmark. This led to the suggestion 
that WTO may have a rather different character in a welfare state: 
more firm-saving than job-saving. 
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As the last factor it was pointed out the entrepreneurial (and 
take-over) processes are common in Denmark, but they are done by 
people with a strong individualist ideology. 
Does this imply that there is no future for worker take-overs in 
Denmark? This question is even harder to answer than the question 
about why there are so few. 
It seems most unlikely that there will be an increase in worker take-
overs in situations where the commerical prospects are poor. The risk 
of "self-exploitation" has no appeal either for the workers involved 
or for the unions, or for left wing politicians who could promote a 
support structure for that type of take over. 
However, when a firm is threatened by closure but still has reasonable 
market prospects and good industrial relations, the situation may be 
treated differently. As it becomes known in Denmark that worker take-
overs can be supported successfully, as in Sweden, it is possible that 
some sort of support structure will develop. At the same time, this 
might persuade more employees that it is possible for them to resist 
closure. The combination of these two factors might lead to an 
increase in successful worker take-overs, even if it remains a margi-
nal phenomenon in the Danish business structure overall. 
Appendix: Three cases of Worker Take-Overs 
Case A - A/S SAMFUNDSTEKNIK 
Samfundsteknik was started in 1970 owned on an equal basis by two con-
sulting engineering firms. It produces consultative services 
conerning sewerage, planning of development areas, road construction 
etc. to the Danish local authorities. The firm expanded in spite of 
hard times for firms of this kind in Denmark. The economic success 
led to a conflict between the two owners. One wanted to withdraw 
capital and invest it elsewhere, the other wanted to consolidate the 
firm. The conflict turned into a dead-lock in which each of the 
owners wanted to get rid of the other. The employees, especially the 
departmental managers, were very frustrated, as no constructive deci-
sions could be made. They formed a group with the intention of taking 
over the firm. This was not easy, as one of the owners was unwilling 
to sell his shares. By a series of complicated legal transactions the 
group succeeded in buying the firm in 1977. 
At that time the firm had 60 employees, and 20 of them, who were 
mainly professionals, bought the shares in joint-ownership, each 
owning 5 per cent. Thus the firm may be characterized as being only 
partly employee-owned. The take-over had nothing to do with a tradi-
tional job or firm-saving action, as Samfundsteknik was financially 
successful. Neither was it rooted in the labour-movement cooperative 
tradition or in the alternative grass-root movement of the late 1960s. 
It may be described as a middle class action with the intention of 
securing the in dependence of the professionals, enabling them to do 
their job as it was defined by themselves and their clients. 
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To reach their goal they had to get rid of any external control, at 
the same time as ensuring that none of the employees, nor a small 
group of them, took over control. As a consequence two principles 
were instituted: (1) any employee-owner who left the firm should sell 
his/her shares to the firm, and (2) the employee-owners should have 
equal shareholding. 
In the following years the firm continued to expand and in 1979 - two 
years after the take-over - the employee-owners decided to increase 
the share capital as well as the number of owners by 50 per cent. As 
a result of this, new owners bought equal amounts of shares. The 
financial success continued in the 1980s. This, however, caused some 
problems: (a) how could the owners enjoy the return on their shares 
without developing too sharp a difference between the two groups of 
employees, owners and non-owners: and (b) how could new owners be 
found who could afford to buy shares, the value of which had increased 
six times within the last years? 
New owners were wanted not only because the number of employees had 
expanded, but also because some owners had left, selling their shares 
back to the firm, and in Denmark a firm is only allowed to own 10 per 
cent of the shares - a fact which meant that some of the employees had 
to buy shares at a certain time. 
In 1982 they tried to solve some of the problems by giving up the 
principle of equal share-holding, thus making it easier to find new 
owners. Then in 1984 the firm expanded the share capital for a 
second time, inviting new owners to buy. At the same time it was 
decided that all owners had one vote, without regard to the size of 
the shareholding. This was primarily a management action with the 
intention of encouraging the most attractive among the professionals 
to buy. But a small 'revoluion' took place as non-professionals, with 
lower status, bought shares in the firm. This 'revolution' was not 
only supported by the non-professionals, but also by some of the pro-
fessionals and should be regarded as something else than the middle 
class drive, described above, which was the background of the take-
over in 1977. 
However, the importance of this 'revolution' should not be overesti-
mated. The general idea of this employee-owned firms is still to 
enable the employee-owners to continue their professional activities 
without external.or internal control. 
Today (1985) the number of employees has risen to 230, spread all over 
the country in small independent departments. 62 of the 230 are 
owners, a slightly smaller proportion than at the time of the take-
over. However, the firm is still concerned about counteracting this 
trend towards degeneration, caused by the financial success of the 
firm. 
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Case Β - INSTITUT FOR KOMMUNAL PLANNING (Ι.Κ.Ρ) 
In 1959 a consulting firm providing shopping-centre-planning was 
established in Copenhagen by two very big chain-stores. In the 1960s 
and in the early 1970s the firm increased its staff to about 40 
employees developing new complex planning services for local authori­
ties. At the same time the structure of the firm developed towards 
collective leadership, and the influence of the board was drastically 
reduced. 
In 1974, however, the firm experienced a drop in orders which re­
activated the members of the board. The situation turned into a 
matter of principle conerning the future of the firm. The board 
wanted to return to the orignal services and a hierarchic structure. 
A minority of the employees accepted this, whereas the majority 
resisted, as it would imply going back to more boring tasks, or 
looking for new jobs eleswhere, (which would have been very easy at 
that time). However, they felt that it was worth while saving their 
firm, as they assumed that the market would require their type of 
complex services in the future, and for such tasks a colective 
leadership was considered more suitable than a hierarchical structure. 
They also preferred the democratic structure for ideological reasons, 
and it would be hard to find that elsewhere. 
After many hard negotiations (lasting nine months) among the employees 
themselves, and between the majority and the board, it was decided to 
divide the firm into two separarte firms, and in 1974 IKP was 
established as a collectively owned and managed independent institu­
tion. 
This meant that new members did not have to contribute capital to the 
firm and that members who left could not withdraw capital from the 
firm. The employees transferred the complex tasks to the new firm, 
and capital was provided without problems by overdraft faciltities. 
The need for capital was rather low. 
The following eight years were financially successful. The net capi­
tal of the firm increased, the number of employees grew to 21, who 
received reasonably good salaries. They developed and provided ser­
vices that earned a high reputation, and new technology was intro­
duced . 
During this period they developed the collective leadership structure 
so that, among many other things, nobody could be elected to a manage­
ment commitee for a period longer than four years. 
In 1982 there was a shortage of new contracts, and the problem was 
aggravated by very strong cuts in public spending, which sapped the 
market. This was the beginning of an economic crisis which led to the 
closure of the firm in 1984. At first they tried to solve the 
problems by reducing working hours and wages and salaries for all 
employees. At the same time they tried hard to switch over to new 
services, but they did not succeed. Further economic reductions were 
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necessary, and they decided now to dismiss some members, as a solidary 
reduction was no longer possible without losing some of the finan-
cially most efficient consultants. The decisions were made by all 
memmbers or decentralized to the groups that were most heavily 
affected by the problems. It was a very debilitating period, which 
was not only characterized by discussions about the problems, but also 
about the procedures, a fact that sometimes prevented the problems 
from being solved. As a consequence of this the members decided to 
consolidate the daily management by allocating more resources to this 
function, and by appointing one of the consultants as the day to day 
leader of the firm. 
Until the very last months it remained uncertain whether they would be 
able to survive with a reduced staff. They did not - not just because 
they had no money left for wages and salaries - but also because they 
had chosen not to keep the firm alive on the basis of the type of ser-
vices which were required by the market at that moment. They could 
have done that, but it would have meant jobs for very few - and jobs 
with very little challenge. 
Instead they applied for jobs elsewhere and almost everyone has a new 
job today, either in more traditional firms or in public institutions. 
Finally, compared with traditionally owned consulting firms, producing 
the same services, and that it competed with, IKP succeeded in sur-
viving for a longer period. 
Case C - L. H. REKLAME 
L. H. Reklame is situated in a Danish provincial town called Kolding. 
It is an advertising agency producing a large variety of adver-
tisements . 
It was established some years ago by an entrepreneur who died suddenly 
in 1980. This was a great shock for the six employees, all women. 
The firm was doing well, and the employees had harmonious rela-
tionships, and very good and independent jobs. 
The day after the death of the owner the employees heard that two or 
three local competitors each planned to take over the firm. The 
employees could not accept any of these potential buyers as they found 
that it would not be possible to continue under the management of any 
of them. 
They had the alternatives of either finding jobs elsewhere or taking 
over the firm themselves. The job opportunities were uncertain, and 
they decided to try the second alternative. The two heirs of the 
deceased founder approved of the idea of a workers' take-over and 
agreed that the capital be divided into eight equal shares, thus 
creating a cooperative society with pro rata liability for the six 
female employees and the two heirs. 
They had no problems in raising the money - each of them was liable 
for an amount of 40,000 D.Kr. (about #3,300). The greatest support in 
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the phase of establishment came from the customers. They encouraged 
the six women to continue on their own and placed many orders with 
them, so in the first year of the take-over the six owners had a large 
ordor-intake and little spare time. They also received strong support 
frorm their families. But still, the first years were difficult, and 
they had to work very hard. First of all they had no experience in 
running a firm. The financial administration in particular was a 
great problem. During the early years this was placed in the hands of 
an accountant who, however, did not take sufficient care of the finan-
ces. Today, five years later, they are able to handle the financial 
administration themselves. 
They also needed legal expertise but succeeded in finding a good 
lawyer. The trade union, of which they were all members took a nega-
tive attitude, expelling them from the union as they were now looked 
upon as employers, not as wage earners. This was not legal, but the 
women did not know that until later. So they joined the unemployment 
insurance fund of owner-managers instead. As a further complication 
it turned out that three of the women were pregnant and one was ill. 
Despite all these problems they took over the firm. After five years 
of financial instability they are now in a safe position. They have 
employed four new people, who are not meant to be owners. This 
question has not been discussed, and until now it does not seem to 
have any effect on the way in which the firm is managed. Everybody -
owners and non-owners - have an informal discussion each day of 
problems and coordination questions. The financial administratin is 
being taken care of by one of the new employees. The climate of the 
firm is characterized by a great flexibility and a readiness to help 
one another; in particular there is a great consideration for the care 
of the children. 
Nine of the workers are young women, and they think that it would be 
difficult for a 'traditional'man to fit into this type of flexibility. 
They earn equal pay in accordance with collective agreements. 
Notes 
1 There is no formal registrations of worker takeovers, and there 
might be more that are not known to us. In particular, some which no 
longer exist, or which were attempted but never succeeded, might have 
escaped our attention. On the other hand we have investigated these 
firms very intensively since 1980, and we certainly know the great 
majority of the population. The 14 known worker take-overs are (1) 
Ajour-klip Aps; (2) Akselstads Vinduespolering Ads; (3) Atheneum; 
(4) IKP (See case B; (5) Information A/S; (6) J.K. Portfabrikken 
Aps; (7) SKA Storkokkener Aps; (8) Granada A/S; (9) BOMA Aps; (10) 
J. P. S. El-Teknik A/ S; (11) J. H. Reklame Aps. (See Case C); (12) 
M.E.C. A/S; (13) Skagen Emballagefabrik A/S; (14) Fyns Tryk A/S. 
Some of these are discussed in Ingerslev, P. (et al): Producer 
Cooperatives in Demark, Copenhagen School of Economics and Social 
Science, 1985. 
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2 The 4 known attempts at worker take-overs which did not succeed 
are: (1) Frichs A/S, (2) Helsingör Dagblad A/S, (3) Skarridsoe Huse 
g Kokkener A/S, (4) Orum Passat Aps. 
3 The intensity of employee ownership is a combination of (1) how 
much of the total capital the employees own, (2) how many of the 
employees are owners, (3) how evenly the captial is distributed among 
the employee owners. For a further discussion see, Mygind, Niels: 
"Are self-managed firms efficient? The experiences of Danish fully 
and partly self-managed firms". In: Economics of Labour Managed and 
Participation Firms. No. 2, 1986, eds. D. Jones and J. SVejnar, Jai 
Press . 
4 We have chosen not to include firms with less than five employees. 
This is because in Denmark there are many small firms which are 
bankrupted every year, and then rescued by new entrepreneurs that are 
sometimes former employees. This would not in Denmark be considered 
as anything special, and certainly not as a worker take-over. 
5 Westenholz. A, and N. Mygind : Information. Virksomhedsbeskrivelse 
no. 3. I nstitute of Organisation and Industrial Sociology,. 
Copenhagen, 1982. 
6 For more information see Westenholz, A and L. Lidkvist (ed): 
Medarbejdereje? -styre i Norden (forthcoming) 1986. 
The 14 worker take-overs can be roughly categorized as follows: 






Regneration of democracy Atheneum (?) 
Growth of democracy IKP 
Information 
Stable democracy Akselstads Vinduespolering 
J. H. Reklame 




(less than 3 years) Fyns Tryk 
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7 There are four stages in Meister's life­cycle model. In the 
establishment phase a conflict developed between direct democracy and 
badly developed economic functions. In the second phase some conven­
tional organisational principles are developed to secure the survival 
of the cooperative. The conflict between the idealists and prac­
titioners is still present. In the third phase a form of represen­
tative democracy is introduced instead of the direct form. This is 
because of the market pressure on the management system and this 
pressure is no longer resisted. This leads to a greater gap between 
management and the others. In the fourth phase the management gains 
full control of the enterprise and the degeneration process is 
completed. See Meister, Α.: La Particpation dans les Associations, 
Ouvrières, Paris, 1974. 
8 In Batstone's life cycle­model there are three phases. In the 
beginning the cooperative is small, the motivation is great and a pri­
mitive (direct) democracy is used. In the second phase the coopera­
tive has existed for some years. It is growing and some members have 
specialised in management functions. New employees are not becoming 
members (owners) and direct democracy is decreasing. In the third 
phase the members want to reinforce democracy and they develop a form 
of collective representative system besides the management system. 
(In the Danish cases the regeneration did not develop a representative 
form but a direct one.) See Batstone, E.: "France" in Stephens, F. 
(ed.): The Performance of Labour Managed firms. London MacMillan, 
1982. 
9 Ajour­Klip, Akselstads Vinduespolering, Atheneum, information, J. 
H. Reklame and Fyns Tryk are still employee­owned, Portfabrikken, SKA 
Storkokkener, Granada , J. P. S. El­Teknik, MEC and Skagen 
Emballagefabrik have degenerated. IKP and BOMA have closed down. 
10 Mygind, Ν. (1986) op cit. 
11 Such results are predicted because, under self­management, income 
per worker is, in effect, the sum of the wage and the average profit 
per worker. Thus, whereas a conventional firm aims to maximise total 
profits (and will expand production to the point where marginal reve­
nue equals marginal cost) the self­managed firm (for a given wage 
rate) aims to maximise profits per worker. This occurs by expanding 
production to the point where the profit earned by the 'last', or 
marginal, worker equals the average profit per worker and it is simple 
to show that this will occur at lower levels of output and employment. 
Moreover, if the price of the output increases, the marginal product 
of labour will increase proportionally ­ but profits (and hence pro­
fits per worker) will increase to a greater extent, because fixed 
costs remain the same. The average profit per worker will then exceed 
the profit earned by the 'last' worker, and the other workers can 
maximise their individual income by firing him or her and reducing 
production. By contrast, if the market wage is unaffected, the 
equivalent capitalist firm will increase employment and production. 
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12 Stephen, F. The Economic Analysis of Producers' Co-operatives 
MacMillan, 1984. 
13 SAPA is a small organization created in 1982 by about 100 small 
collectives. Its members are production collectives, social pedagogi-
cal collectives and educational collectives. It is organized in six 
regions, and has one secretariat which employes two people, paid by 
public money. The role of SAPA is helping to create new collectives 
and to spread information among existing collectives. The two 
employees are involved in consultancy work, arranging seminars, pro-
ducing handbooks, and in ideas for marketing and the development of 
collee t i ves . 
14 Westenholz and Lindquist (1986) op. cit. 
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Workers' initiatives to take over their employer's firm or plant in 
order to prevent its closure have been rare in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Quite often these initiatives failed even before the workers 
could set up their own company. Appendix I lists the 34 known cases 
of WTO, and attempted WTO, over the last 20 years along with infor-
mation on the numbers of employees involved. Although there has been 
a significant increase in such attempts in the 80's, they are still in 
quantitative terms, without any importance for labour market develop-
ments (the picture can change dramatically, however, if particular 
local situations are considered). 
Yet a real possibility of saving jobs through a WTO could arise much 
more frequently, since most factories that are closing down (for wha-
tever reason) have a healthy core which could be the basis for a con-
tinuing business. A central problem, however, is that owners, 
competitors, customers and creditors are usually all trying to get as 
much as they can out of the closure - by seeking to sell, obtain or 
retain valuable equipment, selling patents or the right to use them, 
enticing away key employees, selling stocks, and so on. Before this 
happens it may be uncertain whether the plant or enterprise can be 
reconstructed; but once underway, this process can quickly make 
reconstruction impossible. 
The wide public attention which often accompanies a WTO indicates that 
such events are seen as actions with a significance pointing beyond 
purely economic or labour market considerations. They seem to call in 
question elements of the established social and political culture: 
for example, WTO represent a refusal to accept impending economic 
disaster and a willingness to try and prevent it; such autonomous 
action is unusual for working class people in Germany - especially 
when it takes the form of direct democracy and justifies itself on 
that basis. More generally, the willingness to attempt a WTO may 
signify a certain disenchantment with the role provided by an 
established system that is no longer seen as reliable; and hence a 
readiness to embrace new perspectives and roles. 
In addition, some WTO have explicitly endorsed concerns that are 
rather different from those found in traditional businesses, by, for 
example : 
. declaring that profit making is not what they have struggled for and 
what they aim at with their new enterprise; 
. restricting their product range to "socially useful and ecologically 
acceptable" goods; 
.making every effort to build up effective self-management covering 
all relevant aspects, from company decision making to work place 
organisation. 
Nevertheless, WTO are not - as some people in Germany hope, and even 
more people fear - a first step to overcome capitalism. They clearly 
95 
aim at preserving work places, and are usually the last resort of 
employees, after everything else has failed. Given a situation of 
long lasting mass-unemployment with employers closing down firms, with 
trade unions lacking any effective defensive strategy, and with 
passive state, it is almost inevitable that those in danger should a 
start to consider possible self-help solutions. Hence the reasons why 
WTO do not occur more often in Germany are worth considering. They 
certainly include: 
o the tradition of a labour movement characterized by rather centra-
lized and hierarchical trade unions and by a policy conception of 
'co-determination' with state and capital as against 'autonomous' 
perspectives ; 
o a system and philosophy of social security provided by a welfare 
state, rather than by solidarity and collective action; 
o a tradition and framework of industrial and labour law that strictly 
regulates industrial relations and that controls or prevents collec-
tive action. In particular there are all sorts of procedural and 
substantive legal provisions to ensure an 'orderly' company closure, 
including compensation and benefit payments for the employees; 
o a bankruptcy law which is mainly conceived for the creditors' 
(financial) interests and usually fully applied against the 
employees' (job) interests; 
o the lack of a strong workers cooperative movement or sector, with 
all the related infrastructure; 
o a general scepticism concerning the ability of workers to manage, 
which quite often results in serious difficulties in obtaining the 
capital needed to achieve a WTO. 
Moreover, there are industry-specific conditions which seem to favour 
other than collective answers to the threat of closure or mass 
dismissals. In the building industry, for example, it is not unusual 
for foremen to take over smaller firms, or viable parts of a business, 
as private entrepreneurs (and there are also rather good opportunities 
in the 'black economy'). By contrast with these conservative craft-
based rescues there are an increasing number of cases in the printing 
industry of employers offering financial help and work contracts to 
promote a separate enterprise based on e.g. graphics facilities. For 
larger companies this has repeatedly proved advantageous as a method 
of indirectly reducing labour costs and of avoiding future redundancy 
problems and payments, which can be anticipated due to further tech-
nological change or market developments. Such a policy of separating 
out parts of the company's activities (and employees) because of 
actual or expected difficulties, and offering it to one or two com-
petent employees, mostly junior or middle management, is known in 
other sectors as well. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that various initiatives aimed at 
rescuing jobs or firms or looking for more participative or coopera-
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tive business structures but which are not 'genuine' WTO, are not 
included in this report. These related initiatives include: 
o employees financially supporting the old company or a buyer in 
order to prevent a closure (including indirect methods such as 
accepting lower wages, unpaid overtime work, etc); 
o work-force initiatives aiming at or leading to management buy-outs 
or trying to find an external buyer; 
o rescues with the employees as (main) share-holders without having 
significantly more rights or influence (1); 
o labour participation in company reconstruction by banks acting on 
behalf of the creditors; 
o all employers' initiatives towards a higher degree of labour par­
ticipation (in financing and/or decision making). 
The report starts by considering the broad social, political and 
institutional context that WTO have to contend with, and then goes on 
to consider various aspects of the WTO process, and the companies so 
created, in more detail. At various points reference is made to four 
cases, referred to as case A, case Β etc. which are presented in 
Appendix II. 
2 The economic-political rnnrpxr 
2.1 Labour market crisis 
From a labour point of view the long lasting mass unemployment is the 
most significant characteristic of the 80's. The consistently high 
figures of companies going bankrupt (2) indicate joint cyclical and 
structural problems. In spite of clear upward trends in the economy, 
unemployment figures (3) remain at an almost unchanged and high 
level, pointing at a development - mainly caused by the wide-spread 
use of new technology - where economic recovery does not lead to a 
recovery in the labour market. Labour productivity has grown faster 
than the demand for the goods produced; the quantity of socially 
required labour has decreased. An end to this development is not to 
be forseen. 
Under such circumstances a closure can lead to permanent unemployment 
or very inferior future job opportunities, especially for those in 
depressed areas or for other specific 'problem' groups on the labour 
market. It is little comfort when those responsible for employment 
policies which have failed point instead at the rather favourable 
demographic figures in the 90's. 
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2.2 Trade unions and WTO 
The trade unions not only lack the power to develop and apply effec-
tive strategies to save jobs, they are also having great difficulties 
in finding adequate policy responses to the challenge presented by the 
present scale and patterns of unemployment and its causes. 
Nevertheless, they are heeistant in backing those who have pursued 
less conventional solutions, such as a WTO, even if they are part of 
their memberships. 
Such hesitancy has to do with deep-rooted traditions and practices, 
such as 
o the difficult relationship between the trade union movement and 
worker cooperatives; 
o the leading union policy conception of "Mitbestimmung" 
(co-determination) which differs fundamentally from all 
'autonomous' concepts of self-determination or se If-management ; 
o the objections of rather centralized industrial unions to anything 
which could be looked at as 'the great syndicalist mistake'; 
o the immobility caused by the large size of union organizations 
(they tend to fall into a bureaucratic conservatism, and become 
very cautious); 
o the highly legalized structures of industrial relations in the 
Federal Republic. Not only has this elaborate regulatory fra-
mework become a way of life for officials, but it appears to 
restrict the activities that may be undertaken by e.g. members of 
a works council contemplating a WTO. 
So far at least 6 out of the 17 member unions of the German Trade 
Union Federation (DGB) have had to deal with WTO in sectors controlled 
by them (4). But neither DGB nor member unions have produced anything 
near a clear policy statement: most of them have, officially, ignored 
the subject. The same is true for unions outside the DGB. 
Only the metal workers union (IGM), with about 50% of the known WTO 
cases occurring in their organizing areas, has considered the problem. 
IGM head office was instructed by the 1983 Union Conference to produce 
a policy statement on the subject which was concluded and published in 
March 1985 (5). It is so well balanced "that those in favour of and 
those against WTO can refer to it" (an IGM official). This policy 
statement is based on the understanding that the worsening employment 
crisis must lead to unconventional trade union responses; and that 
resisting further job losses in an effective way will not be possible 
within the terms of the present (industrial relations) law. 
Essentials of the statement are: 
o support for WTO must not absolve either the 'mother' company (in 
the case of plants and subsidiaries) or the state from their 
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responsibility to provide employment. Hence the state should 
provide financial support for WTO on the grounds that it makes 
more sense to invest money to create (or save) jobs than to 
finance unemployment; 
o WTO should lead to long-term job savings. This requires that com-
pany purposes are defined differently, "stressing labour market 
and socio-political points of view and not paying excessive atten-
tion to company profitability". (6) This aims at a new kind of 
overall economic budgeting, and at dealing with WTO attempts as 
elements of regional and structural policies; 
o the finacial position of employees must not be jeopardised, for 
example, by employees providing money to the old company to pre-
vent a closure; or by employees investing large sums in their own 
WTO enterprise at considerable personal risk; 
o certain trade union standards concerning payment, holidays, 
working conditions, etc., shall be observed (no union support for 
"self-exploitation"); 
o more work-force influence, in the sense of extending co-
determination rights; 
o trade union support of WTO shall take account of the chances of 
success or failure and this requires a close study to discover 
what has really caused the closure. 
What trade unions actually do is not always consistent with their 
official pronouncements (or silences). In practice, almost no take-
over initiative has been developed without trade union support, mainly 
provided by local or regional officials. Head offices, usually, are 
more cautious and certainly more "diplomatic"; they prefer to observe 
developments while providing no more than tacit consent. The main 
areas of trade union activities in relation to WTO attempts are: 
o advising and elaborating (or financing) expert opinions; 
o legal assistance; 
o organizing; 
o taking part in (or taking over) negotiations with politicians, 
potential creditors etc.; 
The role of the trade union owned Bank fur Gemeinwirtschaft (BfG), one 
of the leading banks in West Germany, is worth mentioning. The BfG's 
role in dealing with WTO has been problematic mainly because they 
react no differently from any other bank. Their credit granting prin-
ciples do not incorporate any 'solidarity' compoenent whatsoever, even 
if only a modest credit is requested (7). This has frequently led to 
considerable frustration since trade unionists naturally include 
'their' bank in their financial considerations, which the BfG does not 
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discourage, thus raising false hopes. This regularly leads to disap-
pointment and mistrust of union support in general. 
2.3 Employers and their organisations 
Th<:ir official policies are easily described: there are none. 
But there is a very wide range of attitudes and responses to par-
ticular WTO when they take place: from plain efforts to obstruct any 
success (by means of e.g. asset stripping, selling patents, defaming 
the initiative internally and in the public as incompetent, irrespon-
sible or Communist): to simple non-cooperation (such as keeping back 
vital company and business information, refusing to negotiate any 
take-over matters); through to limited and/or conditional support 
(either a permissive attitude or one making any support subject to 
certain restricitons - as in case D when the rescue company was not 
allowed to continue the old production) and finally to fairly generous 
support (such as sufficient information, generous conditions to take 
over the means of production, offer of contract work, market agreement 
- case B). 
A specific role is sometimes played by institutions under public law 
or registered associations closely associated with the employers, such 
as the Industrie und Handel skammer/IHK or the 
Rationalisierungskuratorium der Deutschen Wirtschaft e.V/RKW. In some 
cases they have offered consultation, expert opinions and other sup-
port. They are, however, so much based on conventional company 
thinking that they tend to become useless (and irritating) in as much 
as a take-over initiative tries to realize something rather different. 
Support by such institutions can prove to be damaging to a WTO if they 
try to become a recognized participator in the take-over process 
and/or negotiations, and then attempt - commonly with some success -
to have their recommendation accepted by the banks or by the state (in 
part this is what happened in case A). 
Finally, a rather small number of company owners and senior manage-
ment, due to their participative or humanitarian philosophies, support 
various reformist ideas and activities, inclusive of WTO. They are 
politically represented by a registered association 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Forderung der Partnerschaft in der Wirtschaft 
AGP) of about 450 members, mostly medium sized firms, which strive for 
more participation of employees to company decision making, profit 
sharing and share holding: they do not however re-define company pur-
poses nor do they look for new economic structures. Some enterprises 
arising from WTO have become members of the AGP. 
2.4 Political and state activities 
The state has very few employment policy instruments (in any strict 
sense) let alone anything specifically to support WTO. In essence, 
and simplifying considerably, state policies concerning employment 
inc lude : 
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o different instruments to stimulate economic growth, regional and 
structural developments or to attract the formation of new firms 
in certain areas. These tend to be expensive programs without 
guaranteed employment effects. They are capital oriented. 
o the Public Labour Administration (primarily based on the 
Arbeitsforderungsgesetz/AFG = labour promotion act) with some 
instruments to advance employment, but mainly directed to the 
administration of unemployment. The AFG of 1969 was conceived 
as a preventive act against unemployment, to complement 
Keynesian economic policies in the labour administration field. 
Its intended anti-cyclic effects were severely undermined, from 
the mid-seventies onward, because the financial provisions of 
the act linked the range of its application very closely to the 
overall economic situation: when badly needed, during 
depression and mass-unemployment, the money available has been 
quite limited. It has been compared with an umbrella that only 
functions when the sun shines. Nevertheless, the AFG allows 
some specific support to WTO as will be mentioned below. 
o activities to overcome (supposed) employment obstacles, e.g. by 
the 1985 Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz (= employment promotion 
act) which, among other things, allows employers more flexibi-
lity in dealing with labour in order to revive labour markets. 
It is not at all clear that jobs are either created or secured 
by this. 
It seems remarkable that labour law, which has soaked into all cracks 
and chinks of industrial relations in Germany, does not provide any 
tools for securing or defending jobs. The general abstinence, in 
relation to employment measures, of legislative bodies contrasts with 
the apparent readiness of parliamentarians of all political 
backgrounds, whenever possible, to utilize workers' resuce actions for 
improving their electoral images. And it leaves such matters largely 
at the discretion of executive bodies. However, state activity which 
is not based on clear legislation tend to be erratic. WTO initiatives 
have had to learn this lesson more than once (case A). 
State activity also varies according to the level of government con-
cerned. Public authorities at local levels usually want a WTO 
attempt to be successful; but they often lack the means to secure a 
favourable outcome (not so, however, in case C with very effective 
communal support). State or federal level of government have the 
means; but no-one seems to be particularly interested in successful 
WTO (Again there is one clear exception - the city-state of Bremen. 
See also case D.) (8) 
As can be expected the Social Democratic Party/SPD (from their tradi-
tion and with regard to their voters' electoral base) as well as the 
Greens (with their creed of 'grass root democracy') are much more 
open-minded concerning WTO than the more conservative Christian 
Democrats/CDU + CSU and the Liberal Party/FDP. In practice, however, 
it has not been of great importance - again with the exception of the 
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SPD-governed state of Bremen - which party is in power at local or 
state level. All tend to become involved with WTO attempts in due 
course. 
Worker Take-over initiatives usually turn to the state for financial 
assistance, for support to get money elsewhere, or for securing bank 
credits. The state is sometimes a key negotiator with a 'mother' com-
pany (cases A and D). Other forms of state support include securing 
large scale orders, financing 'unproductive' activities such as market 
analyses, research, product development; help in purchasing or 
renting premises and machinery. 
The Public Labour Administration must be mentioned as a source of 
state support which can be quite important, primarily in the difficult 
transitional and starting phase of a take-over: 
o officials can considerably contribute to reduced wage costs by 
officially keeping the employees - as long as their earnings do not 
supersede certain limits - on the unemployment list and paying 
unemployment benefits; 
o the AFG was amended in 1986 by a paragraph (AFG Para. 55a) saying that, 
under certain conditions, unemployment benefits may be paid for up 
to 13 weeks to those who have been entitled to such payments when 
they set up their own business (which may be a WTO); it is offi-
cially meant to be a bridging grant; 
o by means of the labour administration any necessary training of the 
employees involved in the WTO can be organized and financed; 
o officials can also help to realize a WTO by supporting proposals 
which include setting up, within the company's premises, both a 
productive company and a vocational training centre financed by 
labour administration money (case A); this can significantly 
reduce fixed costs. 
o officials can also subsidize the creation of jobs in the new 
enterprise (and each preserved work-place can be considered to be a 
newly created one). 
According to WTO experience labour administration offices have proved 
to be fairly flexible and inclined to collaborate if a realistic cake-
over conception is being presented. 
Recently, first steps have been taken by the state to advance local 
employment initiatives. So far, only limited resources are available 
and little in terms of the necessary advisory services. Yet, the 
steps taken could mean that further calls for state support may lead 
to more extensive responses in the near future. Moreover, some of the 
measures currently planned or in operation represent more significant 
innovations. For example, the scheme for supporting co-operatives in 
the State of Hessen; and the 'FIBEG' consulting and financial insti-
tution proposed by Network Self-Help and currently being negotiated 
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with the state government of Bremen. Further information on these is 
provided in Appendix III which also gives an overview of current LEI 
and co-operative support measures in the different regions. 
This is, at least, a topic that is receiving some public attention. 
Central issues and demands in the curent debate are: 
o Something more than a mere extension of the instruments and 
financial measures of existing economic promotion policies is 
required. 
o Revolving funds must be developed which can take account of the 
requirements of an economy including its regional and social 
needs (and not just the standards of profitability determined on 
the world market). 
o Financial channels must be developed that are independent of the 
existing banking system. 
o There must be a re-evaluation of factors and efficiency criteria 
on which economic support is currently provided, in order to con-
sider values such as social innovation and environmental protec-
tion, development of democratic structures, balanced regional and 
sectoral economies, and the quality of working life. 
o Particular 'project'-related and labour as well as consumer 
oriented subsidies should be introduced instead of, or in addi-
tion to traditional investment-related economic promotion poli-
cies which are primarily process-oriented, thus advancing 
technology and industrial rationalization (and making the 
unemployment problems worse). 
o Whether or not to favour 'private' support agencies (controlled 
by the new co-op movement, e.g.) or state controlled, or joint 
bodies, as distributors and administrators of support money and 
venture capital. 
Presently, however, it is still clearly the rule that state bodies 
dealing with WTO act in line with traditional commercial appraisal 
criteria, which means that in the end they "let the banks have the 
last word... thus bringing criteria of conservative economic policies 
into the game through the back-door, so to speak, policies which we 
cannot expect to favour such initiatives, although there may be 
substantially good prospects for specific cases." (9) 
2.5 Take-over initiatives, co-operatives and the 'alternative sector' 
It appears that none of the traditional co-operative associations 
(Genossenschaftsverbande), with their central, regional and sectoral 
organisations, have, so far, supported WTO. Nor does it seem likely 
that they would support them. The existing co-operative associations 
are mainly based in wholesale and retail trading in'banking, in agri-
cultural marketing and in building, and they stand in a rather conser-
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vative 'petty bourgeois' tradition. There are only very few producer 
co-operatives (22, according to the 1983 statistics). New membership, 
which is compulsory for each co-operative choosing the legal fra-
meworks of co-operative law, is impeded by restrictive procedures and 
an examination of applicants and members by the associations which 
(Genossenschaftsgesetz) are set up by the Co-operative Act (10). 
However, there seems to be a new renaissance of co-operative ideas and 
practice, fertilized by the 'alternative scene' and explicitly 
including producer co-operatives. New organisations and other support 
structures have been developed besides numerous co-operatively orga-
nised projects with commercial, social, educational, ecological, 
cultural and other purposes (11). Politically, this 'scene' is 
loosely associated with the Greens and the SPD. Hence more impulses 
for WTO support can be expected from these parties. In particular, an 
SPD commitment could help to bring together the (traditional) labour 
movement and (new) approaches to co-operative forms of working (and 
living) (12). In 1984 SPD head-office established a commission to 
promote co-operative ideas and practice: "In co-operation with the 
traditional cooperative societies and new initiatives (unemployed ini-
tiatives, self-help projects, alternative-economic projects, 'new' co-
operatives, employment initiatives and labour owned companies) we will 
point out concretely where political activities on different levels -
local, state and federal government - is demanded to support those 
projects already in existence as well as the new starters. In this 
respect we think in terms of advisory services and financial instru-
ments, working on a co-operative basis, which can react quickly and 
unbureaucratically. Moreover, we will examine whether legislative 
steps are necessary to improve starting conditions of new projects." 
(13) 
Such political orientations have been nourished by the 'new social 
movements', including the peace movement and numerous projects of the 
alternative economic sector. The questioning of present work proce-
dures and life styles, and, increasingly, a concern with urgent social 
problems (particularly youth and mass-unemployment, and the perceived 
ecological and military threats to the very existence of life on the 
planet) have led these groups to reject conventional economic forms 
and to seek to create new ones. Some are satisfied with finding for 
themselves a niche to survive in economic terms - others look for 
more fundamental alternatives to the dominant patterns and values. 
The same spectrum is also true for worker take-over initiatives. The 
'economic survival' rescue may be represented by case C, while Case D 
is a WTO quite strongly influenced by ideas and reflections of the new 
social movements. Parts of their conception are 
consistent self-administration (following the traditional principle 
"one person - one vote"); 
an experimental form of work-organisation, as wholistic and non-
alienating as possible; 
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renunciation of profit making as an intended company purpose; 
commitment to produce socially useful and ecologically acceptable 
goods only (14). 
The alternative scene has not only delivered ideas. With its 
infrastructure (15) and the expertise of many individuals closely 
connected or co-operating with the new co-op movement, they have been 
able to offer substantial support, often in a quite competent manner. 
While their financial means have been very limited, they sometimes 
played a key role in giving advice and organisational support as well 
as informing the public - usually in close collaboration with com-
mitted union officials. 
Of course, the relationship between the workers involved in a takeover 
and those from the new social movements who were offering support did 
not develop without conflicts - quite different worlds, ideologically 
and socially, were trying to collaborate. All those concerned have 
had to learn a great deal about each others concerns and views. And 
this far reaching learning process continues, though the areas of con-
tact have become wider and more varied, for example, including new 
contacts between the 'scene' and the political establishment, trade 
unionists and activists of the self-help movement, officials of the 
European Communities with local projects, - utopia with real money. 
It seems clear that in the longer term these years of experience and 
experiments will benefit WTO by developing a climate and institutional 
context that is far more favourable towards such initiatives. 
3 Essential questions to be dealt with by WT0(16) 
3.1 Initial phase and company information 
There are many reasons to close down a firm. The true causes 
influence the chances for WTO to fail or to succeed. In addition, the 
form of the closure threat is important - whether the firm is under 
the control of a receiver, or not. 
3.1.1 Closure under receivership (17) 
This occurs when an enterprise is bankrupt - in itself, not a very 
good starting condition for a take-over. Moreover, bankruptcy law in 
Germany essentially serves the interests of the creditors, not the 
employees (18). However, bankruptcy procedures are a barrier to 
uncontrolled asset stripping (- though not to asset stripping, as 
such). Sometimes, this chance can be used to influence what happens 
later to the firm (e.g. by taking action to prevent dismantling of 
machines). Since all employer's functions are transferred to the 
receiver he or she can decide whether or not to dismiss employees, to 
take up production again, to restart trading and so on. This can 
allow negotiation and even collaboration between the receiver and the 
work force with a view to avoiding immediate closure of the business; 
and thereafter to preserving it (case C). The chances for the workers 
to take over a company in co-operation with the receiver are not very 
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good, but it can be done and they have not been sufficiently examined. 
In general, the receivers office has considerable discretion which may 
be used to support or to obstruct a WTO initiative. 
An additional difficulty is that a petition in bankruptcy is normally 
filed without any previous announcement - thus producing enormous time 
pressure for a WTO initiative. 
3.1.2 Closure for reasons other than bankruptcy 
Time pressure is a common problem here, too. But there are more and 
more cases of the closure being announced 12 to 18 months in advance, 
or of the final date of closure proving to be negotiable. 
It appears that only initiatives considering a WTO at the earliest 
possible time have a reaslistic chance to develop a feasible concep-
tion." Such considerations may run parallel to looking for other solu-
tions, even opposite ones, such as negotiations with the company, the 
state, creditors or others about continuing (some of) the business or 
entering "Socialplan" negotiations (compulsory negotiations about 
redundancy payments in case of closure, according to German labour 
law: Betriebsverfassungsgesetz - Works Constitution Act). 
It can be very advantageous if the company is still in tact - and 
hence vulnerable - during the take-over preparations: in particular a 
large 'mother' company may be inclined to co-operate with the workers 
because of a concern for its reputation with the public (case B) ; it 
may make concessions because it wants a quiet workforce in other 
plants of the company (case D); or it may be generous because it still 
has to meet production deadlines in the plant it is closing. 
Moreover, a trading company is no 'breakers yard' for impatient credi-
tors. So the take-over initiative can try to preserve the core of the 
assets. An intact workshop has repeatedly proven to be a good argu-
ment to legitimate the workers' case in public. 
3.1.3 Company information. 
For the complex process of developing a WTO proposal and, in advance 
of this, of producing a well based feasibility study, works council 
employees and their advisors need immediate access to all relevant 
company data (balances, profits and losses, marketing data, manufac-
turing procedures and organisation, costings, etc.) In practice, 
however, information which a bank can easily obtain is often handled 
as top secret when asked for by the works council. This can lead to 
enormous problems for a WTO initiative when it is asked by a bank or 
government officials to produce detailed plans to support an applica-
tion for funds. Usually, there is intensive fighting between the old 
company or the receiver, and the works council (and its advisors) 
representing the new management, about rights to receive and obliga-
tions to give information. Even when information is given, there 
remains the problem that part of company information must, according 
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to the law, be treated confidentially - but just which parts is not 
clear. It appears that quite often this uncertainty prevents the 
workforce from using the information effectively. On top of all this, 
liquidators often declare that, under receivership, normal employee 
information rights according to the 'Betriebsverfassungsgesetz' are 
inoperative. 
There is a need for legal improvements, but also for better use of 
existing rights and for developing the ability of employees and their 
representatives to see and to understand early warning signs which 
precede closures. 
3.2 The organisational structure of take-over initiatives and the 
question of support by external advisors 
3.2.1 Works council 
Up to this point works councils officials or individual members will 
usually have played important roles in the WTO attempt, as initiators 
and negotiators as well as in promoting the idea at every opportunity 
continuously. In the beginnning, their legal position favours these 
roles. But as the initiative advances it appears more and more as a 
restriction. For example, they are not allowed to do anything detri-
mental to the (old) firm; they are required to keep industrial peace 
which strictly forbids them from calling for or organizing industrial 
action; they must obey the principle of political abstinence and 
neutrality; they have no right to act in public on behalf of the 
workforce. Hence, such an initiative must create its own organisa-
tion . 
3.2.2 Staff assembly and working groups 
In the beginning simple forms of direct democracy are common: the 
"plenary assembly" for general information, discussion and decision 
making; and specific working groups set up by and responsible to the 
assembly. A more or less informal leading group, usually the most 
committed works council members, co-ordinates the process. These 
organs sometimes develop into the first basic structures of self-
management later on, and at any rate they appear to be a good prepara-
tion for it. Thus their working methods are no less important than 
the results they achieve, - something which external advisors often 
fa i 1 to real ize. 
3.2.3 Staff associations 
Most WTO attempts have created a formally constituted staff asso-
ciation which usually plays an important role. The essential advan-
tage of an association is that a take-over initiative gains a legal 
status (as an incorporated society) which means that both internally 
and externally it can negotiate, sign agreements, and so on. 
Sometimes, this has also helped an initiative to develop a more 
binding internal structure. 
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The association can also be an appropriate vehicle for aspirations 
concerning democratic self-management, since it can become the collec-
tive shareholder in the trading company formed to run the business. 
In such cases the staff association is usually represented by elected 
trustees. 
But even if the WTO attempt finally fails, such associations have 
proved to be valuable for their members in uniting and supporting them 
after dismissal. 
3.2.4 External advisors 
WTO, quite clearly, need to be advised by outside experts, right from 
the early phase of forming ideas and initial planning. There is 
always a lack of legal and economic expertise, and quite often of 
management know-how in other areas, including technology and engi-
neering. WTO need comprehensive plans covering production and 
marketing, finance and personnel requirements, organisation and legal 
structures of the proposed company. Banks or state authorities often 
ask for these in considerable detail before they decide to grant or 
secure loans (case B). But outside support is not only required for 
these commercial aspects. The processes which, hopefully, enable the 
employees to become competent in self-management also need to be sup-
ported by external advisors in most cases. 
Difficulties and problems that occur include: 
o Advisors must not only be experts. They must be able to co-operate 
with workers; they must understand what it means to change over to 
self-management; they must engage themselves in a process of mutual 
learning and teaching. This, more or less, excludes conventional 
management consultants; others, however, quite often lack 
industrial experience. 
o Advisors must be trustworthy to all concerned: the workers, the 
bankers, state officials, trade union officals (- how could you 
trust such a person!) 
o They cost money (unless they work without pay, as has happened on 
occasions). Some initiatives have successfully negotiated such 
payments with their company, having made good use of the Works 
Constitution Act, ( 111/112) which prescribes that, in case of clo-
sure, redundancy payment negotiations must be preceded by efforts to 
balance divergent interests. This has been utilized as a legal 
basis for negotiating money specifically for the costs of planning 
and preparing the WTO (Cases A, D). 
Developments in the alternative and co-operative sector and, 
generally, of local employment initiatives, seem to be promoting a 
supportive infrastructure which is stimulating further development. 
This will also be useful for WTO. 
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3.3 Financing 
A key problem is how and where to get enough money. the legally 
required minimum contribution to start a limited company (GmbH) - most 
WTO choose this form - is 50,000 DM which is usually collected without 
great difficulty. This minimum - which, incidentally is not required 
by the legal form of a co-operative - does not in fact lead anywhere, 
since the stock of equity capital has to serve two functions: it is 
the basis to get loans, and it is part of the money to finance the day 
to day business. In practice, and with the exception of rather small 
WTO, the needs for equity have ranged between about 1 and 10 million 
DM (19). 
The following sources of finance tend to be used: 
o The employees invest their own money - personal loans or, more 
often, some or all of their redundancy payments (case C). This is 
usually opposed by Trade Unions saying that the concentration of 
financial risks on top of employment risks cannot be tolerated. 
There are good reasons, however, to argue that collectively nego-
tiated compensation might just as well be used collectively in 
taking over the company (if its prospects are promising). This line 
of argument has been strengthened by cases of illiquid companies 
where financial compensation was just not negotiable. Taking over 
the assets instead, would provide an alternative form of compen-
sation, which could be used collectively. 
o A WTO initiative tries to collect the capital needed through a soli-
darity campaign, addressing individuals as well as alternative 
financing institutions (case D). Obviously, on its own this does 
not produce the required sums. 
o Very commonly, efforts are made to obtain the assets as the core of 
the equity base. In case A an innovative scheme was developed: the 
state acquires all assets and hands them over to a (non-profit) 
foundation (e.g. the former registered staff association). The 
foundation becomes a shareholder (20) in the rescue company, with 
the assets as its equity contribution. This solution has many advan-
tages. However, the problem of how to raise money is shifted to 
that of how to obtain the assets. In case D the state of Bremen has 
chosen a comparatively simple procedure: they have rented the fixed 
assets from the mother company and leased them to the rescue firm, 
and they have bought tools and machines which can be used by the new 
workers' company for the first 3 years without pay. The advantage 
of this solution is that the rescue needs much less capital in the 
difficult start-up phase. However, since the new firm does not own 
the fixed assets it cannot use them as security when it seeks loans 
to provide working capital. 
o The state is asked for the necessary capital. There are two essen-
tial arguments: first, employment promotion is part of government 
responsibilities (a strong Trade Union position); and, second, the 
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simple calculation is based on general experience that it will be 
more expensive for the government not to support the WTO. So far, 
no case is known in which the follow-up costs of unemployment 
(including subsidies to create completely new jobs) would not signi-
ficantly exceed the financial support which is demanded by a WTO 
from the state. However since anything like comprehensive public 
budgeting, accounting or auditing does not exist, such claims cannot 
be rigorously demonstrated, refuted or tested, so they tend to be 
ignored by politicians and governments. 
Having raised enough equity does not mean that all financial problems 
are resolved. Working capital and further investment funds need to be 
obtained. To some extent, conventional state subsidies and all sorts 
of promotion schemes can be utilized. The bulk, however, has to come 
from the banks. This is when WTO usually meet their most persistent 
adversary. The problem is that the whole idea of a WTO is hard to 
reconcile with the assumptions on which day to day banking activity is 
conducted. In essence a closed enterprise is devalued capital. Those 
ignoring this (e.g. by trying to revitalize it) either show a lack of 
understanding - which disqualifies them as entrepreneurs - or they are 
out to try something different. But if their primary purpose is not 
to make money this appears to disqualify them quite fundamentally. In 
the end, bank conditions for granting loans to a WTO tend to be so 
specified that they cannot be met (for example - case B). More 
recently, however, bankers have begun saying that a committed work-
force is likely to be more reliable than many plausible industrial 
fortune hunters. Motivation and solidarity may yet be considered in 
credit ratings. 
The demand to set up new types of financing (and advisory) institu-
tions under public or state control and supplied with adequately 
controlled money has therefore become stronger. "Financing institu-
tins need to be set up which are oriented by the social benefit of 
such take-over companies. It is self-evident, therefore, that they 
must have a public status." (21) 
3.4 Legal forms of WTO and other legal questions concerning WTO 
3.4.1 Legal forms 
Which form to choose depends on, e.g. the size of an enterprise, the 
amount of capital needed, how the capital is to be acquired, exclusion 
or limiation of liability wanted, the structure and effectiveness of 
se 1 f-administrat ion. 
Remarkably, no WTO has chosen the legal form of a co-operative society 
(Genossenschaft). This may be due mainly to the fct that co-operative 
law is rather unsuitale for WTO's without offering clear advantages; 
to restrictive and sometimes long-lasting economic examinations 
carried through by the co-op associations; and to the reluctance of 
the associations to accept WTO's as members. (22) 
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Usually, the form of a capital company is chosen, with a limited com-
pany (GmbH) as its core. Essential advantages are: 
the limitation of liability, and 
a wide scope in shaping the internal structure of the company, thus 
creating a legal base for self-administration, since statuses and 
articles can be formulated quite freely. 
Form and structure of the company, around and within this GmbH-core, can 
vary according to what purposes they shall serve, e.g. 
more public support and participation may bve achieved by opening 
membership of the staff association to representatives of the 
public if, the association functions as (main) shareholder; 
if autonomous self-administration is to be secured then it may be 
useful to add a company of sleeping partners to the company struc-
ture (GmbH & CoKG); this form may also be suitble if shareholders 
wish a personal liability limitation which the CoKG guarantees; 
easier access to business capital may be achieved by giving ech 
shareholder, inclusive those from outside, voting rights 
corresponding with his proportion of shares. 
Recently, conceptions have been fvoured which represent the employees, 
organized as staff association, in the shareholders meetings through 
trustees. The association is the decision making body and the 
trustees, fully responsible to it, act on its behalf only. 
3.4.2 Other legal problems 
Legal questions accompany a recue initiative from the beginning. 
German law is prepared neither to deal adequately with the factual 
identity of employers and employees, nor to recognise the specific 
interests and conflicts which are actualized by WTO. This touches 
many areas of the law which ought to be checked to see which changes -
sometimes only very little ones - would be required to create a legal 
framework favourable to WTO. In contrast to the provision of material 
support, which easily comes under attck because of unfair competition, 
changing the law, in may instances, could be done in a way detrimental 
to no-one. At least the following areas of law ought to be examined: 
works constitution act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) and protection 
against dismissal act (Kundigungsschutzgesetz) 
labour promotion act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz) and employment pro-
motion act (Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz) 
bankruptcy law 
parts of company and tax law and, possibly, association law 
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co-operative law (Genossenschaftsgesetz) 
economic and industrial promotion schemes and regulations. 
3.5 Sei f-management 
A WTO does not guarantee self-management in a firm that is created -
even if the employees hold the bulk of the shares (case C). Even if 
a WTO initiative decides to pursue self-management they should adopt 
the view that "self-administration is a problem and no solution to 
existing problems" (23). 
It appears that the main threats to effective and continuing self-
management are: 
o The employees themselves. 
After years of being tied up by the company's command structure, 
by competitive work and pay conditions, by work-organisation which 
disconnects everyone from the over-all process, by a works council 
and the Trade Union system which is based on representation and 
delegation much more than on grass-root and individual initiative 
- developing the capacity for self-management is a difficult and 
often tiresome learning process. Vital elements of this learning 
process appear to be : 
(i) organising all WTO activities in a way that enables as many as 
possible to use them as a first course to learn a responsible 
way of acting; 
(ii) preparing working methods that support individual and collec-
tive production controls; 
(iii) devising payment systems which underline the fact that pro-
duction results from collective and not just individual 
efforts ; 
(iv) in general, looking for new ways of doing things wherever it 
is possible, in order not to fall back into the old patterns, 
but without trying to change so much that anxiety starts to 
paralyse the initiative. 
o New management. 
If the new managers are efficient and clever, or if their personal 
behaviour does not differ much from the old management's, this may 
tempt workers to return to old attitudes of "leave it all up to 
them". On the other hand, managers who identify themselves with 
co-operative ideas usually lack industrial experience and are 
inclined to make mistakes, or at least to be less successful. 
This can undermine the workforce's belief in se If-management. 
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o A need for large sums of capital. 
This can be a key problem, not only in the initial phase but also 
after years of successful trading. The precondition for any access 
to loans is the prospect of a good return for the creditor. To 
make sure that the money is safeguarded and used properly, such 
loans are usually conditional on a certain degree of participation 
in governing and controlling the company. In this way, work-force 
influence may slowly fade away. 
o Brilliant success 
In the last century Franz Oppenheimer formulated the iron law of 
transformation": "It is extremely rare that a producers co-
operative reches prosperity. But when it comes to this point, it 
ceases to be a producers co-operative." (24) 
3.6 The products 
There are many reasons why a WTO initiative may consider new products: 
111 e y do not have permission to continue with the old products; there 
is no market for the old products; the existing products are not in 
line with their political beliefs (military production, for instance); 
additional money may be available for certain new products, or more 
attractive markets may exist for them. 
Whatever the reasons behind it, new product development has to deal 
with the following problems: 
o to develop a new product and to find markets for it is a long and 
costly undertaking; a WTO is usually not able to finance its own 
research and development department. 
o royalty payments in respect of products developed elsewhere and 
produced under license can be quite expensive. 
o the marketing of really new products can be very difficult. 
AN/Bremen (case D) are trying to do this, but have gained nothing 
but experience, so far. 
o state technology promotion schemes mainly favour high, hard and 
large technology (and large companies). 
o the development of "technology exchanges" is in its infancy and 
those exchanges, so far, can hardly respond to the needs of WTO. 
In practice, WTO must often turn to contract work to secure their eco-
nomic survival. As case D shows, such an interim solution may last 
for a long time; AN/Bremen, after more than two years in trading, are 
now slowly reaching some consolidation of their contract work activity 
(which is still by far their most important activity). 
Parallel to such contract work several other activities must be 
sustained over long periods, i.e.: 
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setting up working groups which, in co-operation with management, 
look for and develop new product ideas and, eventually, build 
prototypes ; 
seeking and obtaining all possible subsidies for new products, and 
new product development; 
generating public attention (and pressure) to get state orders, 
e.g. to realize pilot projects or to support a production which 
may be of special regional importance. 
Limits and chances of WTO 
Few WTO have been successful so far in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The infrastructure, however, is tending to become more 
favourable for future attempts - and the need to save jobs will cer-
tainly not come to a sudden end. 
An evaluation if present experience should not only consider what is 
measurable, such as the number of job savings. Their value as the 
focus for new social alignments, as signals of new currents and possi-
bilities, as experiments that provided those involved with a positive 
alternative to resignation and passivity - all these should also be 
borne in mind. Doors have been pushed open leading in new directions. 
They have reinforced calls for the state to give up laissez-faire 
attitudes in areas where these only lead to the weak becoming weaker -
and in this regard WTO provide a strongly democratic (and thus a rare 
and maybe precious) element in support of policies that might other-
wise develop in paternalistic ways. 
The experience so far clearly demonstrates that only improvements to 
the economic, legal and political environment of WTO will prevent many 
more failures. Success will be dependent on positive answers to 
questions such as: will there be a growing readiness of the state to 
give more financial support? Can the banks be persuaded to be more 
flexible and realistic (or be replaced by new types of financing 
institutions in this sector)? Will the trade unions come off the 
fence and offer active practical and political support? Only if the 
trade union fully recognise WTO as an element of their fight against 
job destruction, will an individual workforce be able to move the 
state and other institutions to give more support. 
WTO are certainly no element in an anti-capitalist strategy. But 
they could become a substantial part of an economic formation that is 
complementary to the main-stream economy. The reason why they are 
born symbolizes this complementary function: they start where capital 
closes down and retreats. Their opportunity lies exactly there: to 
unfold as elements of decentralizing economic and social policies for 
areas where profit-oriented capital has lost its interest and aban-
doned the workforce, leaving basic needs unsatisfied; or where it is 
not yet sufficiently confident of a high return to be willing to 
invest in a new idea. WTO serving such purposes need to be supported 
by a socially controlled environment, otherwise they cannot survive: 
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in a competitive economy, dominated by very large companies they soon 
become short of breath - sometimes even before they have begun to 
breath. 
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Appendix 1 Summary listing of WTO initiatives 
The known cases are presented in Table N. on the following pages 
There must certainly be a number of unknown cases, especially among 
small and very small firms- and there are cases in between a WTO and 
a different rescue form - some of them are included in the list, some 
are excluded. One can only guess why the proportion of successful 
WTO initiatives in the 70s was relatively high: - perhaps the 
failures have been forgotten; or perhaps it reflects the better over­
all economic situation; or perhaps because most of them were prepared 
to be quite conventional companies with employee share-holding or 
ownership, thus making banks and state more inclined to help. 
The reasons for failure in the final column of Table N are indicated 
by letters. (The categories are neither systematic nor complete). 
The upper case letters stand for the following reported reasons for 
the end of a WTO which started trading: 
A = lack of capital 
Β = managerial mistakes 
X = ceased to be a WTO; business however goes on - which is 
usually the case when more capital is needed and new 
shareholders change the WTO character of the company 
The lower cases indicate the reported reasons for failure before a WTO 
started trading: 
a = old company too deeply in debt 
b = lack of capital (often this also indicates that the state 
has not been willing to help) 
c = obstruction or lack of collaboration by the old company 
d = reasons lying within the workforce (e.g. lack of unity, 
feeling that the task is too difficult, agreeing with a 
different solution including acceptance of redundancy 
compensation payments, etc.) 
e = no promising market 
f = too much time pressure (time pressure, quite often, also 
1 ies behind b + d) 
g = new products required but not possible to develop them 
h = insufficient or wrong advice (may be a reason which, in 
reality, occurs far more often than in the list), 
i = initiative was brought to an end because of a different 
solution (such as purchase of the old company by an 
external buyer). 
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Appendix II - Case Studies 
Case A - Olympia-Werke AG, Leer. 
Founded in 1957 by the Olympia-Werke AG, part of the large electric 
concern AEG and situated in a very poor region in Northern Germany, 
the plant is the largest employer in the small town of Leer. The 
maximum of 2,400 employees has been reduced by rationalization and 
production transfers to 1,300 in 1980/81, when closure is announced 
for the first time. The regional unemployment rate is about 20%. 
Strikes and other industrial action lead to modifications of the 
company's plans: the plant shall be preserved with 770 employees; the 
works council, in return, shall agree to 500 dismissals. Three months 
later, the company says that because of insufficient state subsidy 
they must reduce employment to 450. More industrial action and public 
demonstration. The (conservative) state government grants loans of 23 
million DM on condition employment is kept at a level of 600. After 
more industrial action, an agreement, based on this figure, is signed 
between the company and the works council. 
The company fails to bring new production (as agreed) into the plant. 
(Production, so far, is mainly based on small mechanical typewriters 
and some spares for electronic ones.) In June 1982, the first 
dismantling of machines takes place - and more industrial action. 
Employment by now is down to about 700. Then bad news: AEG goes 
bankrupt which is a serious blow to Olympia AG as well. In November 
1982 the company announces that the Leer plant will be closed on June 
30, 1983. 
More action by the workers and their union (IG Metall) follows, with 
growing participation of the public. Politicians of all parties, and 
the churches, appeal to the state government to make every effort to 
preserve Olympia Leer. Works council members begin to think about 
mounting their own rescue attempt. They and local union leaders pre-
sent a paper outlining a possible labour-controlled production unit, 
based on continued production of small mechanical typewriters, 
contract work, and new "socially useful" products. The company refu-
ses to accept these plans and continues to try to dismantle machines. 
In due course a better developed scheme is put forward. This compri-
ses a productive business and a vocational training centre for about 
150-200 trainees (paid for by public unemployment administration -
which agree to the plan), together taking care of 400 to 500 
employees. In December the company signs an agreement 
("Interessenausgleich") with the works council which gives some sup-
port to the workers initiative (e.g. 75,000DM to pay external 
advisors). Employees are intensively engaged in looking for and deve-
loping new products. In January, they found the association "Jobs for 
Leer" (with employee and external membership) as an organ to prepare 
and co-oordinate the take-over process and to negotiate financial and 
other support from the State. The State government, having favoured 
the closure so far, now agree in principle to the workers proposals, 
but wish more detailed plans. 
i 
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In March 1983 the association presents detailed proposals for the 
rescue firm "Ostfriesische Metall- und Kunsstofferzeugnisse GmbH & 
CoKG", envisaging up to about 300 jobs and company self-management. 
At the same time, there are state elections which are won once again 
by the CDU. Now, a different wind is blowing: 
o state government are still willing to acquire the fixed assets (in 
lieu of repayment for financial support provided) and to hand them 
over to a foundation which is shareholder of the rescue company on 
behalf of the employees; 
o they strictly refuse to grant a loan to the rescue firm, knowing 
perfectly well that this money is a pre-condition for obtaining 
bank loans and although only 1 million DM is required. 
o they declare that any further commitment will be linked to a 
"private solution" (a normal buy-out). 
The last condition helps to split the negotiating team; the majority 
of traditional works council members agree with government to favour a 
private solution. 
No buyer is found, and the plant is closed down as planned, accom­
panied by trade union and public demonstration. Workers carry 
balloons showing promises of management and politicians - and burst 
them. A few months later, the assets are sold by auction. 
Case Β - Schmalbach-Lubeca GmbH/Velbert 
A plant of Schmalbach Lubeca GmbH, situated in the highly 
industrialized Ruhr area,had a peak employment of 350 in the 70's. 
This had reduced to 130 in summer 1983, when closure was announced, to 
take place in July 1984. The product was small plastic containers of 
up to 5 litres. The main reasons for closure: reduced markets for the 
product and an overall rationalisation and restructuring of the com­
pany and production. 
Surprisingly, there was not much reaction from the highly unionized 
and experienced work-force; but there were immediate ideas for a WTO, 
initiated by some works council members and supported by the local 
trade union, IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik. Talks and consultation 
followed with the main company board in Braunschweig, with economists 
of a nearby university and with representatives of the trade union 
owned Bank fur Gemeinwirtschaft (BfG) to clarify the feasibility of, 
and further develop the plan for, the workers take-over. Further 
development was in co-operation and/or consultation with State and 
local governments, public labour administration and the local IG 
Chemie; the RKW gave additional economic advice. 
First results were encouraging: positive commercial assessments by 
experts: generous support by the company (handing over large parts of 
the assets at little or no cost; implicit market agreements; promi-
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ses for contract work during the first 6 months of trading); an 
encouraging response by BfG; continuation of the old production; and 
solid contacts to old and new clients. By the beginning of 1984, a 
carefully elaborated plan to re-start the business 3 months after clo-
sure at the latest, with about 50 employees who would also own the 
company had been prepared. It also considered new activities such as 
container-recycling, and new products. The new company, "Velberter 
Kunststoff Verpackung GmbH", was formally founded and registered in 
January 1984. 
Self-management was not very strongly instituted in the legal struc-
ture of the new company: the employees, represented by 3 trustees of 
the registered association (called "workers take over their firm") 
were only sleeping partners in the company beside the 2 managing 
directors as active ones. A lot of consideration, however, was given 
by the employees to the shaping of future production and work organi-
sation, payment systems and structures of decision making. 
All this was difficult, tiresome, and many of the employees did not 
really feel qualified to realize such a project, and they were someti-
mes near to giving up. Nevertheless, the initiative was never 
seriously endangered by these difficulties. The main problem, and 
this became clearer and clearer, was that of financing. An estimated 
3 million DM in total was needed, with a much smaller proportion of 
share capital which was to be paid in by the employees, from their 
redundancy compensation payments. 
In spite of two independently produced and positive commercial 
assessments by experts (one of them by an RKW member) the SPD state 
government decided to postpone their support decision until after the 
banks hade made up their minds. And they (in return) asked the ini-
tiative for proof of profitable business during the next 5 years(!) -
which of course could not be provided. By the end of February, BfG 
categorically refuse any loans because they believe that there is no 
security for part of the capital needed (a risk, at most, of 1 million 
DM). The second potential creditor, a State bank (Westdeutsche 
Landesbank) produced an efficiency analysis, resulting in a negative 
forecast, and used this to justify not granting any loans. This was 
the signal for state government to declare officially, in April 1984, 
that they had decided not to support this WTO - one of those cases in 
which death took place before birth. 
Case C SWA - Spinnerei und Weberei Augsburg GmbH 
The company (Mechanische Baumwollspinnerei und Weberei Augsburg 
AG/3WA) was part of the Gloggier concern. This was a group privately 
owned by Hans Gloggier who, between 1969 and 75, bought numerous com-
panies, thus pushing his concern into a leading position in West 
German textile manufacturing. By 1975, it was a multinational empire, 
co-operating with 38 inland and foreign banks, with the trade union 
bank BfG as one of the main creditors. It was a total surprise to the 
employees, as well as to the public, when this concern went bankrupt 
in December 1975. While some parts of the concern could be saved 
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without great difficulties, SWA had to file a petition in bankruptcy; 
management, state government (Conservâtive/CSU) and BfG, among others, 
did not see a realistic rescue chance. 
The receiver, taking over a company with 1050 employees and with 60 
million DM in debts, dismisses 300. Clever negotiations with 
suppliers and customers enable him to continue production with the 
remaining workforce. He succeeeds in consolidating the business, 
though there is no chance of reducing the burden of debts. An 
extraordinary thing has begun: production, by a company under 
receivership, is continued until the resuce company is registered, 
finally, in February 1984, - 8 years later, having produced profits 
for the last 3 years. 
The rescue proposal was presented in mid-1983. The new firm was to be 
supplied with 10.6 million DM of equity - 89% of which was to be pro-
vided by the employees (c.6 million D.M from compensation payments and 
c. 3 million DM was a type of labour administration grant) the 
remaining 11% by suppliers and customers. The scheme was worked out 
by the receiver, in co-operation with the local authorities, the 
regional trade union organisation (Gew.Textil-Bekleidung) and the 
works council. 
Once again, it was the BfG which almost caused a sudden end to this 
hopeful under-taking, this time indirectly. In order to reduce the 
extent of their funds at risk, they sold the freehold to the site 
which they held as security, thus giving away a very important element 
with which they could have supported a rescue quite decisively. The 
buyer, the owner of a building company, used the acquired rights for 
speculation and asked, instead of the 8 million DM which he had had to 
pay, for 16 million DM to sell it back to the new company - which 
would have made them bankrupt before they started. After long and 
delicate negotiations, a solution was found: a group of banks (BfG, 
the communal Augsburger Sparkasse, and a state development 
bank/Landesanstalt fur Wiederaufbau) gave credits to SWA, including 15 
million DM to the speculator. Local government (SPD) secured the 
total, which was quite unusual. 
Today there are some 500 employees, inclusive of 45 apprentices. They 
are represented in the limited company by a senior official of their 
union who acts as trustee. Once a year he has to report to them on 
the economic situation of the company. Apart from that he makes his 
own decisions and politics. On the board the workers hold 3 out of 9 
seats. There is no more workforce influence or workforce protection 
thnn in any conventional enterprise. 
This means that the workers, though primarily owning the company, do 
not control company policy. This is done by a general manager with 
industry background who is neither in favour of trade unions nor of 
workers' self-management. On top of this, work conditions are such 
that real motivation or qualification to develop more of a self-
managed firm are very unlikely to emerge. The workers appear to have 
accepted that they work in a company where they had to pay for their 
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jobs. Obviously, they 'bought' nothing else with their financial 
involvement. 
Case D - AN Maschinenbau - und Umweltschutzanlagen GmbH/Bremen 
AN was rescued from the Bremen plant of J.M.Voith GmbH, a South German 
company with a good name in mechanical engineering. The Bremen plant 
was established in 1941 as part of war industry, with civil production 
aft±c i945. In the 1970s employment peaked at 320. Closure of the 
plant was announced in October 1982, to take place in 1983. After 
negotiations, the date of closure was postponed to March 31, 1984. 
When closure was first announced, employment was down to 170. 
Preceding the announcement, the mother company had invested huge sums 
in new technology (thus avoiding taxes on much of their profits). The 
central production capacities created thereby had to be used, so 
orders were shifted from Bremen to South Germany, piecemeal, even 
though the Bremen plant was still an effective production unit. 
However, the works council had become aware of these early signs of 
plant closure, and its chairman, supported by some other workers, was 
well prepared. A few weeks before the closure was announced they had 
set up a "new products" working group, knowing that if the company 
should withdraw from Bremen they needed to have some product ideas as 
a precondition for saving the firm. Nevertheless, negotiations after 
closure was announced failed. Instead of becoming unemployed the 
workers decided to take over the firm. The first step was to set up 
an "economy (and legal questions) commission" and to transform the new 
product working group into a "technology commission", serving as basic 
managerial organs of the rescue initiative and as basis for the co-
operation of worker activists and external advisers and experts. 
Plenary meetings every 2 weeks, open to staff and supporters, 
completed the basic structure and was co-ordinated by the works coun-
cil chairman. 
The worker take-over initiative successfully negotiated support from 
the state government which, in the end, rented the premises, using 
part of it for a youth training centre and sub-letting the rest to AN. 
The state also bought the machinery and let it to the workers' ini-
tiative. The company was moved to provide some minor support which 
helped to make it possible to continue with the old business and to 
prepare the new company at the same time. "This necessary bit of co-
operation was, last not least, secured by the workforce of the 
company's main plant when they threatened to take industrial action 
unless the company would show a supportive attitude towards the take-
over initiative in the Bremen plant." It was made clear, however, 
that the workers' company would not be allowed to continue with the 
old production. 
The new company, AN, officially started trading in April 1984, one day 
after the Voith plant had been closed. It used the legal structure of 
a GmbH (limited company). 50 of the employees had formed an asso-
ciation, open to supporters, which is the collective shareholder (with 
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contributions by the employees of 1,000 DM each); some sympathy capi-
tal had multiplied the available sum of money a few times. 
However,the new enterprise was severely under-capitalised. The 
workers decided not to seek bank loans. Instead, initial wage costs 
were heavily reduced by unemployment benefits and other labour admi-
nistration payments, as well as by employing few members at the start 
- only 5 full-time. By September, 1986 employment was up to 43. The 
first larger sum of outside money came in in 1985 when the federal 
government complemented by a regional government grant, reacted posi-
tively to an AN application for research and development money for a 
new product (an-aerobic fermenting facilities) totalling 1.5 million 
DM. 
The company still relies on contract work - which is quite different 
from what the workforce had intended when they decided to produce new 
products which had to be "socially useful, ecologically sound and not 
related to any military production". They have achieved the first 
step towards economic consolidation, but there is still a long way to 
go to realize the central ideas in their plan. 
This is also true for their ideas of a co-operative self-management. 
Unprofessional management, lack of discipline, of social awareness and 
responsibility, among other things, have led to a partial (and 
temporary?) retreat from ideas like equal pay, individual autonomy 
within collectively agreed frameworks of work organisation, and other 
'grass roots reforms'. At present, there is a tendency by the 
majority of the work-force to go back to more traditional ways of 
managing the company and organising production and labour processes. 
They insist, however, on the plenary assembly, with meetings at least 
once a month, as the basic organ for decision making and management 
control. 
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Appendix 3 - State support for Local Employment Initiatives. 
The Commission of the European Communities recently presented a 
questionnaire to member governments concerning state support directed 
towards advancing local employment initiatives. The answer of the 
Government of the Federal Republic, in March 1986, is summarised in 
Table 2. (25) 
Table 2 - Forms and location of State support for L.E.I 
METHODS/INSTRUMENTS 
financial support, 
such as credits, grants, in-
vestment capital/shares 
advisory boards 
research and pilot projects 
related to new employment 
initiatives 
youth training schemes and 
other instruments to improve 
job opportunities of 'prob-
lem' groups of the labour 
market 
premises, shops and other 
facilities 
public contracts, orders 
LEVEL 
regional government (5 out of 11 
states, i.e. all states with 
SPD majority); a few local 
schemes 
regional government (there are 
only a few - some are subsidized 
by the federal government; some 
closely collaborate with 
'private' organisations and net-
works . ) 
federal and regional government 
mainly financed by the federal 
government. 
local government 
(if at all:) local government. 
Further information on the prevision of financial support by the five 
regional governments that have developed schemes is given in Table 3. 
However WTO exceed the average (small) size of these projects and so 
cannot really profit from most of these support schemes. They are 
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totally insufficient to meet the requirements of a medium-sized com-
pany. On the other hand, the Hessen scheme has many interesting 
features: special grants are available for research and development 
of new products and production processes, to improve environmental 
conditions, and to improve training and job opportunities for young 
and long-term unemployed people to be integrated into co-operatives. 
Finally, the FIBEG initiative currently being negotiated with the 
government of the state of Bremen is worth describing. This is one of 
several proposals to create regional institutions as the backbone of a 
state-financed support infrastructure offering financial, advisory, 
training and other support. This initiative was prepared by the 
regional organization of Network Self-Help and the local association 
of self managed firms and cooperatives (BiS). As the outline below 
indicates it should considerably enhance the existing support scheme 
in Bremen (shown in table 3). 
Bremische Finanzierungs-, Beratungs - und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH 
(FIBEG) 
Purpose 
supporting self-managed firms and co-operatives by financing, con-
sulting and training 
Tools of financial support 
share capital: to increase the stock of the firms' own capital and 
to improve their credit-worthiness 
credit funa : to allow cheap credits 
grants : to subsidize social innovations in the starting period 
securities : for credits granted to co-ops by individual persons 
Advisory services 
Comprising 
any business consultation from setting up a co-op to looking for new 
markets 
vocational training and qualification; 
research and development of new products and services 
Organisational structure 
FIBEG is planned to be a limited company with 3 decision making bodies: 
general meeting (Gesellschafterversammlung): all shareholders 
(anyone agreeing with democratic shareholding can become an asso-










appointing management and for elaborating guide-lines of how to 
use the supportive tools 
Counci1 (Beirat): decides where the money goes to; council mem-
bers are: 
o representatives of the ministries of labour, economy, 
social affairs 
o representatives of co-ops and Network self-help 
o other representatives of the general meeting 
o management 
board (Aufsichtsrat): controls council and management (6 members: 
2 government representatives, 2 co-op/Network representatives, 2 
other representatives of the general meeting) 
Financial structure and re-financing 
capital stock: 100.000 DM (to be paid in by the state of Bremen, 
50% of which shall be ceded to co-op and Network share-holders) 
the 1.8 mill.DM funds of the LEI state support scheme are trans-
formed into assets of FIBEG 
2 mill.DM/year are contributed by the Bremen state budget 
backflow of credits and returns from share holding 
subsidies provided by specific schemes of the federal government. 
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Footnotes 
1. Case C, (in Appendix II), is an exception; although it is not a 
'genuine' WTO, it is a remarkable example of what a receiver can 
do ­ and still be in accordance with the law ­ to save jobs. 
Therefore it is included in the report. 
2. The growth rate of insolvencies has slowed down, but it has 
reached a new peak with 9,515 in the first 6 months in 1986, 
including 6,931 firms (fig. by Statist. Bundesamt, Wiesbaden) 
3. Unemployment has been going down slightly, reaching an 
unemployment rate of 8.5% (= 2,120,234) in August 1986 (fig. by 
Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, Nürnberg) 
4. IG Metall (metalworkers union), IG Chemie­Papier­Keramik (chemical 
workers union), Gewerkschaft Textil­Bekleidung (textile workers 
union), IG Druck and Papier (printing union), Gewerkschaft Holz & 
Kunststoff (wood and plastics workers union), IG Bau Steine Erden 
(building union) 
5. Source: Der Gewerkschafter, 4+5/85 ­ IG Metall has also produced 
a documentation on WTO in the IGM organizing areas: Heinz 
Bierbaum, Dokumentation Betriebsuberhahme, Frankfurt/M, 8/85 
published in: Hauptvorstand der IG Metall (ed.), 
Handlungsanleitung fur gewerkschaftliche Funktionstrager bei dro­
henden Betdriebsstillegungen, Graue Reihe der 
Hans­Bockler­Stiftung, Dusseldorf 1986" 
6. From the IGM policy statement in: Der Gewerkschafter ­ Dokumentation 
5/85, II 
7. One of the reasons why case Β failed was the refusal of the BfG to 
grant credits because of an unsecured risk of 1 million DM 
8. 3 out of a total of 6 successful WTO in Germany in the 80's have 
taken place there, as against 1.2% of the employed population 
living there. 
9. Helmut Martens, Belegschaftsinitiativen zur Fortfuhrung von 
Betrieben. Eine Herausforderung fur Gewerkschaften und 
sozialdemokratische Wirtschaftspolitik, in: W.Fricke u.a. (ed.), 
Jahrbuch Arbeit und Technik in Nordrhein­Westfalen 1985, Bonn, 
1985, p.383f 
10 for more detailed information see 
Armin Holand, Recht und Rechtspraxis als Hindernisse fur ortliche 
Beschaftigungsinitiativen, in: Kommission der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften (ed.), Forschungs­ und Aktionsprogramm zur 
Entwicklung des Arbeitsmarktes. Rechtliche, steuerliche, soziale 
und administrative Hindernisse fur die Entwicklung ortlicher 
Beschaftigungsinitiativen, Vol.I, Luxemburg 1986, pp.22­36 
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and 
Burghard Flieger (ed), Produktivgenossenschaften oder der 
Hindernislauf zur Selbstverwaltung (AG SPAK M 61), Munchen 1984, 
3rd section: ".Grundungshilfen", pp.253ff 
Although Flieger describes difficulties and obstacles caused by 
German cooperative law and associations he pleads for more use to 
be made of this legal structure. 
The gap between the traditional and the new co­op movement may be 
seen from the following quotation. The president of the 
(traditional) 'Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und 
Rai ffeisenbanken e.V.' (national co­op bank association) publicly 
declared that he was unwilling to accept the "Okobank" (new co­
op movement bank to be founded next year) as a member in his orga­
nisation; saying "the political elements of the Oko­Bank, such as 
collective working, co­determination and self­management, don't 
fit into the traditions of the co­operative banks". (Quoted in: 
Weser­Kurier, 19.9.1986, p.3) 
11 the best known and strongest support organisation is Netzwerk 
Selbsthilfe (self help network, a registered association) with 
some 32 regional branches. There are also some local associations 
of self­managed firms/co­ops, as well as first steps of co­
operation on a larger scale in areas like purchasing, electronic 
accounting, distribution, advertising, etc. Part of the 
infrastructure is a monthly periodical, 'Contraste'. Moreover, 
some independent (mainly regionally operating) financing co­ops 
(for crediting and credit securing) have been established; the 
first bank of the new co­op movement (Okobank) will be founded in 
1987. 
Several attempts were made to obtain a quantitative estimate of 
the expansion of the new co­op scene. The figures differ quite a 
bit. Here is one version: 
c.14,000 projects and co­ops in the Federal Republic; c.4,000 of 
them are commercial and producer co­ops, employing some 24,000 
people (not all of them fully paid); the other 10,000 projects 
(with about 80,000 people working there, many of them without, or 
with only very little, pay) belong to the socio­cultural sector. 
(ref: Marlene Kuck, Neue Finanzierungsstrategien fur selbstver­
waltete Betriebe, Ν.Y./Frankfurt 1985) 
Empirical studies and the difficulties of quantitative approaches are 
discussed in: 
J.Berger, V.Domeyer, M. Funder, L.Voigt­Weber, Alternativen zur 
Lohnarbeit? Selbstverwaltete Betriebe zwischen Anspruch und Realität, 
Bielefeld 1985, pp 23­34 
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and 
Jürgen Daviter, Zum Bestand und zur Entwicklungsfähigkeit der 
Selbstverwaltungswirtschaft, in: Kommission der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften, op.cit. (in fn 12), Vol.3 
12 An interesting signal for this is the publication of an article 
"Self-help as employment policy" in the well-known official 
periodical 'Der Gewerkschafter' of the IG Metall (Heinz Bierbaum, 
Selbsthilfe als Besch'åftigungspolitik, in: Der Gewerkschafter 
4/86 p.40f) 
13 Statement by the SPD-commission, see Selbstbestimmt arbeiten. 
Materialien zum Genossenschaftswesen und zur 
Selbstverwaltungswirtschaft, ed.by SPD, Bonn 1985, p.3 
14 The campaign for 'alternative production' - kindled by the activi-
ties of the Combine Committee of shop stewards of Lucas Aerospace 
in Britain - has been widely supported by IG Metall and has spread 
across companies throughout the Federal Republic. 
15 See discussion in note 11 above. 
16 Parts of chapters 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 are based on: Michael 
Grauvogel, Betriebsìibernahmen durch Belegschaften bei 
Betriebsstillegungen und Insolvenzen, in: J.Mehrings/R.Meyke 
(ed.), Wirtschaftsrechtliche Vortrage, Vol.I, Oldenburg 1986, pp 
246ff 
17 In Germany the roles of receiver and liquidator are not usually 
separated. 
18 Further elaborated in: Volkmar Gessner, Betriebsfort fuhrungen 
durch die Belegschaften von Krisenunternehmen in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Kommission der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften, op. cit. (in fn 12), Vol.II, (eh.IV + V) 
19 The average proportion of equity in enterprises in Germany is 
20-25% of the total capital. 
20 Or limited partner (within the expanded form of a GmbH & CoKG/ 
limited co.& limited partnership) 
21 Heinz Bierbaum, Toni Engberding, Finanzierungsfragen bei der 
Betriebsfortführung durch die Belegschaft, in: 0.König u.a. 
(ed.), "Unser Beispiel k'ònnte ja Schule machen!" Das 'Hattinger 
Modell' - Existenzkampf an der Ruhr, Köln 1985, p.209 
- such institutions could be incorporated into the schemes 
described in App. Ill if more money and industrial expertise are 
made available. 
22 see notes 12 and 18; there are informative comparisons of different legal 
company forms and synoptic tables in: Flieger, op.cit., pp 2517-259, 
272-277 
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23 Martens, op. cit., p.383 
¿Λ Franz Oppenheimer, Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft. Versuch einer 
positiven Oberwindung des Kommunismus durch Losung des Genos­
senschaftsproblems und der Agrarfrage, Leipzig 1896, p.45 
25 Source: Der Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung (IIa 1 ­ 2 1 
908), Fragebogen der EG­Kommission/Antwort an die EG ­ Betr.: 
Folgeaktionen ­ Ratsentschliessung vom 7. Juni 1984 'über den 
Beitrag der örtlichen Beschaftigungsinitiativen zur Bekämpfung der Arbeits­
losigkeit. 
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1 . Introduction 
The comparatively widespread occurrence of WTOs is a quite recent phe-
nemonen. There were, nevertheless, many previous attempts 
(especially during recessions) at creating these type of cooperatives. 
A notable example is the failed "mine to the miners" movement at the 
end of the 19th century; another is the creation during the 1930s 
depression of ACOME (1932), still referred to as one of the cor-
nerstones of the movement. 
The mid 60's marked the revival of WTO with the creation in 1965 of 
SADAG (a printing works confronted by technical change and the deve-
lopment of European competition). Ten years later, Manuest - "Lip of 
the Vosges" - was established from a furniture-making company which 
had failed to adapt itself to a changing market. From 1978 WTO 
enjoyed a booming expansion, which peaked in 1982, declined in 1984, 
and in 1985, appeared once again to be on the rise. 
However, at the same time as WTO were increasing, the co-operative 
sector into which they integrated was itself undergoing major changes. 
Until 1978 the cooperative sector was stable and homogenous 
(traditionally rooted in activities related to construction and 
printing). After 1978, it experienced an unprecedented expansion 
(rising from 571 workers-coops in 1978 to 1,269 in 1983) and also 
diversification: it expanded into various industrial sectors and 
achieved openings into material and intellectual service sectors. 
This created problems within the movement concerning, for example, its 
cohesion, its capacity to renew itself, and the need to adapt its 
structure to new circumstances. (The representative body of worker 
co-operatives in France is the General Confederation of worker co-
operatives - CGSCOP). See Appendix 1 for details of its 
organizai ion) . 
1.I Statistical Trends concerning WTOs since 1978 
The available figures on WTO and the number of jobs associated with 
them are given in table 1. These figures are based on the categories 
used by CGSCOP which distinguish between WTO and 'conversions'. The 
latter are, in general, viable enterprises that are changed into co-
operatives on the initiative of the owner (who may be retiring). In 
practice, however, a number of these 'viable' enterprises are marginal 
businesses with somewhat obsolete equipment that would not easily 
attract a private purchaser (if at all). Some cases of 'conversions', 
therefore, are almost certainly better understood as WTO in the terms 
of this study; and hence the figures in table 1 probably underesti-
mate the incidence of WTO in France (Appendix II gives figures for the 
number of 'conversions' for 1985 and 1986). 
131 
Table 1: Annual rate of creation of workers coops and employment between 
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Source CG SCOP 
*Note that resignation or exclusion of co-ops (both listed under 
"deletions") had an impact upon the employment register. For example, 
when 3 taxi companies crossed themselves off the coop list in 1984, 
but continued to exist, this accounted for 1080 fewer jobs on the 
register. 
** The data is not homogenous. From 1985 the figures provided by the 
CG SCOP represent not only their own member-companies, but all co-ops 
formed. The change was introduced in 1984, for which both sets of 
figures are available - hence the two entries for that year. 
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On the whole the rate of coop founding slowed down in 1983 after the 
acceleration in 1979 and 1981. Since this time (1983) the rate would 
appear to have stablized around 200. 
The decline is especially significant considering the employment 
figures for 1984 which saw a slackening of coop creation and a con-
siderable increase in failures. It should be mentioned, however, that 
since most co-operatives are fairly smnall, the failure of a few large 
co-operatives is sufficient to cause a significant drop in the overall 
employment figures. 
As we have no figures on job losses for 1985 we can simply state that 
the number of employees in the entire sector is stagnant (36,600 
workers at the end of 1985). 
The rise in the number of WTOs was especially noticeable in 1981 and 
1982. When they made a particular impact both on the number of new 
coops and on employment (these enterprises start off larger than 
'new-start' co-operatives). In 1984, these proportions dropped. 
As for the loss of employment in the entire sector, in the absence of 
more detailed figures, the only thing we know is that 50% of lost 
employment was due to companies founded in 1981, 82, 83 (2/3 of the 
coops formed in these years disappeared in 1984); 23% of the lost 
employment was due to coops started before 1977, (12% of the 1984 
bankruptcies were among these older co-ops) and 64% arose in the 
industrial and construction sectors. It is obvious that the WTO co-
ops played an important role in job losses, but they were not its sole 
cause. 
Moreover, their failure rate over the first few years seems to be 
quite low: according to CG SCOP (1), 63% of WTOs founded in 1981 
(figures for subsequent years are not available) are still viable in 
1986. This figure is higher than that for 'new-start' coops (only 46% 
of those founded in 1981 are still operative in 1986), and signifi-
cantly higher than the estimates for small and medium sized companies 
(2/3 of such companies are thought to fail within their first three 
years). this indication of the vitality of WTOs and young coops is 
still too vague to permit a detailed interpretation; it does, 
however, challenge the widely accepted idea that this kind of company 
is particularly unstable. 
The decline in the creation of WTOs in 1984 and its recovery in 1985 
seems to be accompanied by a reduction in the size of the companies in 
which WTOs occur. At any rate, this is a tendency that experts on 
the movement have remarked on, a tendency confirmed by the figures for 
1985 (though not by those for the first six months of 1986). More 
information on the recent incidence of WTO, their average size, 
regional distribution, etc. is given in Appendix II. 
Overall, then, the pattern is one in which the years 1978-83 saw a 
surge in the number of WTOs, but this trend was checked in 1984 in the 
context of substantial difficulties within the co-operative movement. 
Hence the development of the WTO phenomenon falls into two clear pha-
ses. An examination of the political and institutional developments 
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associated with these two phases helps to account for the mixed 
results that have been achieved, and for the currently more cautious, 
but by no means negative, stance of many of those involved. These two 
phases are therefore discussed in Sections 2 and 3 before turning in 
section 4 to consider some of the characteristic problems and issues 
that have occurred in the course of WTO. 
2. The development of WTOs from 1978-1983 
The overall economic context is the predominant factor in the develop-
ment of the WTO phenomenon. That context is characterized firstly by 
the rise in unemployment (which began slowly in 1964 and gradually 
quickened its pace) and secondly, by the closing down of companies, 
due to the restructuring of the system of production. Most WTOs 
occurred in the printing, textile and leather, furniture and mechani-
cal engineering industries. But the incidence of WTOs was also 
affected by the attitude of various other actors. 
2.1 Government attitude and measures 
Since 1978, the attitude of the national authorities (although it has 
always been changeable) has been relatively supportive of the coopera-
tive movement. This change materialized with the passing of a law 
relating to coops (unanimously adopted by both assemblies); this law 
facilitates, in particular, the conversion of enterprises into co-
operatives. It also authorizes local communities to give direct 
grants to co-operatives. 
These measures, together with other indirect forms of support (such as 
buying or renting of premises/land, bank guarantees, etc) favoured a 
larger investment by local communities. More and more they felt 
obliged to defend the employment and industrial structure of their 
region. The development of the subsidies system, for creating either 
new jobs or enterprises (not specifically oriented towards the 
cooperatives) also facilitated the creation of WTOs. For example, the 
1980 law permits an unemployed person, who wants to start an 
enterprise, to contribute a part of his or her unemployment allowances 
(limited to the equivalent of six months) to the capital of the busi-
ness . 
As a direct result of this law all wage-earning shareholders in a new 
business were enabled to contribute capital and this proved a powerful 
instrument; its importance would seem to be indicated by the fact 
that in 1984 (when the law could not be applied due to a redefinition 
e;f norms in unemployment insurance) there was a clear drop in the 
number of companies formed. 
With the change of the government in 1981, the social economy and 
cooperation acquired a more important place within the political 
agenda. The social economy became recognized as an independent sector 
of the "mixed economy", while cooperation received more official 
recognition. Gradually, a whole institutional machine evolved 
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(Delegation interministerielle a l'economie sociale in 1981, Institut 
de développement de l'economie sociale (IDES) in 1983; Secretariat 
d'Etat in 1984). 
These bodies did not become directly involved with particular co-ops; 
their role was more that of a 'go-between' and stimulus. As regards 
funding, the financial body which was set up specifically for the 
social economy (IDES created in 1983 with the direct support of the 
civil authorities and of the social economy organisms) has had very 
limited results. On the one hand it was set up too late to be cre-
dited with a significant role in the development of coops; on the 
other hand, due to it's limited means it did not bring it's mission 
(which was to trigger off other means of financing) to a successful 
conclusion. In fact, the support measures for WTOs owed much more to 
public financing through normal industrial policy measures (this is 
also the case for other forms of company). 
Whatever the case, the significant increase in the number of WTOs from 
1981 onwards remains an indisputable fact; but it was not the result 
of an intentional policy. It appears to be due, rather, to the impact 
of a political change that played in favour of a growing demand coming 
from the grass roots, the unions, the cooperative movement, and 
elected, representatives at local and national levels. 
The rise in WTOs can partly also be attributed to the fact that Mr. 
Mauroy's government, at that time (1981-83), gave its benevolent 
approval to applications for support it was presented with. In CG 
SCOP, this resulted in a substantial increase in state funding, and 
later, in the signing of an agreement in 1985 ("contrat de plan") for 
a plan by which CG SCOP undertook to create 50% of the new jobs in co-
operatives through WTO. 
2.2 The attitude of CG SCOP 
Following the passing of the 1978 law, "The implementation of the 
national policy for development of the workers' cooperation" became 
the declared goal of the movement. In 1981 CG SCOP emphasised that 
this goal had been reached but drew attention to the fact that this 
development was only minimally due to it's own policy - the 1978 law 
had been an important factor in the growth of the number of coops 
formed (2). 
Confronted with the growth in the number of coops the movement then 
began to stress (particularly in it's policy for the establishment of 
new co-ops) the importance of the organization of systematic support 
for medium sized and industrial projects. In this way, during the 
"feverent and innovative" Congress of 1981, the movement acknowledged 
WTOs as important for its strategy of development. (3) 
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2.3 The attitude of the Trade Unions 
The difference between the strategies of the cooperative and union 
movement still exist. However, unemployment problems, the closing 
down of factories and the increasing number of the cooperatives, 
attracted a renewal of interest in these ventures) on the part of the 
two main unions (CFDT, a socialist oriented union, CGT a communist 
oriented union). Depending on the specific situation, this interest 
was accompanied by hesitation and considerable differences in atti-
tude . 
CFDT 
Although the CFDT was deeply involved in the formative experiences of 
the 70s (such as LIP), it's impact on WTO was felt only in the cases 
supported by sections of its membership or local officials. No par-
ticular strategy concerning WTO was ever handed down from the national 
level, either before or after 1981. Instead, actions were implemented 
on the local level, as each situation arose. 
CFDT is in favour of self-management, but it approves of a change to a 
coop status only if it leads to social progress within the enterprise, 
(working conditions, work relations, implementation of democratic 
st rue tures, etc). 
In its analysis of the reform of society and of the role of the trade 
union movement, CFDT's interest in the social economy was as a poten-
tial ground for alternative employment initiatives (this concept is 
similar to the one formulated by M. Rocard in 1981): create jobs 
from local initiative, satisfy the needs, and transform work rela-
tions. Within the framework of a "third sector", the future of the 
coop movement lies not so much in the direction of WTO, but primarily 
in 'new starts' where one "acts differently". However, it remained 
unclear what guidelines or support the trade union could provide for 
members involved in particular but very diverse situations. 
CGT 
The CGT firmly rejects the "illusion of this third sector". But it 
changed its analysis and attitude toward the social economy 
(particularly regarding cooperatives) mainly as a result of the 
changes (such as nationalization, decentralization, new employee's 
rights) that occurred in France after the arrival of the left wing 
government. "This new situation modified the balance of power in 
favour of the workers." 
Cooperation (in production) was a means by which the CGT tried to find 
a solution to the general economic crisis, by implementing social 
changes that it considered to be appropriate. In the long term, this 
cooperation was seen as offering a "possibility of enlarging a par-
ticular form of socialization within the framework of a mixed 
economy", (3) In this perspective, the development of the cooperative 
sector became a part of the industrial strategy of the trade union in 
the following ways: it was a means of struggle to maintain and deve-
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lop employment, in spite of the employers' failures; it strengthened 
the industrial structure and preserved the domestic market; it contri-
buted to a modification of social relations; it expanded the 
consciousness of the workers and developed their management skills. 
On this basis, the CGT searched for "the best possible method and 
means to start a systematic and vast action" (4) This was done by 
creating first, a Trade Union sector for the social economy; and 
secondly ADITES, "a technico-political structure." ADITES was a small 
agency charged with participating in the actual operations of 
relaunching and starting enterprises of a cooperative or similar form. 
The CGT considered that the difficulties arising during a WTO required 
judgement and special consideration for each individual case: the 
cooperative solution was not the only one. The objective was to 
create "authentic and efficient enterprises which would be well 
managed and based on democratic principles" (5). The CGT held the 
view that a three-cornered power struggle usually existed within such 
enterprises - between the elected management bodies, the appointed 
managers and technical experts, and the trade unions. However, 
although recognising that these three power bases existed, the CGT was 
reluctant to accept such a situation and explicitly aimed to place the 
Union in overall control - organizing the workforce and supervising 
management activities. Moreover, the CGT was opposed to any of the 
attempts to introduce more radical forms of organization that often 
arise in WTO - elements of direct democracy, or efforts to transform 
social relations within the enterprise 
Without doubt, the CGT put pressure on both government bodies and the 
cooperative movement. During the first 3 years of the socialist 
government, the CGT took a number of initiatives to help small and 
medium sized companies. The exact number is difficult to establish -
probably around 50 had the support of ADITES (the CGT's claims to be 
established in one third of existing coops is arrived at by including 
older coops - predating the wave of WTOs - whose workers had kept up 
their union affiliation through solidarity and a sense of tradition.) 
However these interventions were not without their problems. Often 
the CGT was the first body to become involved with the workforce and 
it acted on its own to prepare a plan for a WTO and the creation of a 
worker co-operative. The plan was then passed on to the experts from 
CGSCOP to implement. Since CGSCOP were keen to maintain good rela-
tions with the CGT but were reluctant simply to implement a plan pre-
pared by others this put their staff in a difficult position. 
All things considered, the support of the CGT for WTOs during this 
period is inseparable from the development of it's strategy in the new 
climate created by the arrival in power of the left. Clearly, this 
political dimension was often allowed to overshadow the concrete 
problems posed by particular WTOs, with political considerations 
overriding a more reasoned approach to particular situations. 
In general, during this period WTOs aroused high expectations which 
were, unfortunately, not always matched by the results that followed. 
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As the economic circumstances became more complicated, the results 
registered after 1983, aggravated by the well publicised difficulties 
of cases such as Manufrance, meant that the attitude of various actors 
became more reserved. Nevertheless, factors other than a concern for 
public opinion contributed to the change in attitude. 
3. Since 1984: Decline in support for WTOs 
The national authorities change of orientation towards WTOs evolved 
with the change of overall governmental policy - initially the 
adoption of austerity measures, but then more strongly with the 
arrival of the Fabius government in 1984. This change in overall 
governmental policy was accompanied by modifications to its thinking 
on the social economy. The ideology of the "third sector" was 
abandoned in favour of a more pragmatic program. With this change in 
approach, cooperatives received support only if they presented an 
"economically viable project". Consequently, the state reduced its 
support of WTOs. 
These changes in the political circumstances (the governmental 
austerity program, the confrontation between the socialist party, in 
government, and the communist party which abandoned the government) 
did not facilitate collaboration between the CGT and government bodies 
over WTO. In fact, this collaboration was directly questioned during 
particular operations, such as Manufrance. Hence the CGT curtailed 
its policy of support for WTO and sought instead more classical 
solutions (e.g. purchase by another company). The CGT justified this 
shift by blaming the failure of WTO co-operatives on financial and 
governmental bodies (despite the fact that the analysis of particular 
cases clearly indicated that more rigorous commercial activity had 
been required). 
Meanwhile, having considered the problems, the CG SCOP adopted a more 
selective attitude towards WTO and the conditions required for their 
success - covering, e.g. the quality of equipment, market forecasts 
and the capacity of management. Appendix 3 illustrates CG SCOP's 
thinking with an extract from a report of this period. 
By its 1984 report CG SCOP's attitude had hardened further. Although 
acknowledging that its growth was largely due to WTOs, it said "Many 
of the WTOs occurred under unreasonable circumstances, and often 
without consulting the movement. The inevitable and expensive 
failures did and will continue to affect the image of the movement". 
(7) 
CG SCOP subsequently shifted its strategy primarily toward the 
consolidation and development of already existing coops, and toward 
the transformation of healthy enterprises - though it did not 
completely abandon the promotion of 'new starts' and "well prepared 
take-overs of failing enterprises". 
In practice this new strategy encompasses a much more rigorous policy 
towards WTO projects involving a large number of employees. It also 
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means that WTO projects involving less than 30 persons are treated 
like 'new starts' (i.e. starting with a small number of employees and 
building up employment gradually). In addition some other methods 
are also to be explored, such as merging WTOs into an already existing 
coop. 
The experts of CG SCOP report a diminishing demand for WTOs from 
employees, in comparison with the great popularity that WTOs enjoyed 
in 1982-84. In 1986, it appears that the movement is even more 
oriented towards 'new starts' than it was in previous years. 
In retrospect this brief account suggests that the cooperative 
movement, confronted with an unprecedented expansion and 
diversification, did not succeed in clearly defining it's strategy. 
It tried to take advantage of every apparent trend or opportunity to 
build itself up (variously, 'new starts' associated with local 
employment initiatives, WTOs, and laterly 'mutations' - the conversion 
of existing business into co-operatives). But it had no clear 
analysis of the role of co-operatives in the French economic 
structure. Hence its reactive attitude effectively prevented it from 
opposing, in due time and with sufficient firmness, some of the 
pressures brought to bear by other actors. 
The strategies of the other main parties involved, combined with 
differences between these strategies, influenced the WTO's movement. 
In practice, poor coordination, inappropriate support, and a lack of 
experience resulted in unfulfilled expectations. At the same time 
many other factors contributed to these results - such as, the 
difficulties experienced by older and larger cooperatives that were 
appealing for public funds, as well as consuming the energy of CG SCOP 
(and thereby tarnishing their reputation as "model coops"); campaigns 
against the economic interventions of local authorities (based on 
criticisms of the agreements reached, the absence of proper controls 
etc); the employers campaign against the transformation of small and 
medium size enterprises into coops - part of a wider opposition by the 
National Union of Employers to the social economy(8). 
In general, the years of growth which the co-op movement experienced 
after 1978 were followed by a crisis. This crisis was concentrated 
among larger industrial cooperatives - whether or not they were 
created from WTOs. 
4. Main Characteristics of WTOs 
The lack of coherent information makes it difficult to present a broad 
picture of WTOs. In addition the extreme diversity of cases makes it 
difficult to draw up a typology. It is, however, possible to discover 
some common features. 
WTOs occur in small and medium sized enterprises in a range of 
different industrial sectors. The incidence of WTO is greatly 
affected by the type of rationalization or restructuring occuring 
within particular industrial sectors. WTOs are usually formed from 
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enterprises that are undergoing problems of modernising their 
production methods in line with the evolving market and new 
technology. For example, there are numerous WTOs in the clothing and 
shoe industry, mechanical enginering industries, metal, furniture and 
printing. 
When they are formed, these enterprises have a relatively large number 
of employees in comparison with the entire cooperative sector (where 
90% of coops have less than 50 employees and 45% have less than 10). 
Of course, their size is reduced if we compare them to the old units 
of production from which they are formed. 
Very often, these enterprises consist of less skilled labour than the 
enterprises of the traditional activities of the coop sector. Thus, 
they contribute to a heterogeneity of the cooperative population - but 
in addition workers in such enterprises are less prepared to cope 
with the responsibilities incumbent upon the cooperators. 
WTOs are a result either of a spontaneous reaction by the workers, or 
of new thinking by actors in the environment. They represent a 
measure devised at a local level (though, occasionally, at national 
level) in order to maintain employment and preserve the industrial 
fabric . 
But the specific form of a worker co-operative (which does not 
correspond to the predominant model of a company) often provokes a 
polarisation of positions (for or against) on the part of the various 
economic, social and political actors involved. In such cases the 
climate thereby created makes the normal progression of negotiations 
and demands, which is essential to the establishment of such an 
enterprise, more difficult. 
Another common problem concerns the large amount of capital needed by 
WTO co-operatives. In order to avoid the difficulties that led to 
the closure and to relaunch the enterprise on a sound basis, the 
product line and production system may have to be re-vamped and the 
distribution and management systems strengthened. 
WTOs share the weaknesses of most small and medium size enterprises, 
and in addition, have all the problems characteristic of their sectors 
of activity. In as much as they are forming companies of a 
cooperative type and relaunching their activity, WTOs are confronted 
with the need for rapid transformation that poses numerous detailed 
problems. These problems are much more complex and varied than simple 
financial problems. 
4.1 The organization and duration of the takeover 
Apart from the concrete problems of a legal or financial type, the 
organization of the WTO (in terms of leadership, conflicts, the 
mobilization of the employees, etc) is a crucial factor in the 
collective dynamism that precedes the launching of· the enterprise. 
This collective dynamism determines whether or not the idea of the 
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takeover will gradually mature and take hold among the workers. It 
determines, too, whether the workers, who think of the cooperative as 
a last resort, will be prepared for their new role. The following are 
some of the pitfalls that may occur: 
o a stifling of the developing collective dynamic by a dominating 
leader; 
o the mobilization of environmental support having a reverse effect 
to that intended - because it takes the project out of the hands 
of the workers; 
o a lack of external support leading to a failure of the project. 
On the commercial side the re-establishment of certain networks 
(clients, suppliers) is made more difficult, the longer the period of 
inactivity. According to CG SCOP experts, enterprises that restart 
after a closure of more than 3 months tend to fail. The discrepancy 
between the sales forecast and the sales actually achieved is 
considered the principal factor in the failure of WTOs. 
4.2 Financin £ 
In general, this is based on the capital derived from the members 
(personal contributions, application of the law concerning unemployed 
workers wishing to create an enterprise, deductions from salary etc.), 
with the balance coming from public sources and the banks (there are 
no clear patterns here - each case is different). 
Some of the difficulties encountered in financing WTO projects are the 
reluctance of banks to lend; shifts in policy on the part of the 
government and the local communities; the negative impact of some 
subsidies; and a mismatch between the type of funding provided and 
the economic requirements of the enterprise. 
As pointed out above, the law concerning "unemployed and creators of 
enterprise" provided the most important lever for acquiring the 
initial capital. Since the capital provided in this way is based on 
the number employed, it might have led to maximising the number 
employed. However such a dangerous trend seems not to have occurred, 
perhaps because coops are formed in sectors of relatively low capital 
intensity and therefore the capital need proves to be proportional to 
the number of employees. 
4.3 The quality of the management team 
The management team of the previous enterprise is seldom present at 
the takeover, and a new management team is not always easy to find. 
No executive likes to enter a WTO which is susceptible to problems 
related to operational difficulties (- and hence the difficulties of 
the CG SCOP in organizing a pool of "relay managers"). Yet, a 
solution may be found among the workers themselves. A leader 
sometimes evolves, through the struggle to achieve the WTO, towards a 
management position. 
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This may pose problems of adaptation for the leader personally and 
also problems in changing the organization's culture. The problem is 
one of transition from being a leader in the struggle to becoming a 
co-ordinator of the general management of the company. As far as the 
collective body of wage-earners is concerned such a position evokes 
contradictory reactions: the leader enjoys a certain gratitude for 
services previously rendered, but the change in his role can also be 
considered by the other wage-earners as a kind of betrayal, and lead 
to serious conflict (everything depends on the form of collective 
management established). 
4.4 Recouping the market and increasing productivity 
Many failures originate from plans that are too optimistic especially 
in commercial terms. In the sectors and conditions in which the WTOs 
arise, problems of production organization are caused by the 
inevitable redefinition of the produces, and of production methods. 
Productivity levels result as much from work organization and work 
relations (atmosphere, form of Organization, skills etc) as it dees 
from difficult choices that have to be irtade in the field of 
investment, training, wages and salary structure. 
4.5 The potential role of the Trade Unions 
The Trade Unions have a problem in defining their role in the new 
structure: this requires a transition from the phase of demands, to 
the phase of management; it requires participation in management and 
the decision-making process, while maintaining its independent 
position regarding employment, salaries, work conditions and so on. 
Whether the Trade Union becomes directly involved in running the 
enterprise, or on the contrary, it tries to impose control over 
"technical" executives (the CGT model), its shift in position is 
always accompanied by certain conflicts. That is, perhaps, why the 
debate within the unions concerning WTOs is so difficult. 
4.6 External Relations 
All these changes take place in an environment that is ambivalent 
towards a WTO - both acceeding to some of its demands, but also making 
demands on it. The successful outcome of a WTO depends both on the 
way these changes are introduced and on the dynamics created between 
the internal decision-making and the external pressures. 
As regards these external pressures, the environments of WTO are 
extremely variable and a multiplicity of bodies may be involved: 
commercial courts; local or national unions; local or national public 
authorities; local community organizations; banks; suppliers, 
clients and competitors; the cooperative movement (CG SCOP, either 
through its regional organization or, through its Confederal Expansion 
Fund; other Coops); business advice and training agencies (chamber of 
commerce, consultants, 'management shops' etc). Generally, while the 
local employers and institutions related to them and the banks 
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(including the financial institutions of the wider co-operative 
movement) do not lend a kindly ear to WTOs, the State administrators 
and the elected representatives, particularly of the depressed regions 
suffering high unemployment, have often been attentive to the demands 
and appeals of WTO initiative. When this happens the co-operative 
movement becomes involved, essentially providing advice, guidelines 
and support. 
5. Conclusions: the opportunities and limitations of WTO 
While experts in this field agree that one could draw up an a long 
list of propositions about WTOs, they emphasise that every case is 
different. There is no one answer, but, in fact, several. 
The criteria and the methods currently applied in the support of WTO's 
insist upon necessary conditions being met in the fields of equipment, 
market research and management "In order to avoid creations based on 
out-dated equipment and on a fanciful commercial hypothesis without 
technical know-how" (8) 
However, even if all these required conditions are fullfilled, it is 
still difficult to take preventive action regarding the cultural 
dimension of the transformation, and the transition from the struggle 
for employment to a search of the possible ways of cooperative 
management. It has always been hard to reconcile the inevitable 
period of apprenticeship with the urgency that characterizes the first 
steps of any new enterprise. Is it possible that the existence of a 
"period of neutralization in production, a period of training prior to 
the beginning of the activity", would permit a closer integration 
between the economic and the cultural projects? - as CG SCOP's 
representatives suggest. Perhaps, but the cultural project must 
remain rooted in the concrete practices of the work of the enterprise 
(the organization of work, decision-making and so on - ) otherwise it 
will wither. 
In concluding, we could suggest the following general hypothesis 
concerning WTO and companies in crisis: the cooperative form is 
inappropriate for capital-intensive activities involving a very large 
number of employees. However it can certainly be a solution for a 
small and medium-sized industrial enterprises (up to, say, 50 
employees). The pre-requisite is to find a sufficient balance among 
several elements product-market possibilities in relation to 
production equipment, financial resources, the members abilities, 
management systems and so on) and to be able to rely on a certain 
level of professional competence among the employees. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Structure and role of 
the General Federation of Worker Cooperatives (CG SCOP) 
The constitution, at the end of the 19th Century, of a federation of 
industrial co-ops has without doubt been an element conducive to the 
continuation of the movement and to its growth at certain times. It's 
structure is one of a federation at the national, regional and 
professional levels. 
The work of the General Federation of Workers' Co-ops (Fr. CG SCOP), 
of which the majority of existing workers' co-ops are members -
membership is not obligatory, but it opens the way to the 
'co-operative quarter' of the public markets - has the job of 
disseminating information to co-ops, organising and representing them, 
and supporting their internal and external development. It comprises: 
a classic structure of representation: every 3 years in a 
national conference, workers' co-ops vote on policy and elect 
the members of the national council, who in turn elect the 
Federal Bureau* and appoint the General Secretary of the 
Federation. 
national and regional services, co-ordinated by the General 
Secretary, whose job is to disseminate information, give 
technical assistance and organise training. Of a more 
specialised nature, there is also the Federal Expansion Fund 
(Fonds d'expansion confederal), set up in 1975, which provides 
financial assistance in the setting-up, development or rescue 
of co-ops (funded by 1/3 of subscriptions paid to the 
Federation by co-ops); set up more recently, in 1981, the 
Development and Support Office does work requiring specific 
skills and 'relief managers'; lastly, there is a Promotions 
and Exports Office. 
At the regional level, since 1975, the progressive 
establishment of regional 'technical' delegations with paid 
workers alongside the regional 'political' unions - which are 
notably responsible for selecting candidates from the co-ops 
for the national council. The 'technical' delegations respond 
to the local development needs of co-ops and assist their 
growth. As at the national level, the main work of these 
delegates is to support the creation of co-ops and to assure 
continuous technical assistance to those already in existence. 
At the local level, co-ops are trying to set up exchange networks. 
This is hindered by the diversity of their activities and 
preoccupations. 
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On the other hand, shared skills constitute a basis for co-ops to come 
together in both traditional sectors and in growth areas. There are 
federations of co-ops in the building and graphics industries, and in 
metallurgy, whilst groupings are being formed in information 
processing and in the furniture trade. This co-operation between 
co-ops is mainly based on the development of their commercial and 
technical potentials and on consideration of the trends within the 
sectors in which these co-ops operate. 
The means of support provided by the movement have been reinforced in 
recent years by a substantial assistance given by the state since 
1982, but this is still not sufficient given the size of the movement 
and the diversity of co-ops. 
On a more ideological level, the revitalisation of co-operation has 
led to questions and debates illustrated by the very recent 
establishment of a network of small co-ops affiliated to the 
Federation: faced with the institutionalisation of a movement where 
democracy is not a major issue, and with a pyramid structure which 
does not fit their needs, these co-ops advocate co-operative 
militancy, springing from actual co-operative practice (information, 
training, facilitation), and more horizontal, decentralised forms of 
organisation, based on the establishment of local groups, the 
proliferation of interco-op exchanges and the opening up of co-ops to 
their environment. 
In the realm of relations between industrial co-ops and the other 
families of co-ops (agriculture, consumer co-ops), co-operation is 
still in its embryonic stages, since the development of co-ops in 
France occurred primarily within the different sectors. 
Interco-operation manifests itself primarily on the political level, 
through the National Co-operative Group and the Higher Council for 
Co-operation, which has a mixed structure including state bodies. At 
the level of the Co-ops themselves, however, this does not prevent 
them having privileged relations of clientele and support with each 
other, as on a wider basis they do with the social economy. 
As far as the banking organisations of the co-operative sector are 
concerned, they seem to take little account of the specificity of 
worker co-ops and take no more risks than other banks. 
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Appendix 2 The size of WTO Cooperatives 
Table 2 presents the average size of WTO and 'new start' co-operatives 
since 1978. However, because of the considerable variation in size, the 
'average' figures are of limited use. 
Table 2: Average number of employees in new cooperatives, by type of co-
operative, since 1978 




21 23.6 44.7 25.8 26.6 26 n.a 11.4 24.6 
8.9 8.6 6.7 7.5 7.4 7 n.a 5.7 5.6 
*Six months only. 
Source: Calculated from CG SCOP figures 
Tables 3 and 4 show the number of co-ops formed and jobs created in 1985 
and 1986, based on their origin and region. They show very clearly the 
wide variation in the size of WTO co-operatives, and also provide an 
indication of the number and size of 'conversions' (some of which may be 
WTO in the terms of this study) that are occurring. 
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TOTAL 981 171 1,097 96 187 13 2,265 280 11 
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APPENDIX 3: Extract from CG SCOP Report on WTO, 1984 
"The analysis of disasters met with soon after their launch by 
co-operatives formed to take over failed businesses leads us to pose 
three problems: 
a) the problem of the criteria and methods of creation 
This was discussed by the National Council in June 1983 and several 
guidelines were laid down concerning in particular the conditions to 
be met in terms of quality of plant, adequacy of market research and 
quality of management teams, in order to avoid the formation of 
co-operatives that are operating outdated equipment which will prove 
too expensive to replace, or ones that are based on quite unfounded 
commercial suppositions or enterprises wthout the necessary expertise. 
b) Modes of intervention of the FEC (Confederal Expansion Fund) 
A decision by the National Council in December 1983 has reorientated 
the FEC's interventions as regards the creation of co-operatives. Too 
often, such intervention has only been requested in order to shift 
responsibility for the case on to the Co-operative movement and only 
marginally contribute to the creation of adequate financial 
arrangements. 
From now on, the financial plan will have to include a reference to 
the funds required to reinforce its management, together with its 
financial needs in relation to its initial launch and training, and 
the FEC's contribution ought to deal, to some extent at least, with 
these costs. 
c) The Reconstitution of a company's capital 
In certain cases, perhaps because an enterprise suffered from an 
initial lack of finance or because hopes of increased sales or of 
improved productivity have proved too optimistic, some large 
co-operatives have used up all their starting capital in the early 
stages of their operations. When the reasons for these losses have 
been identified and elimimated, sometimes at the cost of difficult 
surgery, the business can only get going again if equivalent new 
capital is injected. This problem has been identified but no adequate 
solution has as yet been found." 
APPENDIX 4 
THREE CASE STUDIES 
1. The case of MANUFRANCE 
1. The Manufrance Co-operative Production and Distribution Company 
(SCOPD Manufrance), which has become a celebrated example of a 
resounding failure to convert a conventionally managed company into a 
co-operative, was born in December 1980 after a long dispute. This 
had seen the workforce - and in particular CGT trade unionists, with 
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the active support of their national union - ranged first against the 
local bosses, then against a variety of industrialists interested in 
re-floating it and finally against the Public Authorities, before it 
was liquidated in 1985. 
This case, which involved between 400 and 800 jobs (over different 
periods) and production on a national scale (especially for hunting 
weapons - 60% of French production - and, to a lesser extent, cycles 
and sewing machines) poses a number of questions regarding the 
conditions for transforming a bankrupt business into a production 
co-operative: - some of these concern the market: is it possible to 
pursue as a co-operative lines of production that have very strong 
competition on the international market (from Czech guns, for 
example)? Can the initial bankruptcy simply be explained in terms of 
bad management by the former bosses? What modes of distribution 
should be adopted? Who should one choose as partners? How should 
growth be managed? 
other questions centre on the organisation of production. Can it 
remain as it is? Should there not be - over and above the essential 
modernisation of the plant - a review of the way in which work and 
workforce are organised, in order to raise productivity? 
- yet other questions bear on how the company is financed: when the 
banks are reluctant to become involved, should the State step in to 
fill the gap? Doesn't this give it a right to monitor the company's 
progress? If so, what form should that take? 
- lastly, some questions concern the way in which power is organised. 
How much of it is to be held by the shop-floor workers, by their local 
or national trade unions, by local councillors, by the State through 
its various ministries, and possibly even by external shareholders? 
The history of SCOPD Manufrance casts some light on the conditions 
which caused it to fail. 
The Stor% 
Manufrance, a large company created at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury and based in St.-Etienne in the Loire department (an area known 
for its coalfields), began to decline in the 1960's; as early as 
1969, the managerial staff published a 'white paper' criticizing the 
low level of investment relative to the age of the machinery. Between 
1977 (when it employed 4,000 workers) and 1978, several re-structuring 
plans were attempted. These ended in a petition for bankruptcy being 
filed in 1979 and in the enterprise being bought out and transformed 
into the Nouvelle Société Manufrance [the New Manufrance Company] by 
Bernard Tapie in June 1979. 
The refusal by the unions and the city council, which at that point 
was Communist controlled, to countenance what was considered a 
dismantling of the company (selling off shops with 350 staff, 
separating off the cycle-manufacture and mail order divisions) led to a 
new petition for bankruptcy being filed a year later. 
The enterprise was at that stage occupied by between six and eight 
hundred of the 1800 workers. As the occupation was intended to last 
indefinitely if there was no solution, the idea of a co-operative was 
brought up by the CGT. Twenty union members (affiliated to the 
UGICT-CGT), who were middle managers in the company, requested that 
the proposal be given a proper legal formulation. This scheme split 
the unions. The minority CFDT, which was reluctant to support such a 
course of action, was gradually left out of the proceedings. 
The rules governing the co-operative were lodged at the end of 
December 1980. 
A campaign for support and financial contributions (mainly through the 
CGT, the Works Committees and the friendly societies under its 
control...) brought in some 3,000 outside shareholders. The town of 
St.Etienne showed its commitment to the SCOPD by guaranteeing a loan 
(of 16 million francs in Swiss currency). The National Confederation 
of Co-operative Production Companies [CG SCOP], was hardly consulted 
at all and took no part in the launch. The survival of the SCOPD, 
however, became a national and not just a local issue, the CGT wishing 
to make it an example, not only of the strength of the workers' 
struggle, but also of their ability to manage in the general interest. 
In March 1981, when the new [Mitterand] government came to power, the 
500 worker-co-operators set all the machines running as a symbolic 
gesture. The local legislative elections also marked a victory for the 
Sopcialist/Communist Left and the SCOPD expected that financial help 
would be forthcoming from the new majority. 
An agreement was signed with Bernard Tapie and, in May 1981, SCOPD was 
up and running, after a 225-day occupation. Its hope was, in the long 
term, to create 1,000 jobs. 
170 million francs were needed to make the required new investment and 
provide working capital, while the co-operators provided 20 million 
francs (9 million of which came from State allowances for 
job-creation). In April '82, a finance and development plan was adop-
ted: the State was to provide 80 million francs, half in subsidies, 
half in loans over a fifteen-year period; a group of banks and other 
organisations undertook long and medium-term loans amounting to 70 
million francs. 
The good commercial pospects for 1983 (particularly the opening up of 
markets in Algeria) led SCOPD to increase the workforce to 800. When 
these prospects did not materialise, the number was reduced again to 
400 in 1984. 
Moreover, the age of the plant (and especially its location in the 
centre of St. Etienne) necessitated rapid modernisation. The local 
authority had to buy and renovate a factory on an industrial estate to 
cope with the production work (20,000 sq. m. ; robots, computer-
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controlled machines; an investment of some 47 million francs). But 
because of long delays in financing and building, the new production 
unit only became operational at the point when the SCOPD was forced to 
declare itself insolvent. At that point it had huge over-capacity: 
the new plant had been built to meet an annual production forecast of 
70,000 guns; by then, only 25,000 had been ordered and 14,000 pro-
duced . 
The articles of association chosen for the company meant that its 
management was not entrusted to a Directory assisted by a Supervisory 
Council. This Directory initially comprised seven persons and was 
chaired by a retired former National Electricity Board [E.D.F.] 
employee proposed by the UGICT in Paris. In the course of time, this 
body shrank to two members, both of them outsiders, while the 
Supervisory Council had eleven members, two of them from outside, but 
only played a limited role. At the beginning of 1984, under pressure 
from the banks and the State, the SCOPD adopted a structure with a 
Board of Directors and Chairman. 
The short life of the SCOPD was beset with numerous difficulties. It 
had problems over production (the difficulty of deciding what options 
to select, problems posed by promised foreign sales not materialising) 
until it abandoned sewing-machine production; it had productivity 
problems (the number of non-productive workers continued to grow 
until, in 1985, it was 240 out of 407); there were also conflicts 
between the different political parties (Socialists and Communists) 
and between the trade unions; the involvement of the workers also 
fell off and they refused, for example, to put their thirteenth 
month's wages back into the business in 1982. 
In spite of a total of 257 million francs of State aid, profitability-
problems simply continued to grow: 170 million francs were lost in 
three years, including 65 million in long-term debts: 
in 1982, the trading deficit rose to 34 million francs; 
in 1983, it rose to 76 million francs (with a turnover of 60 
million and a wage bill of 80 million) 
in 1984, the loss was 62 million (turnover: 40; wages: 60 
mill ion). 
Support for the SCOPD crumbled away: 
employees dismissed in 1983 wanted back the money they had 
invested ; 
the new (Social-Democratic) local council, elected in 1983, aban-
doned the co-operative; 
early in 1984, the Ministry of Social Security forced the company 
into liquidation over 4 million francs' worth of unpaid contributions; 
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at the request of the New Company, the owners of the factory 
buildings, the Commercial Court ordered SCOPD to pay 2.8 million 
francs in rent arrears; 
finally, early in 1985, the Government (through the Secretary of 
State for Social Economy, J. Gatel, and the Prime Minister, Laurent 
Fabius) refused any further financial involvement. 
On 10 April 1985, SCOPD was in liquidation and looking for someone to 
take it over. About fifty of the workers who had been laid off sub-
sequently occupied the premises and continued the installation and 
maintenance of the machines in the new factory. 
2. The Case of T.C.S. 
The T.C.S co-operative (Tôlerie câblage de Seyssinet [Seysinnet sheet-
metal and cables] in the Isere) was established after the Rabillond 
company, which employed 74 people, filed a petition for bankruptcy in 
1981. 
After a four-and-a-half month occupation, the worker co-op was started 
up by 19 people, on the initiative of C.G.T. union officials (the 
former owner set up a rival non-co-operative business not long after). 
The idea of a co-operative had first been advanced by an engineer who 
was to have become its managing director, but who left over a 
disagreement on salary before the enterprise got under way. The 
workers were, however, sustained in their efforts by the many contacts 
they had made within the civil service and among local councillors. 
They were able to raise a large initial capital (800,000 frs. out of 
their redundancy money and loans from the regional council) and 
received assiscance from the local authority, which bought the 
buildings and lease-purchased them back to the company. 
Although there were difficulties with the receiver, who over-valued 
the stock, the main problem encountered was over leadership of the co-
operative. At first, the union leader who had directed the take-over 
operation established himself as Chairperson/Managing Director, but he 
turned out to be authoritarian and incompetent. The functions of 
Chairperson and Managing Director were then split, but things even-
tually got so bad that the original Chair/M.D. had to be dismissed. 
Another problem was the desperate lack of commercial expertise. 
After making an unfortunate mistake with one appointment, the co-
operative took on a commercial manager who was better paid than the 
other employees but efficient. Thanks to him, the co-operative passed 
from craft production methods to small-scale mass production. They 
also engaged an accountant to complete the administrative team. She 
became Chairperson of the Board, while a shopfloor worker performed 
the Managing Director's role. 
The co-operative abandoned the polyester activities of the old company 
in order to concentrate on sheet metals and cables. It invested in 
computerised machinery and increased its workforce to more than 30. 
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lts financial position is sound and its commercial prospects are 
good. 
We may say that after some difficult patches, T.C.S has achieved a 
balance both in its functioning as a co-operative and in its produc-
tion. Without doubt, one of the keys to this success lies in the cohe-
siveness and motivation of the workforce. All have had training in 
management; five of the six members of the Board are shopfloor 
workers; they are able to combine prudence in decision-making, par-
ticularly about growth (workers have only been taken on very 
gradually), with determined action in the interests of the co-
operative (dismissal of the former leader, employing managers from 
outside, product specialisation etc.) 
3. THE CASE OF AIRE HABITAT 
This article was written following an enquiry by a team of consultants 
coordinated by J.L. Laville comprising members of a management shop 
(Boutique de Gestion) and of CRIDA. For the complete text see: 
Trames, le fait co-operatif et mutualiste, 'Actes du colloque' 
[Conference Proceedings], Limoges, 1981) 
1. Bankruptcy of the Prudhomme Enterprise 
In December 1980, M. Prudhomme's companies were put into liquidation 
following the owner's arrest for a previous case of fraud. 
Most of these companies were based at Nozay in the Paris region 
(though two small branches had also been set up at Lyon and at Rouen). 
The first production unit dates from 1974, since when there had been a 
remarkable expansion from a mere half-dozen employees to 280. 
These businesses specialised in the conversion of attics, a gap in the 
market that M. Prudhomme had been able to exploit, perfecting a tech-
nique that he had patented. Conversion of lofts was negotiated on the 
basis of an inclusive price per square metre. 
The enterprise enjoyed quite a good reputation as regards working con-
ditions. There was a wide range of salaries; but a large part of the 
workforce earned between 6,000 and 8,000 Frs. The executives were 
generally on 12,000 to 15,000 Frs. There were no unions in these com-
panies, which always had fewer than 50 employees in order to avoid 
having work committees. 
In December 1980, these companies had already been in difficulties for 
several months. In fact, weak management was leading to bankruptcy. 
In a continuous state of expansion, the Prudhomme companies were kept 
going by some clever accountacy. The annual accounts were 'balanced' 
by juggling figures between companies. However, in September 1980, 
when a shortage of orders caused financial difficulties, a receiver 
was appointed and plans for restructuring were agreed with M. 
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Prudhomme; this meant dismissing 120 staff. There was no reaction to 
this news, because the employer saw each one individually to tell him 
that he would be re-engaged at a higher wage later on. 
That was the position when M. Prudhomme was arrested (for other 
reasons) and the companies were put into liquidation. 
The premises at Nozay were quickly occupied. People could not 
understand why a business that was doing so well (its order book was 
full, amounting to 800,000 Frs.) should be closed. Eight workers 
started a CGT union branch; local authorities, councillors and trade 
unions, supported the movement and began to study the possibility of a 
take-over. There was no mention of a Cooperative at that stage. All 
efforts were directed to finding a new owner who would take back most 
of the employees. In fact, losses were assessed at between 50 to 60 
million francs, and no one was in a hurry to buy the company. 
Gradually the movement fell to pieces. Some of the executives started 
their own small business, the client file disappearing, most inoppor-
tunely, at this moment. 
In the end it was a group of only ten people (shopfloor workers and 
supervisors), who were reather bewildered and somewhat sceptical about 
the experts they had met up to that point, that came to a meeting with 
a group of advisers in March 1981 on the initiative of a local coun-
cillor . 
2. Emergence of the Cooperative Project at Nozay 
After this first contact with the leaders of the occupation, a fra-
mework for the involvement of the advisory group was quickly 
established. It took over the arrangements for a joint study of the 
case. That is to say that 11 the workers interested in resumign work 
agreed to collaborate with a group of advisers (one commercial and two 
management consultants) with a view to starting up a new business. 
In fact the term 'take-over' is generally wrong. Legally such 
arrangements are difficult and, in addition, would mean taking over a 
liability for which the workers were not responsible. So it is usual 
to form a new legal entity and 'resume activities'. That is what the 
advisers proposed; and they also considered that co-operative status 
would be perfectly suitable in the circumstances. 
The demand that the whole of the group should be involved in this pro-
cess itself reveals the dual objective of the advisors' exercise: 
1. To provide the technical management skills (in the widest sense of 
the word 'management') that people starting a business must have in 
order to exercise the real power over the future of their project. In 
this regard, they participated in a normalisation of the proposed pro-
duction plans. 
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2. That they chose to seek to equip everyone with those skills 
followed from another consideration - the desire to lay down what I 
shall call, in lapidary fashion, the conditions for real democracy in 
the enterprise. In this, the collective were engaging in a project 
aimed at emancipating the producers by their Association (in the 
strong 19th centry sense of the word). 
I won't pretend that these objectives were fully achieved, if by that 
we mean that all the group participated unanimously and to an equal 
extent in the programme proposed. However, the dynamic that was set 
in motion was not aimed at creating a whole host of bosses in the same 
company, but at creating the condition for collective management, 
which is not at all the same thing. In the event, it was a matter of 
breaking the existing legitimacy on which exploitative relationships 
are based and from which they are reproduced. This legitimacy is 
inscribed in the established division of labour. It follows that 
getting all the members to participate in the financial and commercial 
arrangements involved in setting up a new business is, first and fore-
most, a break with the prevailing divisions. 
3. 'Aire Habitat' Five Months after Starting the Cooperative 
Getting the collective established took fifteen days training (over a 
3 month period) during which were accomplished: 
- informing the members about co-operation and arriving at the defini-
tive constitution of the group (all shareholders except for a secre-
tary and a commercial manager, who were taken on later); 
- production decisions, feasibility study (market research); 
- setting up the finances of the project (based mainly on a capital of 
280,000 Frs., each co-operator acquiring 20,000 Frs. worth of shares, 
the money being drawn against the sura of their unemployment benefit 
under the Act of December 22 1980); 
- the legal framework of the Co-op; 
- organisation of work, including administration and advertising; 
negotiating the first contracts. 
The 'Air Habitat" Co-operative' was formed on June 1 1981. At that 
point, the following seemed to be the company's strong points: 
1. the gap in the market; 
2. the amount of starting capital; 
3. the quality of workmanship provided by a group of good skilled 
workers; 
4. awareness of the need for strong management. 
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Some points remained critical: 
1. the difficulties inherent in any new enterprise (the time required 
to reach the point of profitability; possible mistakes in assessment 
of the market; suppliers' terms for settlement); 
2. unwillingness of some of the group to remain attentive to manage-
ment problems; 
3. difficulties of obtaining credit for potential customers. 
How do they stand after five months of operation? 
Economically 'Aire Habitat' has on the whole achieved its forecasts. 
The order book is now full, and the wages are paid (6,000 Frs. net for 
all the worker-shareholders; 7,100 Frs. for the managing director; 
5,000 Frs for the secretary). This state is essential for continued 
operation. Of course it is still too soon to take things for granted. 
It is a long way to the two-year point beyond which one usually 
reckons that a business is established. But one can show a certain 
optimism over the way in which this group has already proved its mana-
gement qualitites; that is to say that these results are not the 
blind application of a set business plan but its considered application 
to the situation which actually arose, by cooperators showing a 
remarkable tactical intelligence. 
Socially this initial phase has proved very rich. 
To appreciate it onemust remember the position of these employees a 
year before. They were then in a business dominated by the whim of 
the owner and his paternalism. They were without any responsibility, 
had no means of expressing their collective identity, were part of a 
hierarchical system which set shopfloor against office workers, pro-
ductive worker against non-productive, French, North African and 
Portuguese, executives, foremen, skilled workers and unskilled. The 
period of occupation of the premises, and the joining of a union, are 
elements which have helped to bring about a 'transversality' that 
breaks entirely with these models. Their 'formative' role is certain, 
although it is difficult to assess. By way of example of what is hap-
pening on this level at 'Aire Habitat', we can highlight a few facts: 
1. At first the group itself took on the work of door-to-door 
selling. Because of the difficulties they encountered, they decided 
in July to take on a salesman; but that was not a return to the old 
methods. This salesman works to a catalogue prepared by the co-opera-
tors; and they have also given up the idea of a price based on square 
metreage. 
2. It would take too long to describe here in detail the development 
of the 'inegalitarian compromise' by which certain elements (family 
ties, for example) which threatened to upset the balance if the group 
were neutralised. One would see how, during an initial phase, a 
collective finds ways of regulating itself. The question is to know 
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how ;his situation will evolve since, though it may be justified in 
the short term, in the long term it would be evidence of failure. 
3. A group of 'non-productives' got together following a dispute with 
the 'productives'. This dispute, which was overcome in September, 
marks an advance in the life of the group because, until then, most of 
the 'productives' had preferred to leave matters of management to the 
rest. By threatening not to pay their share of the capital, some 
shareholders created a situation in which roles could be redefined. 
From then on there was to be a profound change with regard to the 
technique inherited from the previous business which, let us remember, 
had been considered as one of the project's essential assets. 
Realising their power, the 'productives' were able to apply their 
knowledge and gradually modify the pattern that had until then been 
imposed on them; and they could review, with the customers, certain 
projects which they considered from experience to be badly conceived. 
The 'Aire Habitat' image developed as part of a process in which the 
cooperators were able to regain their autonomy. 
These few points may seem of limited importance. However in our view 
there is no doubt they at least show that there has been a transfor-
mation in relations of production within this young co-operative. The 
cooperative project must not be regarded simply as a way to protect 
jobs. A Co-operative artificially set up with this sole objective and 
organised on the capitalist model is especially vulnerable to the eco-
nomic difficulties which any business meets. Co-operation in produc-
tion stems frm the emancipation of those who produce. This supposes a 
long-term effort aimed at developing the groups' ability to use the 
means at their disposal, so that members can more and more control 
their environment.! 
Works councils can play a part in bringing about this kind of process. 
On one fundamental condition however; that they themselves are 
included in a scheme for collective review where their attitude 
towards the division of labour is subjected to continual practical 
questioning. * 
Jean Francois Marchat 
Sociologist. 
According to the view of Daniel Mothe, L'autogestion goutte a goutte, ed, 
du Centurion, 1980 
^We should mention that on June 1 1 9 8 6 j f i v e y e a r s ä f t e r it h a d started, 
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For more than 10 years worker take-overs of failing and bankrupt 
enterprises have been a comparatively common occurrence in Italy and 
many worker co-operatives have been formed in these circumstances. 
They have both received assistance from other co-operative 
organizations, and, in due course, contributed considerably to the 
size and strength of the co-operative movement. Moreover, the 
enterprises rescued in this way have been sufficiently successful for 
this response to the threat of company closure to have become widely 
accepted among Trade Unions, local authorities and policy makers. 
Such extensive experience of WTO prompts two main questions: 
First, what were the political, economic and institutional 
circumstances that gave rise to this phenomenon? 
Second, what are the characteristic longer-term problems and 
possibilities associated with enterprises created in this way? 
These questions provide the focus for this study and are addressed in 
sections 2 and 3 respectively. 
When WTO began to occur in increasing numbers in the early to mid 
seventies they were primarily an extension of industrial struggle. 
But from about 1976 onwards, and with the deepening economic crisis, 
the orientation shifted towards preserving businesses, and hence 
employment. As this happened the role of the co-operative movement in 
relation to WTO became increasingly significant. Section 2 therefore 
describes the scope and organization of this movement whose rapid 
growth and vitality have made it an important third sector in the 
Italian economy. This leads into a discussion of the constitutional 
position of co-operatives in Italy, for this has clearly facilitated 
the growth of the movement. As regards WTO, for example, the fiscal 
and other advantages allowed to co-operatives are one reason why other 
forms of worker ownership are very rarely adopted. Nevertheless, 
despite state recognition, and some measures of support for 
co-operatives, the legal framework and statutory instruments for 
worker co-operatives also have several major limitations. These 
problems, and the controversy surrounding the implementation of the 
'Marcora Law' - which includes measures to increase the capacity of 
the co-operative movement to assist WTO - provide the agenda for the 
contemporary Italian debate on co-operatives and WTO, and these are 
briefly described. 
Section 3 starts by distinguishing between the different circumstances 
in which WTO can occur, emphasising the influence this can have on 
subsequent developments. The process of re-building the enterprise is 
then discussed in terms of a 'recovery'phase and a later 'development' 
phase. Although the two phases usually overlap the distinction 
highlights the problems that co-operatives formed from a WTO have in 
escaping a situation of commercial marginality and dependence. 
Finally, two longer-term patterns of development are distinguished, 
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one associated with larger WTO co-operatives the other with smaller 
ones . 
2. The Political and Institutional Context of WTO 
2.1 Dimensions of the Phenomenon 
Unfortunately, Italian statistics on co-operatives are incomplete and 
unsatisfactory. The main source of statistics is the Ministry of 
Labour, which keeps a register of all co-operatives that have been 
formed. However, these figures are unreliable because many 
co-operatives are not active and, moreover, the Ministry's statistical 
sources cover only 70% of those that are. Despite these difficulties 
Table 1 provides an indication of the scale and growth of the 
Co-operative Movement in Italy. 
Table 1 - Numbers of Registered Co-operatives by Sector for Selected Years, 
Year 
Consumer Co-operatives 

















































































Source: Ministry of Labour, 
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The categories in Table 1 are those used by the Ministry and they 
preclude any disaggregated analysis of the economic sectors in which 
the co-operatives operate. Moreover, the category of 'mixed 
co-operative' is ambiguous, since it includes not only service 
co-operatives, but also banks and those producer and worker 
co-operatives that mediate between industry and the services (and 
which constitute the 'new co-operatives'). 
Table 2 shows the geographical distribution of co-operatives. While 
it is clear that the movement is generally stronger in the North of 
the country, the regional variations are striking with Lazio, 
Lombardy, Sicily and Campania showing particular concentrations of 
co-operative activity. The significance of the co-operative movement 
being strong in particular areas is discussed below. 
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Table 2 














































































As far as WTO are concerned, it is not possible to provide any 
statistics at all because the phenomenon has never been explicitly 
surveyed. However, since the majority of Italian co-operatives have 
been set up as a result of the crisis of companies in the various 
sectors of production, WTO are a feature of all the categories listed 
above (except consumer and housing co-operatives), and are especially 
evident in the category of worker and producer co-operatives. In 
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fact, so many worker co-operatives have been formed in this way that 
the phenomenon of a WTO is a 'normal' event and generally attracts no 
particular public interest. 
Despite the absence of statistics it is clear that WTO co-operatives 
are concentrated in the more labour-intensive sectors. WTO have 
occurred frequently in the textiles, garments, graphic, newspaper, 
light mechanical, wood and transport sectors, and to some extent also 
in the service sector. 
Given the absence of figures on the number of WTOs, it follows that 
none exist on the number that subsequently succeed and fail. But once 
again some general points are clear. First, both the public acceptance 
of WTO and their continued occurrence in considerable numbers (with 
the support of the co-operative movement and the political 
authorities), suggest that the co-operatives so formed are generally 
quite successful. It is, of course, accepted that WTO have definite 
problems to overcome, but WTO do not have the reputation of being a 
futile exercise, as is the case in some other countries. Secondly it 
is generally accepted that WTO cooperatives are most successful in 
those economic activities dependent on the quality of work 
(flexibility and regularity of work performance, motivated and skilled 
work); vice versa, the most disappointing results occur in those 
activities whose economical running depends especially on factors such 
as management, technology and capital. Finally, given that a large 
proportion of worker co-operatives were originally formed as a result 
of WTO, the performance of worker co-operatives in general can give an 
indication of how WTO co-operatives perform. In this respect a 
research study by Cespe (1), which is comparing data from a sample of 
the larger co-operatives belonging to the Lega, with data on private 
firms, is potentially important. Despite the exploratory nature of 
this study, and Che difficulties of comparison and interpretation that 
the authors warn against, it can be argued that the figures are quite 
sufficient to disprove any claims that co-operative enterprises are 
less efficient, productive or profitable than other enterprises. 
2.2 The Co-operative Network 
The Italian economy is characterised by a substantial and very dynamic 
small-firm sector and by the common occurence of collaborative 
commercial arrangements between small firms. Where both these 
features are most marked, as in Emilia-Romagna, the result is a rather 
distinctive economic formation (2) which appears to achieve many of 
the economies of scale while avoiding the diseconomies. The 
organization of the Italian Co-operative Movement should be considered 
against this background of productive decentralization and 
inter-organizational collaboration. 
The co-operative movement is most easily described as a network which 
is comprised of three different types of organization: 
o the individual co-operative, 
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o the co-operative consortium, 
o the co-operative association. 
The individual co-operative may operate on the market without 
necessarily being enrolled in a Co-operative Association, and without 
having relationship with other co-operatives. 
The Co-operative Consortia are formed by a number of individual 
co-operatives which togetber carry out one or more shared activities. 
Here the term used is 'consortium-enterprise' insofar as it manages at 
first hand its productive activity. By constrast, the 'service 
consortium' does not act on its own behalf but only and exclusively in 
the name of, and in the interests of, its associate co-operatives, and 
in activities designed to obtain better services rather than profit 
(purchasing or marketing cnsortia, for example). A consortium may 
group together a number of co-operatives in a small area, or at a 
regional or even national level (3). 
These consortia may belong to the Co-operative Association, which 
represent, protect, assist, control and guide the individual 
co-operatives that belong to them. There also exist a number of 
national organizations, which take the form of limited companies and 
whose stock is owned by co-operatives and other economic entities. 
Thus, a co-operative is organized on at least five different lvels: 
individually at a provincial sectorial level, 
individually at a regional sectorial level, 
individually, at a national sectorial level, 
jointly with all other co-operatives at a regional level, 
jointly with all other co-operatives at a national level. 
It should be remembered that these various levels are not only 
concerned to represent the interests of the individual co-operatives; 
today, they have increasingly come to assume the role of providing 
coordination and strategy formation for a 'grid-iron' organization: 
an organization whose main strength is its ability to establish or 
re-establish enterprises extremely rapidly, and to plan their growth 
by means of operations involving linking, contact and networking among 
various economic structures (4). 
The political, economic-organizational and sectoral interests of the 
individual co-operatives are looked after by the co-operative 
associations, of which there are four officially recognised by the 
Ministry : 
1. the Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative Mutue (Lega), which 
represents the Communist, Socialist and Republican sector 
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2. the Confederazione delle Cooperative Italiane (CCI), which 
represents the Christian Democrat sector 
3. the Associazione Generale delle Cooperative Italiane (AGCI), 
which represents the Republican and Social Democrat sector 
4. the Unione Nazionale delle Cooperative Italiane (UNCI), set up in 
1982. 
Table 3 indicates the relative size of these associations based on the 
1983 figures provided by the associations. (However the same 
difficulties of reliability and classification that impede analysis of 
the figures provided by the Ministry of Labour apply also to those 
supplied by the Associations. Note, too, that depending on the type 
of co-operative and the area of the country concerned, between 30% and 
60% of registered co-operatives are members of co-operative 
associations. It is presumed that these 'member co-operatives' 
represent a significantly higher proportion of the active 
co-operatives.) 






















































The Co-operative Associations have the following functions: 1) repre-
senting and protecting their members; 2) providing assistance, 
including administrative and fiscal advice; advice on how to obtain 
outside credit, or on self financing through the Associations' own 
finance company or banks; vocational training; 3) checking the 
requirements for access to legal facilities; 4) promoting and 
developing new co-operatives; 5) providing co-ordination and 
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guidance for internal economic-social policies and handling external 
re lat ions . 
This organizational mechanism serves simultaneously both 
particularistic interests (the welfare of its members) and the 
universalistic interests (of the movement more widely) by means of a 
system of progressively integrated levels, which it mediates, 
coordinates and guides. 
Today, the Italian co-operative movement is the third sector in the 
national economy together with the public and private sectors, and has 
assumed the role of a policy maker with respect to the state. 
The co-operative movement continues to increase in importance and size 
in the most traditional geographical areas of co-operative activity, 
where the organizational network is most firmly established, and where 
it possesses sufficient autonomous assets to be able to provide 
guarantees for bank loans. The strength of the movement in such areas 
should be emphasised: for example in Italy, there is actually a 
continuum between worker and co-operative take-overs. In many cases a 
company in crisis is rescued by the direct intervention of other 
co-operatives. This increases the economic coherence of the movement. 
But it can also be seen as an "agressive" strategy, uncoraforably 
similar to the capitalistic one. An example of this (5) is provided 
by Consorzio Produttori Laterizi (CPL), which arose when a company in 
crisis was saved by the setting up of a company comprising natural 
persons (the workers) and juridical persons (six producer and worker 
co-operatives in the same sector and in the same geogrpahical area). 
A manufacturing consortium was thus constituted. Further evidence of 
this trend is provided by the concern shown in the Cespe report (6) 
over the tendency to be found in the larger co-operatives to purchase 
or to set up limited companies when "this proved convenient". 
Thus WTO co-operatives form part of a defensive strategy when they 
occur as individual cases. But they can be part of a more aggressive 
strategy when the co-operative associations act according to a 
commercial logic (aiming for vertical or horizontal integration) or a 
territorial logic (aiming to strengthen their position in an area 
where the co-operatives are widespread). 
The strength of the movement is also evidenced by the ability of the 
Co-operative Associations often to arrange the transfer of workers 
from a co-operative in crisis or that is closing, to other 
co-operatives in the sector or locality, thus avoiding having to make 
them redundant. 
However the Co-operative Associations do not possess such economic 
strength throughout Italy. In other areas, where it might be 
considered important for the movement to gain ground in order to slow 
down a situation of socio-economic disintegration, a lack of 
consolidated financial resources has hampered its development. The 
reasons for this are: 
o the historical, institutional and legal conception of co-operatives as 
an aggregation of manpower rather than of capital; 
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o the limited availability of autonomous financing (social capital, 
loans from members, self-financing and consortium financial 
instruments); 
o the necessity to resort to outside credit, both to meet running 
costs and for investments. 
The problem of financing for co-operatives represents, in fact, a 
crucial factor in the encouragement, restructuring and growth of the 
third sector of the economy. Indeed, access to credit, according to 
current banking laws, is strictly dependent on the provision of 
financial guarantees, which the co-operatives have difficulties in 
providing because their financial resources are usually bound up in 
joint stock which, for legal reasons and by its very nature, is 
limited. This problem is exacerbated, especially in cases of WTO, by 
the high cost of money and requests for financial guarantees. This 
places the co-operatives at a disadvantage with respect to large-scale 
enter rises, who are often granted financial facilities and frequent 
"aid" by the public authorities. 
For some time now the co-operative movement and the legal authorities 
have complained about the lack of coherence between the constitutional 
principle of favouring co-operatives and a credit system which is not 
adapted to the special nature and function of co-operative enterprise. 
It is against this background that the debate over the Act of 27 
February 1985, No.49 (The Marcora Law) has developed. Before 
considering this debate the constitutional position of co-operatives 
in Italy, the principal legal requirements for co-operatives, and the 
existing statutory financial instruments for co-operatives, must be 
briefly described. 
2.3 The legal framework 
The important social function of co-operative and mutual enterprise 
was recognized by the Italian Constitution in the first post-war law 
to reorganize the co-operative sector after the demise of Fascism, and 
by regional statutes in 1970. 
The regional statutes reconfirmed in a particular fashion the 
importance for the public interest of the Co-operative Associations 
(as already provided for by the law on the re-organization of the 
sector) and set the objective of general and sectoral promotion of 
co-operatives. 
The constitutive legal features of co-operatives, as set out by 
national laws, distinguish them from other forms of corporate 
enterprise by: 
- a minimum limit set to the number of members (at least 9 persons) 
- a limit to the amount of social capital held by each member (only 
recently raised to 30 million Lire per person); ■ 
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- democratic management: assemblies must adhere to the principle of 
"one person, one vote"; 
- new members may be admitted on the decision of the Administrative 
Board of the co-operative; 
the number of technical and administrative members may not exceed 
12% of the total membership (only recently, with the passing of 
Law 49/85, has this number been raised to 20% for 
rescue-cooperatives; with the passing of Law 44/86, it has been 
abolished completely for co-operatives of young people in the 
South of Italy); 
the principle of mutual enterprise, which is based on: profit 
reinvestment, setting limits on its distribution among the 
members; the prohibition on distribution of the legal reserves; 
the devolution to the public purse of the co-operatives assets in 
the case of winding up of the co-operative. 
National legislation designed to promote the co-operative movement 
assigns a public promotional and supervisory function to the various 
Co-operative Associations, under the terms laid down by the Ministry 
of Labour. To assist in their carrying out of this function, the 
Ministry grants financial help to the Associations for their 
promotional activities and for their vocational training programmes. 
Similar financial aid is also provided by the legislatures of each 
region (7). The incentives and facilities made available to the 
co-operatives may be of general (tax relief, vocational training, 
etc.), sectoral, state or regional character. Within the context of 
regional aid to co-operatives (more concerning its qualitative than 
its quantitative nature), there exist a variety of legal instruments 
designed to help them obtain credit, build up joint stock, organize 
vocational training; and to provide "real services" and revolving 
funds aimed at specific sectors or types of co-operative (of young 
people, of people who have lost their previous jobs, of unemployed 
workers, etc.) Particular attention is paid to cases of WTO by the 
legislation of some regions (Lazio, Piedmont, Sardinia, etc.), but the 
present tendency is towards co-ordinating existing aid instruments by 
means of a legal framework, and directing economic resources towards 
co-ordinated projects. 
Law No. 49/85 - the Marcora Law - was designed to meet simultaneously 
requirements of a conj^inctural nature (the maintainance of employment 
levels in cases of companies undergoing crisis) and of a structural 
nature (the reform of the co-operative sector and the provision of a 
secure credit system in order to facilitate the setting-up and support 
of co-operatives). 
The first aspect is dealt with by the Law in the form of the 'Fondo 
Speciale per gli Investimenti' (Special Investments Fund); the second 
in the 'Fondo di Rotazione per la promozione e lo sviluppo della 
co-operatizione' (Foncooper) - a special revolving- fund for the 
encouragement and development of co-operatives. 
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The Fondo Speciale was intended to be available to: 
o producer or worker co-operatives comprising workers in Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagnil or redundant workers. In order to set up 
these co-operatives, the workers involved must invest a part or all 
of their severance pay, and they receive in return a maximum of 
three years of wages from the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni. Such 
grants, which are non- repayable, have been particularly criti-
cised . 
o finance companies, set up by the Co-operative Associations, at 
least 80% of whose capital is owned by producer and worker co-
operatives. This financial measure is designed to support, 
encourage and develop the setting-up of rescue co-ops. 
Foncooper was intended to be available to: 
o all co-operatives who initiate projects designed to increase produc-
tivicy, employment, or technological and organizational innovation, to 
give greater competiveness to their products or to restruc-
ture or reconvert their plant; 
o producer and worker co-operatives comprising workers in Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni or redundant workers and which present schemes 
similar to those outlined above. 
Three points about the Marcora Law must be stressed: first, the 
finance provided is very limited: 180 billion Lire have been set 
aside for both funds. Second, it is the WTO producer and worker co-
operatives that have been given priority in receiving this financing 
(to a total of 110 billion Lire), and this has hampered the carrying 
out of a more general reform and strengthening of the co-operative 
economy. Third, the Law shows contradictory elements with respect to 
its long-term goals, the extent of the finance provided, and in its 
operating criteria. Partly as a result of this, and despite the fact 
that parliamentary, social and economic debate began in 1977, the 
normative instruments required to render the Law operable are still 
lacking. 
In conclusion, compared with the economic importance of the co-
operative sector and the politico-social role that it performs, the 
present legal framework appears particularly antiquated and unable to 
measure up to the dynamism and flexibility that characterizes the co-
operative movement in present-day Italy. Moreover the main features 
of the Marcora Law seems to lie in a belief that what is required is 
financial relief, rather than the provision of those structures that 
will meet the needs of the third sector of the economy. 
This is an instrument providing guaranteed wages.in situations of temporary 
company crisis and is paid by the Instituto Nazionale di Previdenza 
Sociale to the order of 80% of the worker's last wage and for the temporary 
period during which it is assumed that the company will recover and be able 
to take all or some of its workers back on again. 
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2.4 The Current Political Debate 
To illustrate the expectations that the various social, economic and 
political actors have for the co-operative movement, and more specifi-
cally, for WTO, the positions adopted by the Employers Associations, 
by the trade unions and by the Co-operative Associations most widely 
represented at a national level will be briefly described. Thereafter 
an analysis of the behaviour and organization of the interest groups 
with the application of Law 49/1985 is presented (8). The analysis 
will not include the positions taken by the Italian political parties; 
apart from some internal differences of opinion shown occasionally, 
they share a practically unanimous point of view, - one which sees the 
co-operative movement as playing an important role in the country's 
economy. This unanimity derives from the fact that all political par-
ties have been directly or indirectly involved in the co-operative 
experience. The differences of policy among the parties concern the 
role that the individual Co-operative Associations may occupy within 
the legal framework governing the co-operative sector. 
The public and private world of Italian entrepreneurialism is 
variously represented by sectoral and area employers organizations. 
Here we will consider the position of the largest private entrepre-
neurial association (Confindustria) and the association that most 
represents small and medium size industry (Confapi). 
Confindustria has always regarded the co-operative phenomenon as 
occupying a marginal economic and social position: an attitude which 
has turned into outright hostility when the State has intervened in 
various ways in favour of the sector. Confindustria has seen this 
State intervention as 'welfare' and as a factor in the creation on the 
market of a disequilibrium which penalizes "healthy" enterprise. In 
fact, Confindustria has expressed itself as being in disagreement with 
national legislation in support of co-operatives, and also with Law 
49/1985, which inhibits the free play of market forces. 
The position of Confapi is rather more moderate and recognizes that 
the co-operatives are at a disadvantage with respect to private com-
panies, especially as far as their access to credit is concerned. 
Confapi accepts the spirit in which Law 49/1985 is written, but asks 
that financial aid should be directed towards the smaller-sized com-
panies and that it should be linked to the effective state of under-
capitalization of the co-operative (through Foncooper). Confapi also 
underlines the risk that the use of the Fondo Speciale may artifi-
cially prolong the life of individual companies in crisis, and 
expresses its perplexity over the role of the Co-operative 
Associations in its management of the non-repayable grants to the co-
operatives . 
The principal Co-operative Associations (CCI, Lega, AGCI) concentrate 
their efforts on the reform of the legislative framework for co-
operatives. They claim that the legal framework, while guaranteeing as 
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it does the principle of mutuality, social function and a new process 
of accumulation, should be reformed to place co-operatives in a posi-
tion of parity with respect to the public and private sectors of the 
economy. To this end, they argue that a suitable instrument of finan-
cial aid is required in the form of a proper credit institution for 
the co-operatives. This would overcome their problems in gaining 
access to the capital market, problems deriving from the fact that co-
operative may not issue debentures, shares or operate on the stock 
market. 
The Co-operative Associations are not in favour of the system of non-
repayable grants. Rather they would prefer to see a system of 
revolving funds designed to overcome the problem of under-
capitalization (caused by the fact that co-operative members possess 
only limited capital), or temporary endowment funds, which the resuce 
co-operatives would be obliged to repay as their situations improved 
and which would thus become available for other co-operatives. 
Financial aid paid out in this way should be based on feasibility 
plans providing guarnatees for the future of the enterprise. In par-
ticular, the expectations of the Co-operative Associations with 
respect to the recent Law 49 are: 
o State support (to be regulated by law for the first time in Italy) 
for the creation of self-managed enterprises able to compete in 
conditions of potential parity with the rest of the economic 
system; 
o the effective implementation by the Co-operative Associations of the 
Law, in order to prevent it from being rendered ineffectual because 
of its internal contradictions: contradictions arising mostly from 
a confusion of the roles of Foncooper (for the development of new 
co-operatives) and the Fondo Speciale (for WTO co-ops) 
o an exclusive role for the Co-operative Associations in the manage-
ment of the Fondo Speciale: a role in which they would act as the 
only public agency supplying aid and "real services" to all co-
operatives. In this manner, the three main Co-operative 
Associations have constituted a single finance company, in order to 
participate in the formation of the WTO cooperatives' social capital 
(as provided by the Law) and to provide the WTO co-operatives with 
the necessary "real" aid. (UNCI has set up its own finance company.) 
The general principles underlying the position of the Co-operative 
Associations are also shared by the most representative trade unions 
(CGIL, CISL, UIL). Indeed, in October 1985, agreement was reached 
between trade union and Co-operative Associations over joint action to 
exert pressure for the passing of national and regional legal norms 
concerning aid for the development of co-operatives, especially in the 
industrial sector and the advanced tertiary sector. In concrete 
terms, such action would take the form of identifying the most 
suitable instruments for the development of new co-operative entrepre-
neurialism, raising the professional levels of the members of co-
operatives, increasing employment by creating job opportunities for 
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young people, developing "real services" and developing new forms of 
participation (economic and industrial democracy). 
This agreement also referred specifically to the implementation of the 
Marcora law, especially regarding worker take-overs, and endorsed: 
o the setting up of a single fianance company, including the 
guaranteed presence of the three trade union organizations, to 
act in a controlling capacity; 
o the setting up of a joint committee to manage programmes 
designed to encourage new forms of collective 
entrepreneurialism; 
o the Co-operative Associations' function as the provider of 
assistance to groups of workers intending to start co-operatives 
utilizing the provisions of the Law. 
It is beyond the scope of this report to describe the vicissitudes of 
this Law and its long delayed implementation. Suffice to say that its 
'conjunctural' aspect (action for WTO co-ops) has prevailed over other 
structural measures involving all co-operatives. Since 1977, the Co-
operative Associations have openly voiced the demands outlined above 
and have on several occasions expressed their fears of being relegated 
to the role of 'managing decline', with all their energies being 
devoted to coping with problems unloaded onto them from the private 
and public sectors. 
In conclusion, the passing of Law 49/1985 had led to a wide variety of 
different, often high, expectations: for example, solely for the 
Lega, a requirement of 80 billion Lire for 60 existing or nascent co-
operatives has been estimated. The ambiguities in the interpretation 
of the Law, and the limited managerial horizons of the workers (who 
favour non-repayable grants) make it difficult for the Co-operative 
Associations to satisfy all these different expectations. The 
Associations, in fact, tend to think in global terms (revolving funds, 
temporary endowment funds, the overall development of the co-operative 
sector), and thus they occasionally find themselves in conflict with 
spokesmen for particularized interests (individual co-operatives, or 
the private sector, which tries to avoid the costs of restructuring). 
In short, the situation is currently quite fluid and it is likely to 
remain so until more of the uncertainties surrounding the implemen-
tation of Law 49 have been resolved. 
3. The Commercial and Social Dynamics of Worker Take-Overs 
This section aims to highlight the characteristic features of the WTO 
process as it occurs in Italy. Despite the absence of statistics, the 
Italian literature on co-operatives contains numerous case studies of 
the 'healing' of 'companies in crisis' through their transformation 
into co-operatives (9). Appendix I provides an account of one such 
case - that of CLG, a highly successful co-operative in the graphics 
sector (it illustrates both the combatative industrial relations prac-
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tices in larger Italian firms, and the important role of the Italian 
courts with respect to 'companies in crisis'). The following analysis 
reflects the common features and problems of WTO, and the co­
operatives that result from them, as these appear in such studies. In 
particular, seven cases were chosen for closer study. These cases are 
summarised and contrasted in Appendix II; and they illustrate some of 
the diversity of the WTO experience in terms of size, sector, outcomes 
etc. 
3.1 The WTO Process 
Co-operatives arising from a worker take-over inherit from the pre­
vious enterprise: 
o its organizational framework, 
o its technological plant, 
o its position on the product and capital markets 
o its organizational and professional cultures. 
Moreover, the way in which a W.T.O co-operative is born has an 
influence over its subsequent life, shaping the social contract that 
binds together those concerned, and influencing the decision-making 
dynamics internal and external to the co-operative. 
Generally speaking, in the Italian experience, a WTO takes place in 
one of the following ways: 
Type A: The initiative for transforming an enterprise into a co­
operative comes from the existing entrepreneur: he suggests to the 
employees that they should form a co-operative, either to divide the 
risks or to avoid conflict and its consequent cost. The initiative is 
usually supported by a paternalist culture, either with artisan origin 
or deriving from a culture originating in advanced industrial rela­
tions. Alternatively, the entrepreneur may propose to his employees 
that they take over part of the production cycle as a co-operative, 
guaranteeing their continued links with the company through work 
orders and various fundamental logistic-administrative services. In 
this situation, co-operation and dependence are interwoven. 
Type Β : The initiative is taken autonomously by the workers, who buy 
into all or part of the productive activity and run it for themselves. 
This they may do by depending exclusively on their already existing 
internal trade union structure, or by finding an external partner, who 
may be, depending on the situation, the external trade union orga­
nization, the local, municipal, provincial or regional authority or 
the political parties. The predominant ethos here is of self-
management as an expression of the workforce's own ability. 
Type C: The initiative involves a number (usually large) of actors 
representing various interests, such as the Co-operative Associations, 
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an already existing Consortium, banks, entrepreneurial associations, 
as well as trade unions, the political parties and local government. 
Generally, this pool looks for the most practicable solution - a new 
entrepreneur, a co-operative, or a mixture of the two. This situation 
normally concerns cases of particular importance for the local eco-
nomy. It can give rise to a mixture of demands, concerns and propo-
sals internal and external to the company, with these generally being 
mediated by the local government. The saving of jobs and the contain-
ment of the costs of the crisis are central to the social contract 
established between the various actors. The particular solutions 
adopted and the subject who plays the dominant role in the recovery 
process determine which of a diversity of social and decision-making 
dynamics, will develop. 
These three types are all represented in the cases summarised in 
Appendix II which also prompt the following observations about the WTO 
process : 
o The size of the firm is an important factor in the manner of its 
rescue: the greater the threat to employment in the area, the more 
outside bodies participate in the start-up of the co-operative. In 
the case of smaller-sized firms, initiative comes more from within 
the factory; the situation is more manageable, since the future 
members of the co-operatives are able to handle its complexities. 
o In smaller-sized firms the social, cultural and relational distance 
between the owner and workforce may help to make the transformation 
into a co-operative less traumatic, and ensure that manufacturing 
and mangeria 1 know-how stays in the firm. 
o Some WTO occur in enterprises with a history of union-management 
conflict. In such cases it appears that the more intense the 
confrontation leading to the WTO, the more beneficial its effects -
insofar as the unity of the workers is strengthened and the period 
of trade union struggles becomes the period of maturation of a 
collective desire for self-management, of technical and socio-
psychological preparation for the introduction of alternative mana-
gement, and the fostering of a commitment to the new co-operative. 
o The social base for the impulse to rescue the firm in crisis is 
almost always to be found among the workers. It is usually the case 
that both the managerial staff and most of the office workers aban-
don the firm. The hierarchical order that differentiates such 
'white collar' staff not only impedes the formation of personal 
realtionships with the workers but also gives rise to conflicts 
within the group promoting the co-operative. 
o The lack of professional expertise, apart from the 'inherited' manu-
facturing skills of the workforce, raises the problem of the 
recruitment of skilled personnel from outside (preferably of indivi-
duals already socialized to co-operation) or of in-company training 
(adopted by CLG - see Appendix I). In general, those who participate 
directly in the leadership of the transformation process also embark 
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on a career within the co-operative based on the development of 
their technical skills, and many cadres in the co-operative move-
ment are of worker origin. Class antagonism and the need for mana-
gerial expertise are two major problems. 
o A significant proportion of jobs saved are in women's employment. 
This is because rescue co-operatives are more common in older, 
labour-intensive sectors of industry employing unskilled or semi-
skilled workers. The characteristics of the female labour force 
make the search for another job a difficult one, especially at a 
distance from the home. Thus the co-operative also often represents 
a last chance for equal employment opportunities between men and 
women. 
o The outside trade union is generally present in all the cases exa-
mined here, although its role varies between being the protagonist 
in bargaining with the local authorities and the proprietors, pro-
viding support for the workers' council, or expressing its opposi-
tion to an initiative it does not believe in. Generally speaking, 
the trade union is active only during the early stages of struggle 
and setting up of the co-operative. As long as the union repre-
sents the workers in struggle it has a definite role to play, but 
once the workers have transformed themselves into members of a co-
operative, into a 'collective entrepreneur', the role of the trade 
union becomes less clear and forceful. In general, the trade 
unions lack the cultural and material instruments to be able to 
continue to sustain the co-operative undertaking and this role is 
undertaken by the Co-operative Associations. Hence the Trade 
Unions appear to hve evolved a distinctive important but cir-
cumscribed role in relation to WTO, one that is complementary to 
the contribution of the Co-operative Associations. 
3.2 The Two Phases of Re-building 
It should be remembered that WTO tke place in situations of company 
crisis, - that is, in situations where private capital is abandoning 
an activity for reasons of economic unprofitability; or where private 
capital is undergoing a phase of restructuring. It is therefore of 
fundamental importance that a WTO co-operative should diagnose the 
weaknesses of the company that preceded it, in order to develop 
feasible plans for ensuring the health of the new enterprise. To this 
end it is useful to distinguish between: 
a) factors internal to the company, such as bad management, a reduc-
tion in profit margins, loss of competitiveness of the product; 
b) factors external to the company, such as crisis in the productive 
sector, a more general crisis in the economic-geographical area in 
which the company operates, changes at the level of the inter-
national division of labour creating disequilibria in relations 
between markets. 
In whatever way it is conducted, the results of such an analysis will 
be reflected in the choice of business strategy that the newly formed 
co-operative makes - for example, 
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o whether to continue with the same product/market position, relying 
on the advantages to be derived from the greater productivity of co-
operative work; 
o whether to change partially the product/market mix, concentrating on 
research and development and the consequent increase in 
competiveness; 
o whether to convert, to a quite radical extent, the activities of the 
company by renewing the product, the market, the production tech-
nology, and so on. 
Needless to say, the evolution of an effective "entrepreneurial 
formula" (10) for the co-operative usually takes some time - and it is 
seldom a tidy sequence of diagnosis, planning and implementation. 
This process of re-building the enterprise can be usefully understood 
in terms of two stages. 
a) a period of recovery dominated by the need for capitalization, the 
purchase of equipment and premises, the search for customers and thus 
for a balance between carrying on manufacturing as before and diver-
sifying production into other readily accessible markets 
b) a period of development distinguished by the search for greater 
autonomy on the market and for greater internal efficiency. 
In practice, of course, these two phases will often overlap con-
siderably . 
3.2.1 The Recovery Phase 
Given the importance of re-starting production, decisions to proceed 
with, and to support, a WTO are usually made on the basis of a general 
appraisal of the commercial situation of the enterprise and are not 
based on detailed business plans. Hence the recovery stage often 
displays the following pattern: 
o Initially, soon after the arrangements for the start-up have been 
completed, the major preoccupation is restarting production and 
making the co-op's presence felt on the market. At a symbolic 
level this means that the co-operative is a reality. Commercial 
issues seem to prevail over productive ones (filling the order-
book, finding customers). Often agreements are made with the pre-
vious management concerning subcontracts, percentages on sales, 
sharing the market, etc. 
o Thereafter, problems concerning the amount of financing move to the 
forefront, insofar as access to credit is of primary importance 
during the first years of the company's activities (at least until 
the break-even point has been passed), since it enables it to 
restructure and wait for a return to profit. During this phase, it 
is of great advantage to have stocks of raw materials, of semi-
finished articles purchased from the previous company or any other 
sort of "reserve". 
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o In due course more specifically "organizational" problems become 
important: functional specialization, the introduction of methods 
of management control, the search for increased productivity, and 
the need for social cohesion (concerning wages, decision-making 
etc) 
It must be emphasised that these activities will be carried out in 
collaboration with the external 'actors' supporting the WTO and taking 
advantage of the measures that have been developed to aid the setting 
up of WTO co-operatives. These range from provision of facilities for 
renting premises or purchasing plant and equipment, to facilitating 
access to credit, to service centres (if they exist) providing 
planning, marketing, administration, and so on. Hence these instru-
ments are not only financial in nature, but also offer "real services" 
which facilitate the acquisition of managerial and organizational 
skills - absolutely essential given the intense learning process that 
WTO co-operatives undergo. These real services may be provided by 
public or private organizations of various kinds, but in the Itlian 
case the most important factor in the success of WTO hs been the orga-
nizational network of the Co-operative Associations as described 
above. 
In general, the recovery phase is dominated by the urgent need to 
restore profitability - or, at lest, to break even. Hence a series of 
short-term or tactical steps are taken which have the effect of 
exploring the more immediate possibilities in terms of both the market 
and the production system. In doing so, a rudimentary management team 
also evolves. 
This stage may continue for several years - indeed, there is a sense 
in which many co-operatives never go beyond the recovery stage. This 
is not so much because they fail - they can generally rely on the 
safety net provided by the co-operative movement. Rather, the problem 
is that they may be quite successful in terms of profitability, while 
continuing to occupy a marginal position on the market. This arises 
because, by their very nature, they possess characteristics that make 
them competitive in areas of little interest to private capital (where 
profit margins are too narrow or uncertain). In consequence, a signi-
ficant proportion of WTO co-operatives, especially those of small or 
medium size, are not able to escape from a situation of marginality, 
from a half-hidden 'shadow' economy, and from their economic and poli-
tical dependence on the medium-large size companies for which they 
perform ancillary functions. 
3.2.2 The Development Phase 
The development phase is marked by a recognition of the need to 
strengthen the co-operative's market position and the formulation of 
longer-term strategies to achieve this - whether through plant moder-
nization, new product development, direct marketing (rather than 
subcontracting) or by other means. The crucial starting point for any 
such development plans is a realistic assessment of the 
'entrepreuneurial formula' of the existing business. Such an 
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assessment poses considerable theoretical and practical problems: for 
example, the labour factor cannot be considered as being part of the 
production costs (to be minimized, according to conventional 
principles), or as a negative component in the profit and loss 
picture; rather, it represents the 'profit' itself. Moreover, the 
assessment of the co-operative's position and prospects must take 
account of its social and organizational developments as well, its 
progress as a co-operative. And a shared idea of what the co-
operative should be like may well influence the choice of product-
market strategy. What is at issue therefore is formulation, or 
re-formulation, of a coherent and credible co-op-business idea (11), 
and its subsequent implementation. 
The variety of business conditions in which WTO occur make it hard to 
generalise about the activities and problems associated with the deve-
lopment phase. However, some of the problems that arise and the 
responses they require can be considered by distinguishing between the 
following different aspects of a co-operative's situation: 
(i) its profitability 
(ii) its underlying competitiveness 
(iii)its social performance 
When a co-operative is considered in these terms one of the following 
patterns tend to emerge: 
o Both profitability and competitiveness are satisfactory, and the 
social interests of the co-operative members have been satisfied. 
In this case, the co-operative idea is deemed adequate and may be 
consolidated. At the same time other parallel undertakings may be 
considered . 
o Profitability is satisfactory but the co-operative's underlying 
competitiveness is weak. This case is very widespread and drives 
in part from poor entrepreneurial skills. In the long term the 
favourable situation of the co-operative may deteriorate due to 
its dependence on external facilitating conditions such as a tem-
porary increase in demand, artificially high price levels, ecolo-
gical niches, non-repayable grants, or the self-exploitation of 
the members of the co-operative (low salaries, overtime, or a tem-
porary increase in productivity due to the initial enthusiasm of 
the members). The product, too, may be uncompetitive: perhaps 
because it is easily imitated, or because it is manufactured with 
antiquated or obsolete machinery, or because there are scant 
prospects of its future development, or because it is not designed 
for a specific market segment. In this case, even if the social 
performance is positive, the co-operative is in state of pre-
carious equilibrium. At worst, there may be a pathological refu-
sal to face up to reality. Here the co-operative idea must be 
reorientated by measures to strengthen the managerial skills. 
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o Profitability is unsatisfactory, but the co-operative is basically 
very competitive. This may be because its product is the only one 
of its kind or aimed at a restricted market, or because of the use 
of competitive technology, or because of a combination of the two. 
The low profitability of the co-operative is therefore due to its 
inability to exploit the profit potential that the combination of 
market and product permit. Generally speaking, low and precarious 
profitablity tends to lead to dissatisfaction among the members of 
the co-operative, and this, in turn, manifests itself in a low 
commitment to the co-operative, leading to both internal conflict 
and people leaving. In such cases the co-operative idea must be 
re-oriented by means of action taken on its organizational struc-
ture, the achieving of greater coherence beween the resources 
employed in the manufacturing process and their economic results. 
o Profitability, competitiveness and social success are all unsatis-
factory. Thus the co-operative cannot survive for very long in a 
market economy: the co-operative idea requires a radical 
overhauling both in terms of its structure (economic and 
organizational), its strategy, and its social objectives. 






























Table 4 Assessing the viability of a co-operative-business idea 
It should also be mentioned that occasionally where the social perfor-
mance is poor, the co-operative maybe 'privatised' (see the case of 
Zetronic in Appendix II). When this occurs it is usually with larger 
enterprises (presumably because in these cases it is more difficult to 
achieve meaningful and widespread involvement by the workforce). In 
such cases the effect of the WTO has been to preserve employment by 
rationalising the activities to a point where they are again attrac-
tive to private capital. 
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Finally, it must be emphasised once again that the discussion and 
decision-making associated with this development phase does not only 
occur within the co-operative. It also involves, and almost to the 
same extent, all those who have combined to set up the WTO co-op. 
These are 'morally' committed to the successful outcome of the under-
taking, but insofar as they are engaged in supplying technical-
organizational-financial assistance, they also have a voice in 
monitoring and improving its performance. 
3.3 Two logics of development 
The size of the enterprise taken over has considerable bearing on its 
subsequent development - simply because size is so important for the 
division of labour and functional organization. As a result one can 
distinguish two quite different logics of development underlying the 
larger and smaller WTO co-operatives. These two logics are outlined 
below, drawing on the cases summarised in Appendix II. 
Logic A : Larger co-operatives (eg Zetronic and Nuova Reguitti in 
Appendix II), right from the beginning, preserve their previous func-
tional organization, and their economic decisions are dictated by a 
desire to maintain employment levels. This often makes major invest-
ments necessary in order to optimize the labour resource. Such co-
operatives have direct access to the market and seek to increase their 
share of it by keeping to the same product even if it is relatively 
mature (through careful marketing and by keeping costs down), and at 
the same time by diversifying production (from metal smallware to 
electronic components, at Zetronic), or by extending the new product 
range (to compensate for the seasonal nature of its garden furniture, 
Nuova Reguitti began production of household and nursery furniture). 
These co-operatives function in the main like conventional companies 
insofar as they delegate to a group of skilled administrators 
(consultants or career managers) the task of defining company stra-
tegy. However, the fundamental basis for the strategy is fixed: 
employment levels should be maintained. Hence, company strategy is 
not based on seeking out potentially the most profitable investments, 
given the state of the market; it is based on the selection of 
markets and policies capable of making the existing human resources 
and other available assets productive. 
Logic B: In medium-sized co-operatives (and even more so in those of 
smaller size) a rejection of the previous functional organization, and 
a search for as much parity in the division of work as possible, tend 
to occur. However, it is recognised that functional specialization is 
indispensable, and the evolution of the management and organization 
reflects decisions regarding the market and the pressures it imposes. 
The organizational patterns are therefore more complex. 
Subcontracting to a limited number of large firms is initially vital 
to the rescue of almost all those co-operatives that base their stra-
tegy on the price factor. However, once subcontracting work is well 
established the co-operative concentrates either on gaining direct 
access to the market or on increasing the number of its custsomers, 
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although still subcontracting. The production range may also be 
increased. Examples ( from Appendix II) of these processes are: 
o Pellicciai Riuniti was unable to meet the costs of purchasing raw 
materials (mink) and of maintaining an automous marketing network. 
Consequently, the co-operative moved into the subcontracting 
market providing a high quality service. At the same time, as 
profitability increased, it started up the manufacture and 
marketing on its own account of reversible sheepskin suede coats 
(where the cost of skins is lower). 
o Didial passed from mass production with little added value, to the 
specialized subcontracting of garments in small to medium batches. 
These required a shorter manufacturing process but with better 
workmanship and the provision of a personalized service, as, for 
example, in the preparation of sample collections. 
o Cabel soon abandoned the assembly of television sets and con-
solidated its own market for electronics equipment. It developed 
its internal professional skills and brought in skilled personnel 
from outside. 
o Cierre initially followed the recommendation made by the local 
association for the coordination of co-operatives in the area. 
They carried out a major investment programme in order to be able 
to manufacture a wide range of products for the publishing 
industry. However, demand was not sufficient to meet either pro-
duction or quality capacity, they were unable to reach the break-
even point, and after two years the co-operative was obliged to 
revise its calculations and to convert its production. 
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The maturation process of these co-operatives seems to be the following: 
o The co-operative's relationship with its market, in terms of its 
dependence on a limited number of customers, ensures initial sur-
vival and competitiveness based on 
a) the quality of both the product and the service provided; 
b) productive efficiency, with a consequent need to improve pro-
fessional skills; 
c) increasing the size of the market catered for. 
o The search for greater autonomy directs the co-operative's strategy 
towards product diversification and finding a wider range of customers 
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for its diversified products and services, and also towards gaining 
direct access to its own market. 
o In this way, organizational and managerial complexity increases, and 
the limitations of the members' expertise and of their being 
production-oriented become increasingly apparent. 
o Functional organization is adopted for technical reasons, although 
idealistic elements oppose the internal hierarchy (introduced to 
improve coordination), direct control and graduated pay scales. 
o In order to meet its requirements for personnel with specific skills, 
the co-operative may either seek external consultation, hire per­
sonnel more or less in sympathy with its aims, or develop the pro­
fessional skills of its members in a relatively organized fashion. 
o Economic success acts in a certain way as the driving force behind 
this process, which sooner or later moves Logic Β closer to Logic 
A. 
In summary, therefore, larger WTO co-operatives tend to maintain a 
more conventional form of business organization but direct it at least 
initially, towards maintaining employment, rather than profit maximi­
sation. By contrast smaller WTO co-operatives adopt less hierarchical 
forms of organization which may evolve in a number of different ways 
depending on the internal social dynamics, and the demands of the 
evolving business strategy. 
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Appendix 1 
CLG - A WTO C o-operative in the Graphics Sector 
The case of CLG (12) provides an illustration of many quite typical 
features of WTOs in Italy. 
CLG was born out of the Salgraf Company of Verona, which was engaged 
in photolithographic work, mainly for Mondadori (a colossus in the 
sector). The firm had a good volume of work, was well-equipped and in 
1975 had 80 employees. Salgraf owned two other firms as well and had 
become involved in a number of complex large-scale deals and opera-
tions. However, in 1974 it found itself faced with a liquidity crisis 
and it tried to cope with this by dismantling the group and winding up 
one of the three firms. The trade unions resisted this move and mana-
gement undertook to restructure the company's finances in other ways 
instead. However, a year later in 1975, and with no prior warning and 
no negotiation with the trade union, the owners placed the entire 
workforce in Cassa Integrazione, (see footnote above), despite the 
fact that the firm had a full order book and was having to resort to 
overtime. The workers reacted with determination against what seemed 
to them to be a non-existent crisis deliberately created in order to 
shift capital towards more profitable undertakings. A strike was 
called to force the owners to negotiate. However, production did not 
start up again and the conflict escalated: the workers occupied the 
factory and took their case to the courts, where an order was issued 
for the confiscation of the factory and the owner's house in order to 
provide a guarantee for wages owed to his employees. 
After three months, about half the workforce, worn down by uncer-
tainty, intimidation and false promises, left the factory for 
employment elsewhere, and the owner applied to the courts for the 
introduction of 'amministrazione controllata' of the firm (a system 
whereby debt repayment is temporarily suspended in order to enable the 
entrepreneur to overcome his economic problems). However, his appli-
cation was rejected on the grounds that absolutely no plan for over-
coming the crisis had been forthcoming. Thus two more months passed 
until the remaining workers applied to the courts to have the firm 
declared bankrupt. And, in fact, five months later, Salgraf was 
declared bankrupt. 
The employees of Salgraf were mainly young people with good school 
educations and professional training. They were also more unionized 
in comparison with small firms in the sector. During the months of 
factory occupation, the idea had begun to grow of forming a coopera-
tive in order to save their jobs, and a heated debate ensued between 
the two main trade unions (CISL and CGL) over the relationship between 
self-management and trade unionism. However, although two trade 
unionists came into the factory to join the co-operative's administra-
tion while it was being set up, the unions were usually conspicuous by 
their absence. 
On the other hand, local political forces had been involved right from 
the start,by the workers' council, which orchestrated the complex 
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Italian ritual for the rescue of firms in crisis: public meetings and 
the involvement of the press and political, cultural and social asso-
ciations. The search for a purchaser for the company was conducted 
half-heartedly, since it was thought that the particular situation of 
Salgraf was not one that would attract a suitable entrepreneur. In 
the permanent assembly the workers began to discuss the idea of self-
management, but with serious misgivings: how could a workers' co-
operative be set up in a sector with such special characteristics as 
the graphics sector, without financing, with the market lost, the 
firm's image ruined in the eyes of its customers and so many workers 
with irreplaceble skills lost? Nevertheless, at the end of February 
1976 the assembly decided on self-management. At the beginning of 
March the co-operative was legally constituted and applied to the 
courts for the factory premises to be leased to them. This raised a 
number of legal questions, since bankruptcy law is either oriented 
towards the dismantling of failed firms to pay off their creditors or, 
in exceptional and limited circumstances, towards temporary management 
by the official receiver while warehouse stocks, perishable goods etc. 
are cleared. The workers' council rallied public support and orga-
nized sufficient pressure to 'persuade' the court to grant them the 
lease of the premises. At the end of March the contract was drawn up, 
and at the beginning of April the co-operative started up with 25 
member-workers. 
The first months were extremely difficult: without customers, after 
months of idleness, without capital and without managerial staff, 
recovery seemed impossible. At first the workers regarded this as a 
period of sacrifice to be borne to keep the firm going until a new 
owner could be found. But after the first positive results were 
achieved, the idea of self-management as the prosecution of workers' 
struggle and as an alternative to working for an employer, gained 
ground. 
Particular attention was paid to factory democracy, of which various 
experimental forms were tried out. In general, it was organized as 
follows: the workers' assembly acted as the body that effectively ran 
the co-operative. It comprised five work groups, each made up of mem-
bers representing all the production departments and each dealing with 
a particular problem. The administrative board had no decision-making 
powers but was merely an instrument for coordination and implemen-
tation, and in each production department the co-operative members 
were responsible for their own work organization. This was subjected 
to a number of changes over time. Initially, the departments stayed as 
they had been under the previous management, and managerial duties 
were carried out by a co-operative member acting as coordinator of the 
workers in his department, but with no decision-making powers of his 
own. This system of factory organization lasted for three years and 
was then changed because, although it directly involved the individual 
members in the running of their departments, it did not provide them 
with a global overview of problems concerning the production process 
in its entirety. 
From 1979 work was organized into a 'planning and technical unit' and 
two 'production units', each responsible for the management of the 
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complete production cycle. Each of these three units was coordinated 
by a highly experienced member of the co-operative. 
Members' wages were fixed by the assembly on the basis of the collec-
tive labour contract, which set out three wage levels according to 
age. There were no other increments: wages were the same for both 
workers and office staff. Only a small number of co-operative members 
with managerial responsibilities were paid a special fixed allowance 
for their hours of overtime. 
The previous firm had employed 80 people. About 60 people are now 
working in the co-operative; a reduction resulting from the introduc-
tion of new technology, mostly during the first four years of acti-
vity. A heavy investment programme was embarked on (with leasing 
operations) strategically aimed at shifting production to medium-high 
quality, for which there is a solid and steady market, and at 
replacing traditional photography with electronic apparatus. 
As always, the co-operative faced considerable difficulties in finding 
finance, but support from other workers and public opinion helped to 
attenuate the problem: the buildings were leased, the restructuring 
programme was set in motion by a number of leasing operations, a local 
bank granted a loan on favourable terms to provide working capital, 
the co-operative members postponed their wage payments for the first 
eight months and the co-operative's most important customer 
(Mondadori), thanks to the intervention of its workers' council and 
the graphic workers' trade union, agreed to monthly cash payments for 
major orders. 
In the years that followed, CLG relied on bank financing, loans from 
co-operative members,· finance from the Lega and various reserve funds 
set up with its own means. Since 1979 wages have been paid regularly 
and the co-operative's initial problems seem to have been overcome. 
At present (1984), CLG has a sales volume of 3 billion lire. In its 
field it may be described as a 'large scale company', since the speci-
fic nature of its product (photographic separation) requires a large 
amount of work in a very short time (something that smaller sized 
firms are not able to do). Moreover, the high quality of its product 
has given the co-operative direct access to the market, of which it 
now control a good 50% at home and broad, and the high profitability 
of the product has permitted such speedy recapitalization that in 6 




Seven WTO Co-operatives Compared 
Choosing illustrative examples of workers' takeovers in Italy is a 
difficult task because every case of WTO arises from a particular set 
of circumstances in which a variety of factors play a determining 
role: the economic and cultural context of the region, the charac-
teristics of the workers as individuals, the size of the rescued firm 
and the type of 'co-operative idea' that the group of founder members 
has elaborated collectively and sought to put into practice. 
In order to illustrate the similarities and differences among the 
strategies adopted by WTO co-operatives in their first years of acti-
vity, a partial elaboration of recent research data (13) has been 
carried out extrapolating only that information that relates to the 
sub-sample of 7 co-operatives that originated from the bankruptcy or 
crisis of the firms that preceded them, or from their transformation 
into cooperatives as a result of financial difficulties. This selec-
tion was also made with the aim of drawing comparisons between the 
case of CLG (Appendix I) and other co-operatives in the same region 
(Veneto) or in neighbouring Lombardia. Table 5 sets out the principal 
features of the rescue co-operatives and also reveals their heteroge-
neity . 
Cierre was converted into a co-operative on the joint initiative of 
the entrepreneur and a small group of young people and an agency for 
the co-ordination of co-operatives in Verona. By means of a major 
programme of innovative investment Cierre tried to acquire new 
markets. However, it was not able to identify areas of the market 
suited to its new machinery. It was forced to operate in conditions 
of plant under-utilization and after a short time had to embark on a 
recovery programme. 
Cabel was born on the initiative of the ex-owner, who put forward the 
idea to his employees (all very young) to set up a co-operative, since 
the firm's sole customer for its assembled television sets was 
beginning to show signs of crisis. It seemed, therefore, more sen-
sible to look for new markets and new products. The entrepreneur 
wanted to share the risks involved and to avoid the costs of 
industrial conflict. The work-force was sceptical, and it was only by 
the efforts of a trade union leader that the conversion was made 
possible. Production changed over to videos, video games and moni-
tors, with great success, and the entrepreneur took on the respon-
sibility of training the young technicians himself. 
Didial arose out of the bankruptcy of a clothes factory operating in 
an unprofitable sector of the market (low quality garments). The firm 
was too large for its market, at a time when the entire garments sec-
tor was in the process of restructuring. The firm's bankruptcy had 
been preceded by a period of major trade union effort aimed at saving 
jobs and recovering productivity: this led to the formation of an 
'organizing group' of workers which subsequently promoted the co-
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operative. During the ten months of official receivership, a 
purchaser was sought in vain. The receiver pronounced himself against 
the winding-up of the firm and proposed the idea of a co-operative to 
the workers. A permanent assembly was set up with the task of ana-
lysing the production cycle, costs and work organization, and of 
drawing up a detailed plan for the rescue of the firm and its trans-
formation into a co-operative. 
Pellicciai Riuniti arose from a large firm in the furs sector with 520 
employees in 1976 and a sales volume of 20 billion lire. Its 
situation became critical and in 1980 its staff had dwindled to 138. 
During this period the trade union was severely hampered by conflicts 
among the workers. While the union contemplated self-management, a 
group of office workers set up a co-operative. The shop-floor 
workers, however, remained sceptical and were unable to decide whether 
to commit themselves to the co-operative. In time, though, the 
workers were forced to make up their minds: they joined the co-
operative, and negotiations started over the assignation of the firm. 
The owner leased the trademark and the buildings, the management 
assisted in the setting up of the new administration, and a recently-
formed company (in which the ex-owner had interests) made a large 
order. 
Nuova Riguitti arose out of a crisis caused both by the maturity of 
the product and by its seasonal nature (garden furniture), as well as 
various errors of strategy. After two years of 
amministrazione controllata, mainly on the initiative of external 
political and trade union bodies a co-operative was set up which kept 
the firm's trademark and widened its production range with two new 
lines (household and nursery furniture). 
Zetronic was born after seven years of company crisis when the share-
holders decided to liquidate the firm. Se If-management began shortly 
afterwards because the trade union and the political parties were con-
cerned about the impact on employment in the area (750 people were 
employed by the firm). Production was maintained because orders had 
not been cancelled, and also to keep the firm in production. The 
trade unions and political parties, in agreement with the previous 
owners, set up a limited company until a definitive solution could be 
found. The limited company's capital was formed out of earnings 
accrued during the period of self-management and capital from the 
Associazione Industriale of Padova, thus demonstrating that the inten-
tion was to find a new owner for the firm and that the workers' 
takeover was merely a temporary solution. After more than a year of 
waiting for the appearance of an entrepreneur willing to accept the 
employment guarantees required by the trade union, the idea began to 
grow of a co-operative that would take over most of the social capital 
of the limited company administering the old firm. In this way, it 
was not necessary to declare the firm bankrupt, and a buyer could 
still be found. The old managerial staff left the firm, and new mana-
gerial resources were brought in from outside to begin the process of 
restructuring and conversion to electronics. 
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These efforts were generally successful and the commercial position of 
the enterprise gradually strengthened, with employment output and 
sales increasing sharply in 1982. In 1984 a private buyer was finally 
found for the enterprise. 
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the fact that in the specialized literature there is only one book 
exclusively devoted to the subject, published after a colloqium held 
in Milan in 1984: Irecoop (ed), 
I problemi delle cooperative industriali nate da aziende in crisi, 
Milano, Cens, 1985. Unfortunately data from empirical research are 
not provided. On the other hand, in almost all research studies on 
co-operatives, a large number of rescue co-ops form part of the 
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A.A.V.V., L'autogestione nell'industria, Bari, De Donato, 1978, 
A.A.V.V., Oggi l'autogestione, Roma, Edizioni Lavoro, 1980, Regione 
Toscana, Cooperazione in Toscana, 1977-1982, Flashlavoro, n. 1, 1985, 
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Lavoro, 1985, S. Gherardi, A. Masiero, "The impact of organizational 
culture on life-cycle and decision-making processes of newborn 
co-operatives", paper presented at VI Egos Colloquium, Stockholm, 
1985. 
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Unfortunately a more detailed comparative examination of these case-
studies (about 70 co-ops) is impossible because of piece-meal data. 
(10) A. Tessitore, "Il potenziale di risanamento della formula 
cooperativa nelle crisi aziendali", in Irecoop (1985), develops and 
applies to co-operatives the analysis of V. Coda, "Evaluation of the 
entrepreneurial formula", Economia Aziendale, n. 1, 1984. 
(11) The 'co-op business idea' is derived from R. Normann, Management 
for Growth, Chichester, Wiley, 1977. His concept of business-idea 
refers to the specific logic of action in the interplay between the 
organization and the environment. This has the merit of focussing on 
the idealised elements in the particular structure/strategy rela-
tionship. Since for a co-operative organization, the choice of its 
position in the market is likely to influence, and be influenced by, 
the shared idea about what a co-op is like, the term 'Co-op business 
idea' includes these elements as they are embodied and reflected in 
concrete economic choices. 
(12) The case-study of CLG is contained in A.A.V.V. (1978) and in 
A.A.V.V. (1980); this co-op is also part of the sample of the 
research Carbognin-Masiero (1985) see note 9 above. 
(13) These illustrative materials are taken from a sub-sample of the 
research Carbognin-Masiero and are directly known by the author who 
elaborated them jointly with Masiero: Gherardi, and Masiero (1985). 
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WTO in Spain are carried out in two different ways - by the formation 
of workers' co-operatives, and by the formation of Sociedades Anonima 
Laborales ('Labour Companies' known by the acronym SAL). In Spain, 
these take-overs have been, and continue to be, made possible by 
financial assistance obtained from public funds administered through 
yearly programs under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor. 
This report focuses on the experience of WTOs that have used the SAL 
framework. There are basically two reasons for this: 
First, far more information is available. Although the statistics for 
SALs in the period 1975-1985 have many deficiencies, they do all 
refer to instances of WTO, because no 'new-start'SALs were formed 
during this period. By contrast, the aggregate statistics for worker 
co-operatives do not distinguish between those originating from WTOs 
and those formed in other contexts, and hence it is more difficult to 
judge the extent of the phenomenon. There is no doubt that co-
operatives arising from WTOs have been significant historically in the 
development of the worker co-operative sector in Spain, particularly 
in Catalonia, with its tradition of se If-management. For example, the 
oldest producer co-operative in Spain - the Mataro Glassworks formed 
in 1920 - was the result of a WTO. Nevertheless, it is widely held 
that only a minority of co-operatives have arisen in these circumstan-
ces - perhaps 30% of the co-operatives in industrialised areas like 
Catalonia. Moreover most of these have been followed by a 'phoenix' 
rather than a 'rescue' strategy, often following a lengthy period of 
closure. Hence they have often been more comparable with 'new 
starts'. In consequence, the question of WTOs has not been so impor-
tant for the co-operative federations who have provided rather less of 
the public analysis and debate of the issues than has been provided by 
those involved with the SALs. 
Secondly, regardless of the precise numbers of WTOs of each type, it 
is clear that the SALs are economically more significant because more 
WTO have chosen this form and they tend to be much larger. Most of 
the WTO that have given rise to worker co-operatives have involved 
less than 15 workers, whereas SALs are generally medium-sized firms of 
50-100 workers, and sometimes more. 
Before describing the evolution of the SAL phenomenon a number of 
general points must be made about the political and economic con-
ditions in Spain over the last 12 years. The development of the eco-
nomic crisis from 1976 coincided with a period of enormous political 
change. Since 1976, Spain has been involved in a transition from a 
dictatorship to a democracy, and from a centralist state to one with 
17 parliaments and 17 regional governments. This prolonged institu-
tional upheaval has been accompanied by a highly politicised climate 
of opinion which has affected business organizations and the whole of 
Spanish life. During this process there have been times when politi-
cal priorities prevailed over economic ones - consider the attempted 
coup in February, 1982 - as a result of which one can speak of the 
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economie costs of the transition toward democracy. Thus, for example, 
Spain has the highest rates of strikes and industrial disputes in 
Europe during the period 1977-82 , which also saw intense inter-union 
conflict. 
During this period, unemployment rates were the highest in Europe -
and they remain so - as well as showing the fastest yearly growth. 
Moreover the opportunities for emigration, which had been an important 
means of finding work during the years before the crisis, were closed 
off. 
In addition, unemployment and social security benefits have been very 
limited for several reasons. First, most businesses based their 
contributions to the social security fund on wages that were lower 
than those actually paid to their workforce. These contributions were 
supposed to finance unemployment compensation at 75% of the employees 
wage. But since lower, notional wage levels had been used it was 
quite normal for compensation to be no more than 50% of the actual 
wage. This unemployment compensation system was signficiantly changed 
by Law 31/1984. Secondly, the maximum period for drawing unemployment 
compensation was 18 months. Once this period had expired, benefits 
were strictly limited to healthcare. 
Finally, while unemployment compensation was being drawn, its 
purchasing power was being progressively reduced by the high rate of 
inflation (14.7% annually, on average, in the period 1976-1983) 
In summary, the Spanish experience of worker take-overs must be 
understood against a background of political upheaval, economic cri-
sis, rising unemployment and poorly developed system of social 
security. 
2. The Nature and Extent of the SAL Phenomenon. 
2.1 Origins 
The first SAL officially began operating in Valencia in July of 1964 
(SAL TUV). It consisted of workers from the firm that had been given 
the public-transport concession by the administration in that city. 
This case, analysed in detail by Salabert Parramon R. (1), was made 
possible due to the political wishes of the highest officials in the 
labour unions and the Ministry of Labour. According to its official 
promoters, it was an instance of creating a type of national-union 
enterprise, in keeping with governmental ideology, that would be 
capable of overcoming the Marxist-capitalist dialectic. The regime 
did not want cooperatives. It was trying to stamp them out by 
integrating them into the official system and placing them under its 
control, because it understood them to have been a part of left-wing 
organizations during the Republican period. 
Four years later in January, 1968 the Palma de Mallorca transport com-
pany was converted into a SAL. Subsequently, transport companies in 
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Almería and Las Palmas de Gran Canaria became SALs. All of these com-
panies were monopolies in the market, since in order to operate they 
needed an administrative concession from the municipality. 
The process of transformation into SALs was the same in all cases: 
- The non-renewal of administrative authorization granted to the con-
cessionaire . 
- Intervention by official union representatives in order to convince 
workers and facilitate the creation of SALs. 
- Granting of loans with public funds under advantageous conditions to 
purchase the company, which involved no payments by workers. 
In these SALs, worker participation took place through a Foundation 
that held the company's shares and to which the public funds were 
paid. Thus both the company and the Foundation had separate legal 
status. This arrangement kept the workers from freely managing their 
shares. Only workers could be shareholders, and the condition of 
worker-shareholder (with no payment by the worker) was a factor of the 
labour relationship. The Foundation always maintained control over 
the shares because once the labour contract was terminated, the rights 
to these shares would pass on to other workers through the Foundation. 
The Foundation also administered the resources earmarked by the com-
pany for social and cultural purposes. The company was managed 
through a conventional management structure, with the managing direc-
tor accountable in principle to those elected representatives of the 
workforce on the govening body of the foundation. Workforce represen-
tation was also supposed to occur through an elected enterprise 
committee whose role was to negotiate day to day matters with manage-
ment. These representatives were members of th National Syndicates, 
not of independent unions. 
Nowadays, from the standpoint of the labour movement, this belated 
initiative - after more than 20 years of "national unionism" - was an 
attempt to pre-empt the new workers' organizations that were then 
springing up outside of the official framework. 
2.2 The Development of the SAL system. 
The purchase of businesses by workers was made possible through the 
granting of loans by the Ministry of Labour through the "Fondo 
National de Protection al Trabajo" (FNPT) - the National Labour 
Protection Fund, an agency that operated between 1960-85 under a 
system that was supposed to be similar to that of a commercial bank, 
(but it is uncertain to what extent these loans have actually been 
repayed to the FNPT). 
The loans were of the following nature: 
- They were personal loans not granted to the SAL. For this reason, 
the workers had to provide individual guarantees in order to answer 
to the FNPT in case of default. 
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- They established a maximum amount per worker, which was adjusted 
annually by the Ministry of Labour. 
- They offered advantageous conditions regarding interest and amor-
tization periods (5-8% and 8-10 years). 
It is important to appreciate three features of this scheme: 
First the terms of this programme were modified on several occasions 
and in 1985 - 1986 it was substantially redesigned. Assistance is now 
arranged through a newly created Directorate of Labour Co-operatives 
and SALs, within the Ministry of Labour. Loans are now granted to 
companies (rather than individuals) and on the basis of their finan-
cial needs (rather than the number of worker-owners), and they are 
provided by banks who have signed agreements with the Ministry of 
Labour. However, it is too early to evaluate the impact of these 
reforms and so the discussion that follows concentrates on the 
arrangements during the period 1979-1985 when the SALs first came to 
prominence. 
Second funds from the FNPT were not the only soruce of finance for 
these WTOs. The workforce commonly made use of redundancy payments 
and back payments of wages (provided by the 'Fondo de Garantia 
Salarial' (FOGASA), a public fund that exists to provide these 
payments in cases where a bankruptfirm is unable to meet its 
obligations). In addition, further funds would be obtained from banks 
on normal terms. 
Third, until the passing of Law 15/1986 the SALs did not actually 
exist under Spanish law, but were instead completely governed by nor-
mal Company Laws. However, in order to benefit from official 
assistance provided by the FNPT, the Ministry of Labour required spe-
cific conditions to be reflected in the statutes of SALs. Between 
1979 and Law 15/1986 the requirements were: 
o A minimum of 50% capital had to belong to the workers. (Before 
1979, 100% of capital had to be held by workers; law 15/1986 
requires that this percentage be at least 51%). 
o No worker-owner could hold more than 25% of share capital 
(previously it could be as much as 35%). 
o Shares had to be registered and could only be transferred to other 
workers in the company (the two-tier framework using a Foundation 
was no longer required). 
o Modifications to the above statutory conditions could only be made 
upon authorization by the FNPT. 
Hence the existence of the FNPT and the evolution of the terms under 
which it operated enabled large number of WTOs to take place. Many of 
these adopted the SAL framework, which ensures a form of worker 
ownership. How these arrangements have worked in practice, in terms 
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of management and control, remains somewhat unclear, partly because no 
detailed research has been done, and partly because the way the basic 
SAL framework is used depends very much on those involved. The key 
differences between SALs and worker co-operatives are obviously first 
that SALs allow for external shareholding, and second that in SALs 
voting is proportional to shareholding (rather than one member one 
vote). In practice, these differences appear less significant since 
the workers generally own equal numbers of shares. Moreover, dif-
ferences in the management practices of SALs and worker co-operatives 
may have more to do with the larger size of the former, rather than 
the constitutional differences. 
2.3 The Preference for SALs. 
The measures made available by the Ministry of Labour in order to 
create SALs and co-operatives in the context of WTO are practically 
the same. There are however more tax incentives for worker co-
operatives than for SALs. So the question arises as to why workers in 
businesses undergoing crisis have preferred to adopt the SAL rather 
than the co-operative form? 
An initial answer can be found in the negative opinion that workers in 
mid-sized businesses had of Spanish producer cooperatives - excepting 
of course Mondragon - during the Franco government. These cooperati-
ves were usually small, with elementary technical processes, existing 
under precarious conditions, with many of them benefitting from 
governmental assistance because of their ties to the government. 
Nevertheless, this negative image of industrial cooperativism during 
the dictatorship does not really explain the preference of workers in 
mid-sized businesses for the SAL plan. Given that the workforce 
lacked co-operative ideals and the SALs lacked any clear ideology, the 
main reasons must be sought in the fact that workers value the econo-
mic advantages of the rights that Spanish legal laws grant them as 
workers and as shareholders. 
SAL workers continue to be considered as hired workers, maintaining 
all rights they originally had under the Spanish labour system, which 
are basically as follows: 
o The power to appeal to a court for their work rights from a company 
in which they are shareholders, as well as workers. 
o The right to receive benefits from FOGASA, the Wage Guarantee Fund. 
o The right to receive financial and assistance benefits provided by 
law for jobless workers. This is a point of enormous importance, 
because until June 15, 1985, the date on which Royal Decree 1043 
extended unemployment protection to working partners of producer co-
operatives, had no right to unemployment insurance, due to the fact 
that the recognized legal relationship between the co-operative 
member and the co-operative was of a corporate, and not a labour, 
nature. Bearing in mind the birth pangs of a new enterprise and its 
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uncertain future, it appears logical that in WTO's prior to June of 
1935, this was an element that would greatly affect the choice of 
legal framework. 
Another set of arguments seen as favourable by workers, lies in the 
fact that the SAL form allows third parties to hold share capital in 
the businesses. So it is possible for a part of the capital to be 
lawfully held by non-working partners. This is an important aspect 
for two reasons: 
o The need to raise capital for the recently-acquired business. This 
cannot be on the basis of short-term profit forecasts - for obvious 
reasons. Investors must be prepared to take a longer term view and 
will wish to have some influence on company policy. 
o The interest in sharing risks that any business activity has, since 
the primary objective of the workers is always that of keeping a 
job, and not the possible profit - or loss - resulting from acting 
as a company shareholder. 
Owing to the great restrictiveness of Spanish cooperative legisation, 
which does not allow for external shareholding (though this is 
currently being revised under bill in Parliament) workers see the 
above arguments as an advantage of the SAL over the Co-operative. 
Two other facts also seem to influence the workers' preference for the 
SAL plan, though to a lesser degree: 
o There are fewer restrictions on the transfer of shares under the SAL 
form. 
o With a SAL, partners have rather less responsibility vis-a-vis third 
parties . 
2.4 The Growth and Distribution of SALs 
SALs are enterprises that are constituted in a manner so as to benefit 
from loans and subsidies granted by the FNPT. Their growth has there-
fore been proportional to the yearly budget assignment made by the 
FNPT, a result of governmental policy. 
Although some SALs were formed in the 1960s and early 1970s their num-
bers began tó increase after 1975 and took off sharply in 1979, when 
78 SALs were formed employing a total of 7038 people (average size: 
90). The following year 104 SALs were formed giving jobs to 10,782 
workers (average size: 104). Thereafter SALs have continued to be 
formed in large though very variable numbers that seem to average 
about 150/year in the period 1981-1985. However, their size measured 
by the average number employed, seems to have fallen sharply which 
probably reflects changes in the terms and policies of the FNPT. 
































































































1,225 100.00 46,413 100.00 
Table 1: No. and Distribution of SALs, and employees in SALs, 1985 
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total number of SALs and their distribution, as of 1985. However the 
accuracy of the figures is open to question partly because some of 
these SALs may no longer be trading. Thus, when Law 15/1986 was 
introduced in Parliament, the same Ministry calculated the number of 
SALs to be around 600, but estimated they employed 60,000 workers. On 
the other hand, the Catalonian Federation of Lavour Companies 
(FESALC), in a census carried out in 1985, counted 190 SALs in 
Catalonia, with 8,835 workers, contrastins with the 132 SALs and 9,421 
workers according to the figures in Table 1. 
It should also be emphasised that the size of SALs varies very con-
siderably - from those with less than 10 workers, to those with 
several hundred. Ministry of Labour figures also indicate a heavy 
concentration of SALs formed in 1983, only 1 was in agriculture and 26 
were in the service sector. It is clear, too, that most SALs work for 
the local and domestic markets. 
Overall, however, it is clear that upwards of 50,000 jobs have been 
saved through WTOs facilitated by the FNPT and utilising the SAL form. 
3 Problems and Performance of SALs. 
There is no doubt that the SALs have experienced severe problems, that 
a significant proportion have failed, and that many are having to 
struggle to stay in existence. However the support provided to SALs 
has evolved quite rapidly in response to these problems, so the 
current position is rather more promising. 
3.1 Organizational and Management Problems. 
Like other WTOs, the SALs have often had to improvise as regards mana-
gement, especially since most of the more senior and qualified mana-
gers leave when the firm is taken over. A lack of training and 
experience on the part of the remaining managers and supervisors has 
led to poor planning and control. In addition, like other WTOs, most 
SALs are using old and obsolete equipment which has made it difficult 
to achieve the productivity required to be competitive. These problems 
have become particularly serious with Spain's entry into the E.E.C. 
Domestic Spanish industries (not the multinationals) generally have a 
lower productivity than European ones. Hence, in the medium-term, the 
SALs will have to compete with firms that have higher productivity 
than their present competitors in the domestic market. For the same 
reason, the SALs will have to increase productivity very considerably 
indeed if they are to be able to export. In short, many SALs are 
marginal enterprises and vulnerable to current economic trends and 
changes . 
However some specific features of the FNPT scheme and the SAL form 
have created particular problems. 
First, although SALs have always employed fewer workers than the 
source company the workforce is normally above requirements. One of 
the reasons for this is that the loans were being granted according to 
the number of employees in the company. Hence the'number of workers 
to be recruited upon the incorporation of a SAL was determined more by 
the initial financial requirements than by production needs. 
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Second, the fact that SALs were not legally recognised until the 
passing of Law 15/1986 meant that there were conflicts between the 
Company Laws under which they were registered and the limitations 
placed on their statutes by the Ministry of Labour. According to 
Company Law, limits such as the FNPT required could not be applied to 
share sales or transfers. These ambiguities were often a source of 
some conflict and uncertainty. 
3.2 Financial Problems 
The financial problems of the SALs have been particularly acute. Some 
of the reasons for this are to be expected in the context of WTOs 
(e.g. the need to replace obsolete equipment; the initial business 
plans being over-optimistic; shortages of working capital arising from 
difficulties in obtaining loans from banks and credit from suppliers). 
However some of the problems have been particular to the Spanish con-
text . 
First, as noted previously, the financial provisions of the FNPT 
scheme were not based on the business requirements of the enterprise 
but on the number employed. Hence under-capitalization, from the 
start, was common. 
Second, it was not uncommon for the source company's assets to be 
purchased at a value considerably below what they would be worth in 
the context of a viable business. Once a SAL was trading however, it 
would wish to value the assets more realistically to provide security 
for additional loans. Unfortunately, to do this left the SAL liable 
to increased tax, in line with the usual provisions of Company law. 
Third, in the early years the procedure for incorporating SALs was 
through the issuing of new shares and their sale to the workforce. 
This had the effect of underwriting the company's debts to Social 
Security and tax agencies, which were still carried by the re-
structured enterprise. More recently incorporated SALs form a 
separate company which purchases the trading activities of the source 
company - and the source company then goes into liquidation. The work-
force thus acquires the assets of the company but not its debts. This 
method of SAL incorporation is known as the 'Catalonian path' and 
since its development some of the older SALs have been allowed to 
overcome their difficulties by cancelling their debts to the Social 
Security and Tax agencies. 
Furthermore, the 'Catalonian Path' has given rise to the creation of 
the so-called re-SAL, that is, the dissolution of a SAL as a result of 
the bankruptcy of the company, followed immediately by the creation of 
a new SAL. This can happen if the workers are owed wages by their com-
pany. This means that legally they have preference over other credit. 
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tors with respect to the assets of the company - which they then use 
to set up the new SAL. 
3.3. Survival rates 
An important number of re-SALs have been created from the SALs set up 
in the period 1976-1981. This creates problems in estimating the 
number of failures of SALs during the quoted period because legally 
the re-SAL is another enterprise, although most of its assets and 
workers come from the former one. If the re-SALs are not considered 
as new enterprises then those closely associated with the SALs esti-
mate that 50% of SALs formed during the period 1976-1981 have 
survived. 
Since 1981 an estimated 70% are surviving despite the increasingly 
severe economic trends mentioned above. This improvement if it per-
sists can be put down to two factors: 
o the improved support provided by the Ministry of Labour. Apart 
from the revision, and eventual replacement, of the FNPT scheme, 
already described, the Ministry has developed additional measures 
to subsidise the recruitment of general managers for SALs, and to 
subsidise the preparation of feasibility studies. Hence the work-
force is now able to prepare and carry through the resuce of a 
firm on the basis of a more professional evaluation of the 
possibilities. 
o the formation of the SAL federations which provide an increasingly 
important source of support and advice. 
Overall, then, the picture is one of rapid change which, along with 
the absence of reliable information, makes the evaluation of the SALs 
performance very difficult. On the one hand, the SALs do appear to be 
surviving despite the difficult circumstances in which they arise. 
Indeed, their survival rates are probably comparable with those for 
other small and medium-sized enterprises. On the other hand, the 
position of many SALs is still thought to be precarious, especially in 
the face of increased competition. 
4. Prospects for the SALs 
This section considers briefly the attitudes of other parties towards 
the SALs, and some current trends developments that are likely to 
influence the development of the SALs. 
4.1 Attitudes of other bodies towards the SALs 
4.1.1 Trade Unions. 
Initially (between, say, 1975 and 1981) the attitude of the main trade 
unions - the UGT and CCOO, as well as ELA-SIV in the Basque Country -
was to totally reject the policy which allowed the' formation of SALs. 
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Trade unions felt that the formation of SALs entailed the transfer of 
an increasingly heavy responsibility to workers during an economic 
slump. If the company purchased by workers was subsequently forced to 
close, the workers could not join together to resist the closure since 
it would be seen as their own failure. At times, too, the SAL policy 
was seen as an attempt by the government to divide workers and put an 
end to the socio-political problem of worker unity when a medium-sized 
enterprise is closed. However these attitudes were not always shared 
by trade union members. 
The Trade Unions also had complaints about the way SALs were run. 
Often there were confrontations between trade unions and the workers 
who created SALs, since some of the latter were requesting backpay 
owed them in order to leave the company. In many cases, too, there 
have been confrontations between workers on the Company Committee and 
management reflecting continuing tensions in the labour relationship. 
Nevertheless the CCOO Confederal Congress held in 1982 entailed a 
change in the attitude of this union toward the SALs, in which they 
were shortly joined by the UGT. Hence nowadays, their attitude is 
favourable, but they have no clearcut policy: their position is basi-
cally pragmatic - to evaluate each case on its merits. 
4.1.2 Employers' organizations 
These organizations have always rejected the SALs. In their view the 
failure of an enterprise also means the failure of the workers and 
hence a WTO is misconceived. In addition employers think that the 
failure of an entrepreneur mainly results from: 
Legal difficulties in cutting down the company workforce. 
The high cost of workforce reductions, the redundancy payments that 
firms must make amount to 45 days salary for each year on the com-
pany payroll. 
The high cost of Social Security (27 - 32% of salary), the highest 
rate in Europe, which makes companies less competitive. 
Therefore, the justification of SALs as a policy aimed toward creating 
jobs is not accepted by employers who have other priorities for such 
purposes : 
Making firms more competitive and the labour market more flexible by 
reducing the cost of dismissals. 
Reducing of employer's contributions to Social Security. 
In spite of the above, some small companies have become SALs on the 
employers' initiative. The employer has proposed that workers 
purchase shares through loans granted by the FNPT, because this was 
the only way he could find to obtain finance after, commercial banks 
had refused loans directed towards maintaining operations. 
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4.1.3 The Co-operative Federations 
Although the worker's co-operative movement shares some common 
interests and perspectives with the SALs, the relatinship between the 
two groupings is characterised by considerable mistrust. At one 
level, the co-operative federations criticise the SALs on ideological 
grounds. Thus, it is argued that the SALs preserve the structure of 
capitalist enterprise: the distribution of at least 51% of the shares 
among SAL worker-owners is no guarantee that in practice they will 
control the business, since external shareholders can act in such a 
manner as to control some of the worker-owners and consequently the 
company's Board of Directors. For the co-operative federations, 
therefore, the SALs are only justifiable when they are formed as a 
step towards conversion into a workers' co-operative. 
However the attitude of the co-operative federations must also reflect 
some more pragmatic considerations. Both the SALs and the co-
operatives receive public funds. In both cases these are administered 
from the General Office of Labour Co-operatives and Companies within 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. As a result, there is a 
problem of fund distribution: an improvement in the allocations for 
SALs would be detrimental to co-operatives, and viceversa. 
4.2 Consolidation and new trends 
Although SALs were the outcome of a national policy, the continuing 
economic slump has driven them to become organized in federations 
within those areas in which they are concentrated. The first of these 
was FESALC, the Catalonian federation set up in 1981. Later, ASLE, 
ANEL and ASATA were formed, being the SAL (FESAL) federations of the 
Basque Country, Navarre and Asturias, respectively. More recently 
ASALMA, the federation for Madrid, has been formed. These federa-
tions, although obtaining a part of their financing through contribu-
tions from their SALs, are supported by public funds granted by the 
Ministry of Labour. 
These federations are an important development in allowing the con-
solidation of SALs. They advise associated companies on their con-
tacts with the government, explaining the various schemes available. 
They also provide SALs with negotiating leverage with the government 
in regard to common problems they could not resolve on an individual 
basis. 
Another aspect of SAL consolidation is their political support. There 
is now talk of the SALs providing Spain with 'the socialism of the 
21st century'. The management committee of FESALC (the Catalonian 
Federation) is linked to the left political parties and the nomination 
of candidates to FESALC management positions undergoes preliminary 
negotiations with political parties. 
Overall, it appears that SAL consolidation is a fact, and in rural 
areas (particularly Andalusia) the maintenance of industrial companies 
is not only a matter of saving jobs. It has prevented the dein-
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dustrialization of the area, by maintaining certain industrial capaci-
ties that otherwise would have disappeared with the company. 
Moreover, the formation of the SAL federations and recent measures to 
support enterprise creation (particularly the right to capitalise 
unemployment benefit) have meant that the SAL phenomenon is no longer 
based entirely on WTOs. Large numbers of new enterprises are being 
created using the SAL framework - one source at the Ministry of Labour 
has suggested that three SALs are registered each day. A provisional 
report by FESALC in 1986 suggested that these SALs are being formed 
mainly in the service sector and are, understandably, rather smaller, 
withless than 15 workers on average. Nevertheless, this is another 
indication that the SALs are likely to become an established and 
significant in the Spanish economy. 
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In 1971 following the inspirational example of Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders, over 100 factory sit-ins and work-ins took place in the 
United Kingdom. One of these, in Norfolk, led to the formation of 
Fakenham Enterprises - the first in the recent wave of WTO. Nine 
women, made redundant when a medium sized shoe company closed a small 
branch factory, set up their own cooperative. With considerable 
financial help and advice from Scott Bader (the largest worker co-op 
in the UK) and others, they grew to a peak of 30 women and worked for 
several years making parts of shoes and other leather goods (1). 
Then in 1974 Tony Benn became Secretary of State for Industry. 
Against the advice of his civil servants he provided Government 
finance for three of the major sit-ins to set up as cooperatives. The 
Scottish Daily News lasted only six months. But Kirkby Manufacturing 
and Engineering Ltd continued with 750 workers till it closed in May 
1979; and Triumph Meriden struggled on, employing over 400 people, 
even longer (2). 
These 'Benn coops' were repeatedly attacked in the media. As a result 
they are usually dubbed failures, a waste of Government money, or not 
'proper' coops. But they suffered from seriously inadequate 
financing, and insufficient preparation for organizing cooperatively 
on a large scale. In the circumstances it can be considered a major 
achievement that so many jobs were preserved for so long. Although 
trade union attitudes are still influenced by this experience there 
are clear lessons from the 'Benn coops': for example, it takes time, 
specialist skills, finance and planning with all those involved, to 
make it work, before and after restructuring; the reasons for com-
pany's failure need to be closely examined; and usually only part of 
a business can be saved. 
Since then, there has been a steady trickle of smaller ' rescue' and 
'phoenix' WTOs', these have been less overtly political than the Benn 
Coops, have received no national state funds (or support) and many 
have not received local funds, yet their total now stands at about 90. 
Around 70 of these are still trading. Appendix I provides a list of 
those for which some information is available. In contrast to 
problems of the 'Benn co-operatives' which were widely publicised, the 
greatly improved performance of WTO co-ops since then has gone largely 
unnoticed. 
This quiet development of the WTO phenomenon has to be understood 
first, in relation to the broader political and economic context 
(outlined in the next section); and second, in relation to the growth 
of the worker co-operative sector and its improved standing in the 
labour movement. In 1970 there were only about 30 worker coops, 
mainly long established businesses formed at the turn of the century. 
It is only in the past few years that there has been a substantial 
rise in numbers, from about 300 worker coops in 1980 to 600 in 1982 
and about 1000 by the end of 1985. Though WTO numerically are a small 
proportion of all coops formed, because of their higher capitalisation 
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and greater number of workers, they are a more significant part of the 
coop movement. This big upsurge in 1983 and 1984 was of very small 
"new start" co-ops. This rapid development was greatly facilitated by 
the creation of numerous local Co-operative Support Organizations 
(CSOs). While most of the effort of CSOs has been directed towards 
'new-start' co-ops, it is clear that they have also played a signifi-
cant role in relation to many WTOs, particularly the more established 
CSOs. In addition, during this period a fitful re-appraisal of the 
co-operative option within the Trade Union movement was taking place -
both a cause and an effect of local TU Involvement in WTO and other 
co-ops. These two developments provide the focus for much of the 
discussion in section 3 which considers the roles of external actors 
in WTOs. 
Another way in which the environment has become somewhat more 
favourable for WTOs in the last ten years is in relation to legal 
questions. A number of standard legal frameworks now exist within 
which a WTO co-operative may be readily constituted. Most have a 
collective ownership structure with financial structures that have 
nominal individual equity, and almost all of the finance provided 
through loans; this tends to produce serious problems in their gearing 
ratios (low equity/high loan); in their financial demands on workers, 
and in their limited access to outside finance (4). In general, out-
side shareholding is not allowed, and members have to make substantial 
personal contributions - either immediately, or through low wages and 
the accumulation of retained earnings - if they are to attract signi-
ficant amounts of external loan capital (which, of course, may not be 
forthcoming). 
Only very recently have people begun to address this issue - some 
people are investigating the possibility of making use of non-voting 
preference shares, which would be taken up by sympathetic investors 
such as local government or the local community; debentures are being 
issued to increase co-operative loan funds, the US originated Employee 
Stock Ownership Pians (ESOPS) are being actively promoted, and despite 
opposition from most sections of the coop movement model rules, have 
been drawn up for Equity Participation Cooperatives (EPC) - a tran-
sitional form of co-operative that allows external shareholding (and 
external representation on the board). There is also growing pressure 
to liberalise banking restrictions. However, so far there is very 
little experience of any of these schemes. 
In any event, access to venture capital is impossible under most 
cooperatives legal structures, and WTO generally rely on loans and 
members' own finances. 
Overall, the support networks for co-operatives have developed con-
siderably over the last 10 years, raising the visibility of WTOs and 
improving their prospects. Nevertheless, a closer examination of the 
experience of WTO to date (in section 4 and in the case studies in 
Appendix 3) demonstrates that these networks are highly localised and 
that a number of important issues still need to be addressed. 
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2 Political and Economic Context 
2.1 Attitudes of the main political parties. 
Cooperatives attract support from political parties for different 
reasons. The Conservative party is largely indifferent: in the con-
text of employment creation they may praise them as a form of self-
help, but in general they are treated as another form of small 
business, and supported so long as they do not require state support 
and so long as they have not challenged conventional industrial rela-
tions practices through illegal actions such as sit-ins. Opposition 
to co-operatives within the Conservative Party arises from the per-
ceived folly of expecting workers to be able to manage, and in general 
conservatives prefer to extend the 'property owning/share owning 
democracy' through employee shareholding schemes that do not have any 
effect on the system of management. 
As far as WTO are concerned, conservatives are against subsidies to 
prevent business failures, and since they now have a stronger belief 
in market forces than earlier conservative governments, they are less 
susceptible to political pressure to intervene to preserve employment. 
Hence the Bradley and Gelb thesis - that judicious support for WTO co-
ops provides an economically acceptable alternative to other forms of 
intervention in cases where some state action is politically necessary 
(3) - lacks relevance for them. (Interestingly, right wing members of 
the business world may agree with Bradley and Gelb: recently Rupert 
Murdoch offeredhis sacked striking print workers their old printing 
presses to produce a labour movement newspaper as a worker 
cooperative.) 
The attitude of the Liberal/SDP Alliance is well formulated but since 
their rise in popularity is so recent there is less evidence of prac-
tical commitment. However it is clear that they see coops as recon-
ciling the interests of labour and capital and possibly reducing the 
strength of (or need for) trade unions. Their firm belief in the 
market is tempered by old fashioned liberal democratic values and a 
community orientation; this renders them more open to the political 
conflicts that Bradley 6e Gelb suggest would be resolved through the 
WTO option. The sources of opposition to coops and WTO are unclear, 
though they may derive from a belief in the greater efficiency of tra-
ditional labour market and industrial development policies. 
The Labour party's position has become more positive after the setback 
of the failures of the Benn coops. The growth of coops in the '80s was 
largely due to the work of local labour movement activists in 
establishing a network of state funded coop support organisations 
(CSOs). The mainstream Labour party bases its support for coops on 
the egalitarianism of coops, their organisational form (where the 
workers own the means of production), and especially their policy 
relevance (and publicity value) for creating jobs. To the extent that 
the left of the Labour party supports co-ops, it is as a route to 
'workers' control' and a socialist economy. Opposition stems from two 
sources; the 'hard' left who are still wedded to paternalistic state 
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socialism and the rhetoric of nationalisation; and sections of the 
mainstream who view co-operatives as islands of socialism in a sea of 
capitalism, and doomed to degenerate. 
2.2 Economic trends and policies. 
The government's monetarist policies, the world recession, an over-
valued exchange rate, and new technology have resulted in massive eco-
nomic restructuring. The collapse of manufacturing industry has been 
most apparent in the North, on Merseyside and in the Midlands. Growth 
of new sectors has taken place primarily in the South and outside 
metropolitan areas (excepting the development of new commercial 
services). 
The UK official unemployment rate is currently between 14 and 15%. 
There are considerable regional disparities with certain regions 
(North, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, West Midlands, Merseyside) 
suffering far more than the South. In addition unskilled workers 
suffer more, particularly in inner city areas, and if they are young 
and black. 
Traditionally there have been a range of policies and financial provi-
sions to help redress imbalances in regional industrial development. 
Such policies are directed mainly towards large and medium size firms, 
- providing investment, tax and rent subsidies to move into an area -
and are generally thought to have produced very limited benefits. The 
latest measures of this type - the creation of 'Enterprise Zones' - do 
not appear noticably more successful. However WTOs are sometimes able 
to take advantage of these measures - for example the one Sewing Co-
operative was set up in an Enterprise Zone established after the clo-
sure of a major steel works. 
As regards labour market management, more extensive efforts are now 
being made to provide industrial training and retraining. However, the 
infrastructure has been savaged and now lags further behind 
many other European countries and such provision is of limited value 
without either jobs in the local area, or opportunities for labour 
mobility. The former requires a far more effective regional policy, 
while the latter would require very positive measures to counter well-
established trends in the housing market which have substantially 
restricted the mobility of ordinary workers (i.e. the stock of public 
housing - and hence the possibility for transfers - is being reduced 
through privatization; tenant protection legislation has reduced the 
supply of private sector rented accommodation; a very substantial and 
increasing differential exists between house prices in the north and 
in the south of the country). 
Overall, the development of effective and co-ordinated regional deve-
lopment, housing, retraining and mobility policies is an enormous task 
that has never been successfully addressed even by more interven-
tionist governments. But the considerable inadequacy of current 
policy has been a major factor in developing and reinforcing extreme 
regional disprioties of jobs. The result is a lot of high paid jobs 
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in the South pushing up house prices, increasing labour market 
inefficiencies/inflexibility, and the reverse situation elsewhere. 
This increases demand for jobs in peoples own communities and con-
sequently favours WTOs. The only direct benefit of these national 
policies for WTOs has been the occasional use of training provisions 
(e.g. MSC support for training initiatives at the Lettering Centre). 
It is in this general context that Local Authorities (local 
state), especially in the north, have taken up the challenge of high 
unemployment by developing a range of local economic initiatives 
including enterprise boards and coop development agencies, thereby 
creating a more supportive environment for WTOs. 
Finally, it should be emphasised that the UK small firm sector is the 
smallest in Europe - this is due partly to the concentrated nature of 
the economy (limiting market entry prospects), and partly to the 
nature of UK financial institutions which are strongly oriented to 
institutional investors and overseas capital markets. The result has 
been a shortage of venture capital, a conservative banking attitude to 
small firms, and a reluctance to go beyond short term secured loans. 
This is currently changing dramatically but the effects are felt 
almost exclusively by larger small firms and medium size firms. 
3. The Role of External Actors in WTO 
3.1 Local Government 
Recent years have seen a great variety of policy initiatives by local 
governments to promote industrial development and create jobs. The 
measures adopted range from conventional subsidies on rents and 
reduced local rates (taxes), to more innovative local economic ini-
tiatives such as those pursued by the metropolitan county councils 
where direct intervention in the local economy was attempted. The 
Greater London Enterprise Board created by the Greater London Council 
is an example of these more interventionist measures. Besides direct 
investment in coops, it has backed initiatives for coops in strategic 
industrial sectors, promoted joint marketing initiatives, and set up a 
subsidiary organization (the London Co-operative Enterprise Board) to 
provide financial and other support for co-operatives. Similar 
Enterprise Boards were created by other metropolitan county councils 
and some of this infrastructure remains even though these particular 
councils have since been abolished. 
Local Government support for co-ops and WTOs has also been provided in 
two other ways. Either the Local Government has funded a local and 
formally autonomous, Co-operative Support Organization (see next sec-
tion) or it has included co-operative promotion in the activities of 
economic development departments. In the latter cases the scale of 
activity varies considerably, but assistance in obtaining premises, 
small start-up grants, low-interest loans and some advisory support 
have variously been provided Appendix 2 provides more detailed infor-
mation on the financial provision for co-operative support by local 
authorities. 
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It is clear that WTO have tended to benefit more from the initiatives 
of the major enterprise boards than from other forms of direct local 
government support, not least because of the greater resources 
available to the enterprise boards. For example, GLEB was prepared to 
finance strategic investment that enabled Lithosphère (See Appendix 
3), several years after it became a WTO, to establish itself in a much 
more profitable segment of the market. Nevertheless, in either case 
two problems have often arisen. First, there has been a tendency to 
use coops to help meet the social objectives of the local government 
while insisting that they compete openly in the market. For example, 
the implications of equal opportunity policies (regarding race and 
gender) and the aim of rehabilitating disadvantaged groups into the 
labour market have not always been considered in terms of appropriate 
training provision and adequate financial support. 
Secondly,the procedures for appraisal of new business proposals, and 
for providing assistance to them, have often been inappropriate or 
inadequate. This has happened for a number of reasons - the second-
ment of local government staff (without appropriate skills and with 
little or no retraining) to newly created or expanding Economic 
Development Departments; the failure to recognise that new procedures 
(e.g. in relation to financial approval) were required to match the 
new tasks being undertaken; the overloading of internal processes due 
to understaf fing and the high level of applications leads to a 
bureaucratisation of provisions that runs counter to the quick 
integrated response required for WTOs. 
Overall, however, the capacity of local authorities (or their 
enterprise boards) to support co-ops and other local economic ini-
tiatives seems to be steadily increasing, and it can be expected that 
WTO initiatives will benefit in consequence, even if the particular 
requirements of WTO are not normally given particular attention or 
priority. 
3.2 Co-op Support Organisations 
Local activists, particularly from the labour movement and community 
groups, have been the major force in setting up cooperative support 
organisations. (Many but by no means all of these CSOs are formally 
autonomous and are called local Co-operative Development Agencies 
(CDAs)) others are part of local state machinery. The first of these, 
The Scottish Cooperative Development Committee (SCDC), was formed in 
1976. Since then over a hundred local CSO have been set up, about 
half of which have obtained money to employ development workers. Some 
CSOs have also been allocated resources to provide comparatively cheap 
loans to co-operative. (However the sums involved are generally 
limited - see Appendix 2 for details). Such developments have mainly 
occurred in inner city areas, metropolitan counties and other Labour 
Party controlled areas where in some cases they form part of alter-
native local economic strategies. However, CSOs have also received 
support at a local level from Conservative, Social Democratic and 
Liberal councils. 
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CSO workers generally target their efforts at the unemployed by 
creating small new co-ops ("new starts") and assisting them through 
the crucial early years, many also give priority to disadvantaged 
groups such as women and ethnic minorities. They favour an in-depth, 
participative ("bottom up") approach towards helping groups of 
unemployed people form co-ops (rather than a more distant, 'expert 
advisor' or directive role; or taking a lead themselves in preparing 
new ventures). As a result a fairly widespread network for creating 
co-ops now exists and it is clear (4) that the increase in the number 
of co-ops has been greatest in areas served by local CSOs - even if 
many of these new co-ops remain small and economically vulnerable for 
obvious reasons. 
Most of the more recent cases of WTOs have been formed with some 
assistance from CSOs, though this forms a relatively small part of 
their overall workload. In a survey of Coop Support organisations in 
1984 (5) only three had more than 2 WTO cooperatives in their area: 
these were the Scottish Cooperative Development Committee (SCDC), 
Sheffield Cooperative Development Agency CDA and Northern Region CDA 
(NRCDA). One reason for this limited involvement of CSOs in WTO is 
obviously the limited number of occasions where a workforce considers 
the WTO option and seeks assistance. But as Cairns Campbell, a highly 
experienced CSO worker, has suggested on the basis of his own 
experience, the issues surrounding WTO can appear very formidable. 
This, and fear of failure with bad publicity similar to that which 
surrounded the failure of 'rescue' cooperative such as KME and 
Scottish Daily News, has probably put off many development workers 
from actively promoting rescue co-operatives. In addition some of the 
development workers we surveyed were concerned about whether it would 
be possible to develop cooperative working in such difficult cir-
cumstances, and felt that there was a danger that 'rescue' cooperati-
ves would be too dependent on them for their survival. However, when 
development workers were asked the priority they would, hypohetically, 
give to various types of potential cooperative, 17 out of 25 gave 
first or second priority to "helping a group of 80 workers in a rescue 
situation". This suggests that more CSOs may be willing to get 
involved with 'rescue' co-operatives in the future. 
Sheffield and SCDC have deliberately tried to support WTO cooperati-
ves. Both have promoted the idea to trade union leaders as a strategy 
for dealing with threatened business closures if more traditional 
methods of defence fail. In particular, Sheffield has tried to deve-
lop close relations with trade unions, and gives unemployed workers 
with traditional local skills and 'rescue' or 'phoenix'* cooperatives 
very high priority. The Scottish Co-operative Development Committee 
has also promoted the idea to the Scottish Development Authority, and 
to local government, so that several of these bodies now frequently 
contract SCDC to investigate the scope for a WTO whenever the idea is 
raised in their area (see Appendix 3 for more information on the SCDC 
strategy towards WTO). 
*A phoenix is a WTO that requires far more restructuring and 
scaling down than a rescue. 
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Experience in Scotland and Sheffield suggests that working to form WTO 
cooperatives presents the development worker with additional problems 
and constraints to those found with 'new starts'. It requires a dif-
ferent process of development. In Sheffield for instance several 
rescue attempts have failed because the CDA had inadequate warning and 
was unable to get the cooperative organised before the liquidator sold 
valuable assets. In addition setting up 'rescue' or 'phoenix' 
cooperatives may involve substantial and complex negotiations with the 
owners of the business, or the liquidator, over the assets that the 
new cooperative would need. External finance also has to be nego-
tiated, and for large 'rescues' or 'phoenixes' this can be very 
substantial. As well as the problems of trying to identify and plan a 
viable business, the development officer also has to introduce 
cooperative working practices within a very short period of time. 
However, with larger WTO he or she has to work more through workers' 
leaders and representatives than with the group of workers as a whole. 
Thus the shortage of time, and the large size of the cooperative, may 
mean that the development worker has to be much more directive in 
setting up the cooperative than he or she would in 'bottom-up' deve-
lopment work with a small new cooperative. 
In summary, rescue and phoenix cooperatives, particularly if they are 
large, can be very demanding in terms of the development workers' time 
and skills and they represent a concentration of risk (political as 
well as financial) in comparison to work with 'new start' co-
operatives. The experience to date has highlighted several weaknesses 
of existing CSO support for rescues. They tend to be small agencies; 
and their method of development work is intensive, local and medium 
term, designed for creating small 'new starts'. In consequence, they 
lack resources of staff, expert advice and finance to assist large WTO 
co-ops that have to be set up fast. 
3.3 Trade Unions. 
For many years the trade unions were overwhelmingly indifferent or 
suspicious towards co-operatives and WTO. Such attitudes are still 
widespread but in recent years the questions raised by these initiati-
ves have received much more attention and it is clear that attitudes 
are now changing. Three large Unions (the AUEW, TGWU and GMBATU) have 
produced policy statements supporting co-operatives under appropriate 
conditions - with 'new starts' receiving a stronger endorsement than 
WTO. The first two of these unions have special branches in London 
for workers in co-operatives - a development that would have been 
practically unthinkable even five years ago. In addition the Trade 
Union Congress (TUC - federal organization of Trade Unions in the UK) 
has produced a policy statement, though its position is more cautious. 
Its main reservations are: 
- low wages undermining other TUC wage agreements 
- recognition of the need to restructure the business (and not 
save all the jobs) 
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- recognition of the need to acquire sound financial/marketing 
information on the business 
- a wariness of parent companies trying to sell unprofitable com-
panies that have no 'turnaround' prospects 
- possible loss of redundancy payments and other rights. 
- a concern that coops may be used as a strategy to ease the path 
of privatisation; they discourage using the coop option in 
such situations, even as a last resort. 
However, the statement did recognise the importance of working with 
co-operative support organizations in promoting WTO and other co-
opérât i ves. 
Such policy statements are more a reflection of changing attitudes and 
the continuing debate than an indication of current Trade Union acti-
vity. In practice there are considerable differences both between 
unions, and within unions, with the attitudes and policies at national 
level tending to be more conservative than at district/regional level. 
This is especially clear where unemployment and local economic ini-
tiatives have stimulated new thinking in particular localities - for 
example, the involvement of AUEW and TASS in co-operatives and WTO in 
Sheffield. 
A steadily increasing number of occasions of Union involvement with 
co-operatives and WTO has been both cause and effect of these changing 
attitudes and policies. However the very limited experience of WTO 
among Trade Unionists favourably disposed towards them has meant that 
the results have been mixed, with many mistakes being made. Some of 
the more notable occasions of Trade Union involvement with WTO have 
been: 
o the three 'Benn' coops (Formed in 1974) are still prominent in 
the minds of many trade unionists, who may not have drawn 
appropriate conclusions; such very large scale WTO are no 
longer typical. 
o The Transport and General Workers Union was closely involved 
with the "Tauntcn Shirt Coop" which eventually failed. This 
failure exemplifies many of the classic traps Trade Unions may 
fall into in a WTO - for example the centralisation of 
control in a manager/shop steward alliance to preserve the 
Trade Union investment at the expense of member involvement; 
inadequate business skills (in par ticularly, in this case, 
marketing). 
o The experience of the Wales TUC in setting up a Co-operative 
Development and Training Centre. This was originally intended 
for 'new starts' and was not in favour of WTOs. However it 
became involved with them as a result of local trade union 
pressure and this is now an accepted part of its work -indeed, 
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it has a training programme for local officials aimed at pre-
paring them to be able to support WTO. This whole initiative 
and its subsequent development may provide important lessons 
not just on the way attitudes can be expected to change as a 
result of greater involvement, but also on the appropriate 
means for providing Trade Union support: the creation of a 
specialist body provides Trade Union legitimacy and resources 
for rescues in a competent manner, while maintaining some 
distance between their dominant concern for job preservation on 
the one hand, and the need for difficult economic decisions on 
the other. 
A detailed study of trade union attitudes towards, and involvement in, 
WTO on Merseyside (6) provides a picture that is probably typical of 
more conservative trade union attitudes in many other parts of the 
country. The views and experience of local trade union officials 
regarding co-operatives were generally limited and there were clear 
differences between the unions in their views due to different cir-
cumstances (public employees, large business orientation, etc). In 
addition, views were not consistent between different officials in the 
same unions. In general, however, co-operatives were simply not an 
issue - 50% of trade union members were in public employment with a 
strong commitment to public ownership and nationalisation; despite 
increasing privatisation it is such an emotional issue that WTOs are 
rarely considered. Co-operatives were commonly regarded as a distrac-
tion from 'major problems.' The officials had a firm belief in the 
value of collective bargaining (which many of them hoped could be 
extended to include additional decision areas) and they doubted that 
collective bargaining could be effectively pursued within a co-
operative framework. There appeared to be an inverse relationship 
between strength of belief in collective bargaining and degree of sup-
port for co-operatives. 
Whether or not one shares the officials preference for 'adversary 
democracy' (i.e. collective bargaining) over co-operative democracy, 
there are clearly problems over how and to what extent the two can be 
combined. Scott Bader, Britain's largest worker co-operative, bought 
from another company a smaller and unprofitable factory on Merseyside 
with a strongly unionised workforce displaying traditionally defensive 
and oppositional attitudes. The attempt to run it as a co-operative 
and to improve its economic performance foundered on just this clash 
over different cultures and traditions of industrial democracy, and 
eventually Scott Bader closed the factory. In general, an appre-
ciation of the commitment of British Trade Unionists to 'collective 
bargaining' is essential for an understanding of the debate on co-
operatives within Trade Unions. For example, it helps to explain the 
fact that Trade Union attitudes towards management buy-outs - of which 
there have been many in the U.K. - have been generally favourable ( 
(7) at the same time as they have tended to ignore WTO. 
The officials' attitude to WTO was also affected by much more pragma-
tic considerations: they were under considerable time pressures with 
large work loads. Unionisation in any small firm is problematic, but 
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the effort/return ratio for coops was not seen as worthwhile, par-
ticularly since the learning required for this new strategy was con-
siderable, the risk of failure significant, and the costs of failure 
substantial. 
Despite the generally negative or indifferent attitudes, WTOs were 
still considered as an option in the face of plant or company clo-
sures. And although local officials usually had to operate in isola-
tion without national union guidelines, and without adequate resources 
and skills to carry out the feasibility studies, and the negotiations 
for a takeover, once they became seriously involved the experience was 
often fruitful, for example: 
o USDAW negotiated with the large supermarket chain Fine Fare over 
their divestment of several small retail stores. Eventually 3 
coops were set up and Fine Fare gave the coops better terms than 
they offered for stores divested to management buyouts. 
o TGWU negotiated with Dunlop in setting up Bootle Co-operative 
Instailations 
o NGA were prominent in setting up Parados Graphics Co-operative 
o TGWU gave considerable support to the setting up of Liverpool 
Boatment Ltd to carry out dockwork. 
Overall, therefore, Trade Union attitudes towards WTO are changing with 
considerable variations within and between unions, and in different 
parts of the country. In general, it appears that the more direct 
experience of WTO that Trade Unionists have, the more positive their 
attitudes tend to be - but this is not always the case. The per-
ceived advantages and disadvantages of WTO for trade unions are sum-
marised in Table 1. 
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ADVANTAGES AND HOPES 
o Strategy against closures 
o Strategy against unemployment 
o Extension of Industrial Democracy 
(Challenge to managerial perogatives) 
o Extension of work reform 
o Extension of Labour movement presence in small firm sector 
DISADVANTAGES AND FEARS 
o Low wages and poor terms and conditions 
o Possible undercutting of prices in conventional firms (and con-
sequent threat to other jobs) 
o Only some jobs saved 
o Clash with traditional principles - unfamiliar strategy demanding 
new skills 
o Financial risk - where loans are made 
o May undermine opposition to privatisation 
o Incompatible with occupational base of trade unions 
o Greater administrative problems of organising in small 
firms/co-operatives. 
o Undermines collective bargaining and protection of workers 
o Cultural clashes with co-op movement - e.g. demands for reform of 
TU sexist and racist practices 
o Diversion from class struggle against capitalism 
o Collaboration with different class interests associated with co-op 
movement. 
Table 1 Principle Reasons for Trade Unionists support or rejecting an 
involvement with WTO and co-operatives. 
3.4 Co-operative Movement 
The worker co-operative sector in the UK does not have strong social 
or commercial links with the other more strongly developed sectors of 
the co-operative movement. The (national) Co-operative Development 
Agency (CDA) set up by an Act of Parliament in 1978, is making some 
efforts to promote inter-sectoral collaboration, but this is a long-
term project. The CDA itself is only loosely linked to the rest of the 
co-operative movement and its existence may actually have made it more 
difficult for the worker co-operative sector to secure funds for its 
own infrastructure, (i.e. co-op owned and controlled). 
The Industrial Common Ownership Movement (ICOM) is the national member 
organization of the worker co-operative sector. By comparison with 
the representative bodies in e.g. France and Italy it is very weak and 
poorly resourced. Co-operative activists and expert advisory person-
nel are generally based in co-operative support organizations or in 
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autonomous co-operatives. Nevertheless, ICOM provides an essential 
forum and source of information on developments, and it has been suc-
cessful in promoting training initiatives (for Women starting and 
working in co-operatives; for larger co-operatives) using money from 
the European Social Fund. In addition, ICOM has its own revolving 
loan fund, Industrial Common Ownership Finance (ICOF), which has built 
up considerable experience of co-operative financing even though the 
resources it has available are very limited. Finally, co-operatives 
in a few sectors are now forming federations. 
The UK workers co-operative movement exhibits a broad range of views, 
and this is certainly the case in respect of relations with Trade 
Unions. Overall there is support for Trade Unions but in practice 
many coops don't see the need for them, and may only join for soli-
darity reasons, or to help secure radical niches in the market. The 
role of shop stewards within co-operatives is unclear. The main argu-
ments expressed within the worker co-operative movement on both sides 
of the debate regarding the contribution of Trade Unions to co-
operatives are summarised in Table 2. 
FOR TRADE UNION INVOLVEMENT 
o Protection for worker interests, and in particular a safeguard 
against self exploitation (pay, terms and conditions) 
o Representation of interests of minorities or individuals 
(particularly in case of disputes) 
o Counterbalance for isolationist tendencies - closer links with 
the labour movement 
o Defence against degeneration, and in particular a check on 
managerial ism 
o Source of outside skills, finance and assistance (e.g. artibra-
tion) 
o Political support 
o Protection against unfair economic practices 
o Broaden base of appeal and support 
AGAINST TRADE UNION INVOLVEMENT 
o Workers see no need for a union 
o Undemocratic and divisive; or incompatible concept of democracy 
o Clash of cultures and class (where coop is middle class or 
alternativist) 
o Centralising and bureaucratic tendencies 
o Sexist and racist tendencies in unions 
Table 2 Views within the Worker Cooperative Movement regarding 
Trade Union involvement in worker co-operatives 
As regards WTO more specifically, the same spread of views is apparent 
- from those who welcome WTO as an opportunity to broaden rapidly the 
economic and political base of the movement (through more, and larger 
co-operatives, and closer links with the labour movement); to those 
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who are more cautious and fear the problems of 'reluctant co-
operators' and adverse publicity; through to a smaller proportion who 
see WTO as so fraught with difficulties - commercial, social and poli-
tical - that they consider them bound to compromise, discredit, and 
weaken the movement. 
So far these varying attitudes have not'threatened coop/TU collabora-
tion in setting up WTO as the financial resources available to the 
coop movement are the main constraint. However, as the movement grows 
this may change and ICOM has attempted to improve relations with Trade 
Unions through, for example, publications on Trade Unions and coops, 
and setting up a TU sub-committee. 
3.5 Other Actors - Receivers and Liquidators 
Receivership is not the only route to a worker takeover, but it is the 
more difficult route, due to time reasons and the doubtful viability 
of the business. 
An official receiver is appointed on petition by a creditor or other 
party to a court if there is 'good reason' i.e. 
o the company is unable to pay its debts; 
o it has been decided and resolved in the company's meeting that the 
company should be wound up by the court; 
o if the court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that 
the company should be wound up. 
A receiver looks into the running of a business in an attempt to save 
it if he or she thinks it can be saved. A receiver can either continue 
the business or decide to close it down. Consequently negotiations 
have to be carried through fast. Creditors lower down the ranking 
order stand to lose if it's not sold as a going concern, but those 
first in the ranking order may have to be persuaded to wait whilst 
finance is raised by the workers. In the meantime other buyers 
(companies and managers) may be sought by the receiver. 
Receivers therefore have some discretion over how they choose to exer-
cise their obligations. Those appointed as receivers are usually 
qualified accountants specialising in this work and the general 
feeling is that they tend to be unsympathetic towards workers 'rescue' 
initiatives - out of a combination of rank scepticism and a desire to 
avoid unfamiliar complications. 
When a company is clearly unable to settle its debts and be preserved 
as a trading entity, it may be put into liquidation. Control then 
passes to a liquidator responsible for the sale of physical assets. 
At this stage, if the finance has been arranged, a WTO initiative may 
well be able to secure a chosen selection of the assets and start a 
'phoenix' co-operative. Staff of the Scottish Co-operative 
Development Committee consider this route, generally, to be preferable 
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to attempts for form 'rescue' co-operatives (-see Appendix 3 for more 
details of their approach). 
4 The Experience of WTOs. 
4.1 An Analysis of the Figures 
The memory of the failed Benn coops lingers on in the minds of many 
people when they think of WTOs. Yet there have been many successful 
cases during the intervening 10 years with relatively little publicity 
- over 80 rescues have been formed, many of which are doing well. 
Sectors well represented include engineering, clothing, newspapers and 
printing. 
Data on the known cases of WTO is presented in Appendix 1. The 
figures are most sensibly analysed by excluding the Benn co-
operatives. Their size (average number of workers >700, compared to 
26 in other WTOs), and circumstances of formation, make them comple-
tely a-typical, and it is hard to imagine such 'experiments' being 
repeated in the forseeable future. (See the case of the Bitteswell 
Employment Alliance in Appendix 3, for a more recent workers' ini-
tiative in the context of a large plant closure; despite the limited 
success of the BEA initiative the underlying strategy may have a great 
deal to recommend it, both economically and politically, compared with 
'Benn-style' attempts to rescue large plants.) 
Excluding the 'Benn' co-operatives, therefore, about 65 out of 85 WTO 
co-ops are surviving, 19 have failed and 1 has been privatised. The 
sparse data make it difficult to analyse these in terms of sectors. 
However, the survival rates by year of formation suggest that in com-
mon with other small business, many are economically weaker than large 
firms with a more limited life expectancy. Thus, only seven of the 
fifteen WTO co-ops formed before 1981 are still trading; whereas 19 of 
the 26 formed in 1981 and 82 have survived; and 29 of the 31 formed in 
83-84 still exist. Since the expertise in supporting WTO has deve-
loped to some extent, there is hope for improvements in later years 
particularly as we are emerging from the recession. Nevertheless, if 
these figures are compared with failure rates for small businesses 
(40% fail in 5 years) the picture is actually fairly good. 
The fact that many of the WTO co-operatives have to struggle to over-
come their origins - under-capitalised in marginal sectors - underli-
nes the importance for the co-operative movment of funding being 
available to support strategic investments in those co-operatives 
whose market position, and record of recovery and internal develop-
ment, present an opportunity for consolidation or expansion (the 
Lithosphère case in Appendix 3 illustrates what can be acheived in 
such circumstances). 
One other point is very clear from the data: the WTO co-ops that 
failed had an average of 47.5 workers; the average size of those that 
survive is 21. (Nevertheless, the variation in the size of both sur-
vivors and failures is considerable). 
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4.2 The Organizational Process of WTOs. 
Generally, WTO arise after all other options have been explored i.e. 
as a last resort. Inadequate and inaccurate information is undoub-
tedly a problem as rumours fly before a closure. There have been some 
attempts (with limited success) to set up trade union early warning 
systems to provide support agencies with sufficient time to plan and 
organise a rescue. (Trade Union rights of access to company infor-
mation are weak in the UK.) Also receivers can be obstructive - some 
of them have never even heard of coops. In general the attitude of 
the current owners can make an enormous difference - as the case of 
Lithosphère also illustrates. Paradoxically the 'last resort' atti-
tude of trade unionists increases the risk that rescues will only be 
formed in marginal situations since it is a substantial barrier to 
worker take-overs of the more viable business. First outside buyers, 
then management, are given the option to purchase, and only thereafter 
do the workers get their chance. This considerably reduces the 
prospects of organising sufficiently fast for continuous trading 
without losing suppliers and customers, as well as the more skilled 
workers. 
Where a business is viable, time is vital but where substantial 
restructuring and reduction of the workforce is required than a delay 
can be functional in allowing a period of self selection, retraining 
for new skills and cooperative working, and new product development, 
as well as the development of commitment. 
The shop stewards are usually key figures particularly in the area of 
organising and campaigning. Their knowledge of the production process 
and of the work of individuals can also be invaluable, and they may 
have had to acquire financial expertise in their negotiating work. 
However they do seem to lack other managerial skills and knowledge, 
particularly in marketing. In both multi-union and single union 
plants the internal union structure will often be the organising 
vehicle for a rescue. External organising will usually be through a 
CSO often with close collaboration of the local state and labour move-
ment activists (including local state democratic representatives). 
A close working relationship between shop stewards and cooperative 
development workers is important from an early stage but an 
appropriate division of roles between the two has yet to emerge. 
Similarly, further work is required to develop criteria and tools for 
assessing rapidly which rescue candidates have the better changes of 
succeeding so that assistance can be concentrated there; and what 
business restructuring strategies and styles are most appropriate to 
cooperatives . 
Two crucial problems that have been noted repeatedly in UK rescues are 
the development of sound management and the development of democratic 
decision-making. 
Management skills tend to be lacking either because management has 
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left, or because important management activities were undertaken in 
head office rather than at plant level. One experienced consultant to 
WTO believes that where a market and the productive capacity are 
available the absence of a suitable general manager or management team 
is the commonest single obstacle to achieving a WTO. Even if members 
of the workforce have the potential to undertake these functions they 
may lack the confidence, or they may need to work alongside an 
experienced manager initially. Often, however, the shortage of mana-
gement skills is accentuated because managerial activity is under-
valued. A chronic distrust of 'management' may arise during the 
period of deterioration of the previous business. Often this attitude 
extends to white collar work and to meetings - both are regarded as 
not being real work. The importance of these areas of work has to be 
appreciated and they have to be established as legitimate activities. 
In consequence it may take some time for a co-operative to evolve 
effective management roles and practices, in forms appropriate to the 
values of the co-operative - as the case of the Lake School of English 
in Appendix 3 illustrates. 
The second problem, the development of democratic practices within the 
co-operative, has a number of aspects. The traditional adversarial 
collective bargaining model of industrial democracy fits uneasily 
within the participative structure of a worker cooperative. The 
latter is more unitarist and requires more active participation by 
workers. The result is often a confusion over the role of shop 
stewards and a tendency for them to take on managerial roles thereby 
severely restricting the scope for active participation by worker mem-
bers. In other contexts, where managers from the former business are 
involved in the WTO, not only is there a major question over their 
competence (after all it was probably their decisions that led to the 
business failing) but there may be worker distrust of them, and the 
risk that once the co-operative is trading things may revert to the 
'old ways', with the membership no longer involved in or understanding 
the decisions that have to be made. One solution to such problems is 
for the funding body to make a programme of training for members a 
condition of funding (and to include provision for this in the loan). 
This appears to have been successful at Barnsley Metal Finishers where 
an experienced co-operative training consultant helped members of the 
co-operative evolve new forums for democratic oversight of and par-
ticipation in management (8). Also as the co-operative sector grows 
its managerial labour market will develop so that new managers are 
available to WTOs. 
It is clear that in the years since the 'Benn' Co-operative an enor-
mous amount has been learned by groups of workers and by agencies 
about slimming down a business and restructuring it on a co-operative 
basis. Compare, for example, GLEB's support of Custom Shoes in 1983, 
with its support of the Lettering Centre a year or so later: Custom 
Shoes was established under strong political pressure; most of the 
jobs in the old firm were preserved in the Co-operative; no proper 
market analysis was undertaken; the previous management was retained; 
and the time needed to achieve a turn around was underestimated. In 
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the case of The Lettering Centre the work force was initially cut back 
sharply to 10, though it rose to 15 again fairly soon; the previous 
owners were excluded from involvement and a new management team deve-
loped; a thorough study of the market was undertaken; there was no 
expectation of an early return to profitability (15 months to break 
even); resources were budgeted for training in business and co-
operative skills; an interim control structure was devised to allow 
financial supervision by GLEB. Custom Shoes collapsed, while the 
Lettering Centre now has plans for a workforce of 25. 
The problem is that the accumulation and dissemination of this exper-
tise is still extremely piecemeal. It does take place within CSO net-
works to some extent; but the insights and experience of the activist 
members themselves are an asset of great potential value for other WTO 
attempts, and one that the movement has so far been unable to utilise 
effectively. 
5. Conclusions: Some Policy Questions 
A WTO attempt must, in essence, acquire financial resources and a 
range of skills - to negotiate the rescue, plan the business, develop 
co-operative decision-making, and so on. Where, then, can it obtain 
these resources and skills? - given the lending policies of financial 
institutions, and the extremely limited supply of co-operative mana-
gers on the labour market (which means that advisory support must be 
committed over some considerable period). The main external sources 
are Trade Unions, existing Co-operatives and co-operative movement 
organizations, the local state, (enterprise boards), and Co-operative 
Support Organizations. 
While the Trade Unions have an important if still problematic role in 
WTO and they have some financial resources, they lack important 
skills. Existing co-operatives and the co-operative movement have the 
skills and experience but lack resources. The local state has resour-
ces, but in practice often lacks many of the skills. CSOs may also 
lack specialist skills, and often also lack resources. However, in 
combination, the local state and the CSOs currently represent the best 
possiblity of assisting WTOs. Their experience so far has been reaso-
nable, particularly when organised as a "specialised team" on a 
regional basis. The important question is: what could they have done 
if they were adequately resourced? 
Such a question does, however, raise the whole issue of co-operative 
financing since a simple increase in the level of resources available 
to co-operatives through the sorts of loan funds currently operating 
would not be without its difficulties. In the first place, finance 
provided by the local state is often aimed at creating as many jobs as 
possible, with the attendant risk that its use will be biased away 
from WTO towards low capital, labour-intensive 'new starts'. 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, there are important questions over 
the appropriate mix of 'equity' and loan capital (gearing) which 
already cause major problems for WTO. 
At issue, here, is the vital bar on external shareholdings in worker 
co-operatives. If coops should consider external sharenolding there 
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are increasing numbers of venture capital organisations involved in 
managment buyouts that might be a contributory source of finance for 
particular WTOs. In addition there are some sympathetic investors who 
could buy equity, such as Unity Trust - a new coop/TU investment fund. 
To be compatible with co-operative principles such shareholding would 
have to be preferential non-voting and not involve board represen-
tation. But there may be enough sympathetic investors for this to be 
possible. Note that there are implications of a particular co-
operative legal structures for the relevant form of external finance. 
For example a collective ownership structure (most UK co-operatives) 
is compatible with a system of loan finance. Substantial external 
equity would, only be possible lead to with a legal structure allowing 
greater individual shareholding to co-operative members. 
In summary, then, if more and more successful WTOs are to be achieved, 
the following issues must be addressed: 
How can WTO expertise be better promoted and utilised within sup-
port organisations (coop and local/regional state)? 
How can the experience of more effective WTO strategies (avoiding 
'last resort' efforts, shop steward management, etc) be properly 
disseminated in the Trade Union movement? 
What is the appropriate location for state support? - for example, 
should it be used to resource the coop movement's own development 
infrastructure, or administered directly by agencies of the local 
(or regional) state (e.g. enterprise boards), or through hybrid 
bodies (such as many CSOs)? 
How may learning resources and opportunities best be provided to 
develop the skills of those taking on managerial responsibilities, 
and of the membership at large, in WTOs? 
What innovations in co-operative financing can be developed to 
allow more WTO attempts to secure support and to do so with more 
appropriate capital structures? 
endix 1 !££ 
Name of Coop 
228 a 
Rescue Coop« in UK lince 1972 - it of June 1986 
Region/County CDA present 
Bardrec 
Craighton Bakery 
Fife Fashions Ltd(?) 
Fife Sewing Coop Ltd 
Grange Carpets 
Highland Holiday Boats 
lnchinnan Engineering 
Randolph Leiaurewear 
Scottish Daily News 
St. James Clock Co Ltd 
Maydovn Engineering (?) 
Cleator Hoor (?) 
Altepak Services Ltd 
Chirton Motor Services Lt 
Claremont Nursery Coop 




Northern Pattern Hakera 
Orly Company Ltd? 
Pheonix Fabrication Ltd? 
Redhead Ship Repair 
Yard Ltd 
Other (details uncertain) 
Other (details uncertain) 
Other (details uncertain) 
Wilahaw Rainwear 
Other (details uncertain) 




Procon Builders Merchants 
Traffic Systems 
Raven of Barns ley 
Barnsley Metal Finishing 
Hoyle Mill Engineering 
Manchester Cold Rollers? 
Fourwaye, Bury? 
Boot le Instai lat ions 
K.M.E 
Liverpool Boat Men 
(buyout) 
Parados Graphics 
McKenzie & Brown 
Red Dragon Stores 








New Springva Le Ltd 
Community Print 
War ley Independent News 
(Wolverhampton) 
Reel Print 





























































































































































































































































Ltd (buyout) Derbyshire 
Trio Ltd Leicestershire 
Other (details uncertairOLeiceeterehire 
Grantham Enterprises Lincolnshire 
Castle Engineering Northanta 
Ventura Northanta 
Nottingham News ( lockout jNottinghatn 
Fakenhao Enterprises Norfolk 
Other (details uncertainJNorfolk 
NO 
NO 






Pregnancy Adv Services 
(defensive conversion) 








Calvert'· North Star 
Press? 
The Lettering Centre? 
Marble Arch School 
of English 






















































CEASED(50) Clothing 1982-84? 
12 Engineering 1982? 
CEASED (180) Mnfcturing 1982-83? 
170 Services 1980 
55 Ed. Services 1984? 
CEASED(IOO) Shoes (clthg) 1983-857 
Engineering 1984? 
10(*40) Magatine 1982 












This listing is indicative, not authoritative. Some WTO will have been 
overlooked and some of those listed may be cases where the attempt at a WTO 
collapsed after a co-operative was registered, but before trading could start 
(a number of such cases have been excluded. 

















taXST MIDLANDS 1 . 
( c o v e r s . B'h.st 
Coventry , Black 
Country CDAs 2 . 
ArtOL'KT iNTEBEST RATE SCAJRCE 
'ANO MANAGEMENT 
E 1 0 0 0 0 0 
e 20000 
£ 2S000 wich 
top up each 
year 
£100000 w i t h 
top up each 




f o r f i r a t y e a r 
and ES0000 f o r 
second year 
Current ly 
40000 wi th 
annual I n c r e ­
ments o t 20000 
30000 (from 
l o t t e r y fund) 
£25000 
£S00 ,000 
Not more than 
1\ above base 
r a t « 
5 \ 
3% below 




basa r a t e 
3% balow 
b a s · r a t e 
Less than \Q\, 
rev iewed q u a r t e r l y 
not known 
not. known 
f r e e or S.l\ 
County Counc i l 
C i t y C ounc i l 
County Counc i l 
Urban Programme 
( C i t y C o u n c i l ) and 
£50000 g r a n t from 
the C ounc i l 
Greater London 
E n t e r p r i t e Board 
C i t y C ounc i l 
Urban Programm« 
(Borough C o u n c i l ) 
D i s t r i c t C ounc i l 
C i t y Counc i l 
Wost Midland 
County Counc i l 
• * 
A panel has been formod 
t · . « · «h» m x , i­h« County 
C o u n c i l and l o c a l banks 
The COA makaa recomeiand­
a t l o n s t o th« c h a i r , v i c e ­
c h a i r and t r e a t u r e r of th« 
Counc i 1 
The CDA makes recommend­
a t i o n s t o th« C i t y Counc i l 
Th« COA w o r k e r · make a 
recommendation t o th« CDA 
General C ounc i l which t a k e s 
th« d e c i s i o n 
S e p a r a t · Company Limitad 
by Guarantee w i th r e p ­
r e s e n t a t i o n from London 
c o ­ o p s 
A d m i n i s t e r e d by a f i n a n c e 
a u b ­ c o m m l t t · · of th« CDA 
w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from 
th« C o u n c i l . The d e c i s i o n 
t a k i n g body i s th« CDA 
A committee convened by ICOM 
North mak« recommendations 
t o th« Borough C ounc i l 
Admini s tered by t r u s t e e s 






Not a t 








2 . Loans a p p r a i s e d by c o ­ o p 
a f f i c e r e bf th*» C o u n c i l s 
Economic Development U n i i . 
■ — 
COMMITS 
The panal a d v i s e s t h e CDA 
CDA who c o n t r o l the fund 
The fund p r o v i d e s "pump prla:t*u ' 
Ioana of up t o £3000 . when loan 
repayments are made t h e CDA 
r e t a i n s c o n t r o l of th« funds 
g e n e r a t e d 
Th« C o u n c i l h o l d th« fund but 
tak« v e r y l i t t l e p a r t in 
d e c i s i o n making 
Grant« «ay a l s o be made tvom the 
fund ­ o f t e n l i m i t e d t o p r ç u l s e s 
d e v e l o p m e n t . Funds a r t h e l a by 
th« COA 
Th« LCEB can make l o a n s of up t o 
£ 2 5 0 0 0 . A p p l i c a t i o n s f o r l a r g e : 
amounts are r e f e r r e d t o GLEB. 
An " e n t e r p r i s e p lan" i s a g r e e d 
w i t h th« a p p l i c a n t which i s 
r e v i e w e d a n n u a l l y 
A p p l i c a t i o n s are a c c e p t e d for 
l o a n s of up t o £8000 . Larger 
l o a n s a r e p r o c e s s e d j o i n t l y 
w i t h t h e I n d u s t r y and Employ met. · 
Committee o f th« Counci l 
Funds a r« h e l d by the Co u n c i l 
Funds are h e l d by the C o u n c i l . 
S t a r t up g r a n t s and 1ο.«φ ­tua rat ­
t e e s a r e a l s o a v a i l a b l e . 
1.The fund i s a d m l n i s t e r r d by 
I n d u s t r i a l Common Ownership 
F inance f o r W««t Midlands C.C. 
2.The s e c o n d fund i s c a l l c t l the 
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Appendix 3 - Case Studies 
CASE I: Lithosphère Printing Cooperative Ltd 
Lithosphère is an example of a WTO of a successful business, it became 
a printing coop in April 1980. Prior to that it had operated as the 
1in-house' printing service for the campaigning charity War on Want. 
In 1979 the operation was adjudged 'commercial' by the Charity 
Commissioners and War on Want was inst-ucted to dispose of it. The 
department was closed and the staff of six made redundant, but the 
assets were sold to the workers, and their redundancy pay provided the 
initial working capital. It has since grown to over 30 members and 
relocated with the aid of local government and GLEB finance. Its 
substantial investment in a 4 colour press has extended its market 
from trade unions and community groups to education and publishing. 
The coop is fully unionised (NGA and SOGAT), pay is on a grade system 
with a 4% differential between grades; terms and conditions of 
employment are at least as good as union guidelines. Sales are 
expected to increase from £350,000 in the year to January 1985 to bet-
ween £660,000 and £1 million by 1986-7. 
The coop operates a management/coordination Committee comprising 
elected departmental representatives and union representatives, which 
meets monthly. 
CASE 2: Lake School of English 
Lake School of English is based in Oxford where they teach English as 
a Foreign Lanaguage (EFL). They employ five full-time teachers and a 
full-time administrator, and have just moved to smart new offices that 
they had specially converted to serve the needs of the school. The 
founder members of the co-operative all worked for the EFL department 
of a large tutorial college. In 1977 the college closed down its 
department because it was said that it was not making enough money, 
and they decided to set up their own co-operative. 
For two years they ran the business from a small office in the town 
centre, and put on their courses in an old church hall on the 
outskirts of town. Then in '81 they acquired new premises and British 
Council recognition with its scholarships. 
In the early years the job of administrator had been rotated on a 
yearly basis between the members of the co-op who were all teachers. 
Administration at Lake is a big job, and eventually the members 
decided that it would be better and more efficient if they employed a 
full-time specialist-administrator. This greatly improved efficiency. 
However the teaching staff all spend some time in the office. 
Regular meetings of the co-op take place on Friday afternoons. This 
is where the information is exchanged and decisions are made. It's 
also something of a social event as they wind down at the end of the 
week. Decisions are nearly all made by consensus. · 
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CASE 3: The Bitteswell Employment Alliance 
BEA was established by workers made redundant following the closure of 
the Bitteswell factory of British Aerospace in Spring 1983. Of the 
2000 made redundant, about 250 formed BEA with the aim of creating 
their own employment. Initially they elected a Committee, consisting 
mostly of the members of the joint staff and works shop stewards com-
mittee, then they gradually developed a suitable structure - a company 
consisting of all the individual members of BEA, organised in project 
groups while they are still unemployed. A project group aims to 
employ members in a work group and eventually to register as a co-op, 
establishing a permanent relationship with BEA through a contract of 
association. All BEA members employed in work groups (or by BEA 
itself centrally) have a workers' council to safeguard their interests 
as workers. The BEA Committee (the Company's Board of Directors) was 
made up of elected representatives from these various bodies and 
groups . 
The Coventry Co-op Development Agency first made contact with the 
Bitteswell Employment Alliance in the Summer of 1982 following the 
announced factory closure. They were introduced to the Alliance 
through Coventry Workshop and the Unit for the Development of 
Alternative Products (UDAP) to examine the potential for creating 
employment with the highly skilled redundant workforce. 
The CDA has worked with BEA providing assistance with the legal struc-
ture, fund raising, support for the managment committee, education and 
training, and business development advice to project groups. 
Numerous project groups developed promising and innovative prototypes 
(among others, Lok-a-bike based on a secure cycle locker; Community 
Aid Products, developing a variety of aids for the disabled; Powergen 
working on electronic equipment for schools; Beagas based on a gas 
detector). However, BEA drew its membership overwhelmingly from 
skilled production staff who, quite understandably, and despite the 
efforts of advisors, tended to concentrate on the engineering aspects 
of product development at the expense of more general business 
planning, and marketing in particular. It took the failure in 1985 of 
the first and most ambitious trading cooperative to emerge from BEA 
(it assembled 'Jiffy' vehicles, a light commercial vehicle kit, and 
manufactured custom-built van bodies) and also prolonged difficulties 
in moving other projects from the stage of prototypes and customer 
interest, to that of securing orders, financial support, and premises, 
to bring this home to those involved. During this period the finan-
cial support provided to BEA (mainly from the local state) was largely 
consumed, and the number of active members declined. 
Hence, although a small number of jobs have been created and efforts 
on several projects continue, BEA as a whole has not really succeeded 
in achieving its aim. Nevertheless, the BEA experience may prove 
important both for the novel strategy that it expressed, and for the 
lessons for future attempts that can be derived frpm it. 
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CASE 4: The SCDC Strategy for supporting WTO 
The Scottish Co-operative Development Committee has given priority to 
the support of WTO over a number of years and has the most extensive 
experience of this work of any of the CSOs. Its approach has three 
elements: (i) measures to obtain early contact with enterprise clo-
sures, (ii) providing assistance to the work force in considering the 
WTO option and in trying to achieve a WTO; (iii) supporting the new 
enterprise in a variety of ways after the take-over, often for a pro-
longed period. 
Apart from some general publicity and contact with Trade Union offi-
cials, SCDC has promoted the idea of WTO with a range of economic 
development officials in local government and in the Scottish 
Development Agency. These officials often hear of impending closures 
and notify SCDC when a WTO may be an option. In some cases standing 
arrangements have evolved wherby SCDC staff are contracted to investi-
gate the WTO possibilities, and then contracted to work with the work 
force if they decide to pursue the option. These arrangements operate 
informally by telephone agreement at standard rates, so that there is 
no delay. 
As regards assisting the workforce, the development worker's role 
inc ludes : 
i) Informing workers and their leaders about the cooperative option. 
This is a frank description of what they can expect - it is not a 
matter of 'selling' the idea, which may be abandoned at this 
point. 
ii) Working with potential members of the cooperative to assess the 
feasibility of the cooperative. This will involve cycling 
through the following activités in progressively greater detail: 
a) analysing why the business closed. 
b) searching for products/services for the cooperative and iden-
tifying customers. 
c) identifying whether the necessary factors of production are 
present or could be acquired. This will frequently involve 
negotiations with the previous owner, or the liquidator if the 
business has gone into liquidation. 
d) assessing the human resources of the cooperative. Identifying 
how many people the new business can employ, whether people 
have the necessary skills and commitment, and working out how 
the cooperative will be managed. 
e) working out the financial resources that the cooperative will 
need to get off the ground, and identifying ways it can be 
raised. 
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iii) On occasions, mobilising public support for the cooperative in 
order to help persuade the previous owner or other relevan;, orga-
nisations to help the cooperative. 
iv) Preparing a business plan in order to raise external finance and 
backing. 
v) If successful, helping to implement the plan and getting the 
cooperative off the ground. 
Because of the need to slim the business down, and the additional time 
for planning and preparation that is available, SCDC generally favour 
'phoenix' co-operatives to 'rescues'. One very experienced former 
staff member has estimated that for every 10 occasions when they make 
contact with the workforce of an enterprise that is being closed, on 
roughly 5 occasions the discussions will be very quickly abandoned 
(usually because of a combination of poor prospects and workforce 
reservations); on a further 4 occasions the option will be seriously 
explored but will not in the end be achieved; and on only one occasion 
will a co-operative start trading. When a WTO cannot be achieved it 
is usually for a combination of reasons, but the absence of people 
able - or with the confidence - to undertake managerial roles commonly 
contributes. On occasions, SCDC has attempted to overcome this 
problem by seconding one of its own staff into the co-operative on an 
interim basis . 
Once the new co-operative is established SCDC development officers 
will stay in close touch and provide further advice and assistance for 
the crucial early years. For example, in recent years SCDC has 
encouraged such co-operatives to lease from them (at a very modest 
charge) a simple micro-computer with a basic accounting package pre-
pared to their requirements, for which initial training is provided. 
Not only does this ensure that the co-operative has the financial 
information it needs, but it means that when SCDC staff visit they too 
can be kept well informed. 
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